Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

112. Telegram 178 From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State¹

Brussels, January 16, 1975, 1600Z.

178. Subj: TTBT–PNE Negotiations and EnMod Discussions: Letter to NAC. Ref: State 10042 (Notal).

In accordance with instructions in State 10042 (Notal), Mission sent letter to SYG and copies to PermReps on January 16, 1975. Text of letter follows:

Begin text:

Dear Joseph:

The purpose of this letter is to summarize for you and other Council members the negotiations on an agreement governing nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs) in accordance with Article III of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), and discussions pursuant to the U.S.-Soviet joint statement of July 3, 1974, on the subject of environmental warfare, both of which were recently begun in Moscow.

Article III of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty provided that “underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes shall be governed by an agreement which is to be negotiated and concluded by the parties at the earliest possible time.”

The first round of these negotiations took place in Moscow from October 7 until November 6, 1974.

The principal tasks of the U.S. delegation were to elicit Soviet views and proposals on the content of the PNE agreement and to obtain a better understanding of the nature of the Soviet PNE program. During the negotiations the U.S. delegation stressed that any PNE agreement must satisfy the following criteria:

(I) PNEs must not provide weapon-related benefits otherwise precluded or limited by the TTBT.

(II) The fact PNE activities are not contributing to such benefits must be adequately verifiable.

(III) The agreement must be consistent with existing treaty obligations, including in particular the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).

In addition to elaborating on these basic criteria, the U.S. delegation presented details of its PNE program, noting in particular that it is very limited in scope; the Soviet program appears to be much broader. The U.S. delegation stated that prospects for the future involve only the possibility of a few experiments using contained PNEs. With respect to verification, the U.S. delegation took the position that, for all PNEs, information on the yield, purpose, depth of burial, geographical coordinates and geology of the explosion site, including basic physical properties of the rock, should be provided with observers confirming as much of this information as possible.

In the Moscow negotiations, the following principal features of the Soviet position emerged:

(I) They asserted that there should be no limits on the yields or numbers of PNEs, claiming that this was consistent with the obligations of NPT Article V. They proposed that the time, location, yield and purpose of PNEs greater than 150KT. be provided prior to the event, with actual yield and results provided afterward. For PNEs with yields greater than about 50–70 KT., but below 150 KT., similar pre-shot data would be provided, but added data would be provided only for cases where they considered that the yield might be assessed as above the threshold. For PNEs below 50–70 KT., verification would rely on national technical means.

(II) They proposed a “broad” agreement of cooperation with the U.S. in PNEs, in which the TTBT Article III verification provisions would be embedded. They stated that the agreement might include a joint commission on cooperation in PNEs, exchanges of information, instruments and technical personnel, joint scientific R&D work in the institutes of both countries and joint PNE projects in third countries in accordance with Article V of the NPT. They are also attempting to tie the degree of cooperation involved in the “narrow” task of verification under Article III of the TTBT to how “broad” an agreement the U.S. will accept. Soviet delegation Chairman Morokhov remarked that if the PNE agreement is narrowly confined to Article III considerations then only “minimum” verification information would be provided.

(III) The Soviets agreed in principle at the July Summit that U.S. observers could be present for at least some PNEs, but, as reported to the NAC by Secretary Kissinger on December 12, in the first round of these negotiations their delegation backed away from this understanding. Morokhov stated that he could not tell us whether or not the Soviets now favor arrangements for observers. The Soviet delegation indicated that the verification information to be obtained by observers would be routinely available to participants or “representatives” in joint PNE projects. They did not, however, rule out an Article III agreement dealing with verification matters only.

(IV) The Soviets also discussed their current PNE program and listed several applications that might be undertaken in the future.

The U.S. delegation noted that the Soviet listing of PNE applications did not include any contained PNEs above 100 KT. and offered, on an ad referendum basis, to accept a 100 KT. limit on contained PNEs provided adequate verification, including observers, were assured. The Soviet delegation did not accept this proposal. They stated among other reasons that some contained applications might eventually require much larger yields. The TTBT/PNE negotiations are now in a working recess. They are expected to resume about February 10.

At the July 1974 U.S.–USSR Summit meeting, the U.S. agreed with the Soviets to advocate effective measures to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes. The two sides agreed to meet bilaterally to explore the problem. Pursuant to the summit statement, U.S. and Soviet representatives met in Moscow from November 1 through November 5. The objectives of the U.S. delegation were:

(I) To explore and assess the nature and scope of Soviet interest in measures to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes;

(II) To assess the prospect of eventually arriving at a common approach, and to make clear to the Soviet side that such an approach cannot be expected on the basis of the draft convention the Soviet Union introduced in the UN General Assembly.

During the meeting the Soviets repeatedly pressed the U.S. side to accept their draft or to table a draft on its own. They emphasized that prohibited activities should be specified in detail and include research and development. The U.S. side made clear the unacceptability of the Soviet draft as a basis for the discussions. The delegation stressed the need, as the first step, to agree on a satisfactory conceptual approach to defining the subject matter of any measures; and for differentiating measures concerned with this matter from other arms control problems, the environmental effects of weapons, and other “environmental” problems. It was made clear that in the U.S. view consideration of a convention, including the degree of detail required, at this exploratory stage was premature.

With regard to conceptual approach, the U.S. side proposed that the subject matter under discussion be defined as “efforts to release or manipulate, through the use of environmental modification techniques, natural processes or forces for purposes of destruction or disruption directed against an adversary.” In particular, the U.S. delegation suggested that the use for military purposes of such techniques which could have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects should fall within the purview of any proposed ban.

The U.S. delegation also sought clarification of the intended scope of the Soviet draft convention, which refers to “military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health.” The Soviet side indicated that this language was designed to cover all possible hostile uses of environmental modification techniques, whether or not they were conducted in a declared war. They made clear that incidental effects of civilian applications would not be included.

In response to the Soviet proposal for a ban on research and development of environmental modification techniques, the U.S. side stated that a broad prohibition of R&D was not practical. The delegation pointed out the intrinsically dual (civil or military) applicability of much research on environmental modification and the likely impracticability of verifying a broad prohibition on research and development for military purposes.

In the course of the meeting, the sides also examined the state of scientific and technical research in various areas of environmental modification.

From the point of view of both sides the exchange of opinions in Moscow was useful for clarification and reaching agreement on positions in the future. It was agreed to hold further consulations in Washington at a later date. These consulations [omission in the original]

I am sending copies of this letter to our colleagues on the Council.

End text.

Bruce

1. Summary: The mission reported that at the Department’s request, it had sent a letter to NATO Secretary General Luns summarizing both the TTBT/PNE and environmental modification negotiations in Moscow.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret. Repeated to all NATO capitals and Moscow. All brackets are in the original except those indicating omissions in the original text. In telegram 10042 to USNATO, January 15, the Department instructed the Mission to prepare the letter for Luns. (Ibid., D750016–0220)