Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

107. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 6, 1975, 12:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• President Gerald Ford
• Dr. Fred C. Iklé, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
• Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

President: Happy New Year.

Iklé: I have a bit of good news. The Senate has ratified the Geneva Protocol. A signing ceremony would show that the Legislature and Executive are now cooperating.

Another issue: The danger of nuclear proliferation. The Congress is very worried. Brazil, Argentina, Pakistan, Libya all may be looking around. South Korea also. A number of efforts are under way. We are trying to deal with the export of nuclear materials. Action is slow because the French are obnoxious.

What this comes down to is a number of hard decisions which may come at a price. For example, the Italians are holding back from signing the NPT. Some never will sign. But if it begins to unravel we could be accused of not doing enough.

President: How many potentials have not signed?

Iklé: Most of them. But if we could show motion with Italy, it might keep a sense of momentum.

President: What nuclear powers haven’t signed?

Iklé: France and the PRC. But the PRC has not exported material. I bring this up to show that things have to be done. We are preparing a package for you of things which have to be done.

President: I think the success of getting the Senate to move was excellent and I congratulate you. I haven’t focused on a signing ceremony.

Giscard seemed forthcoming on this at Martinique.

Scowcroft: Their team is coming next week. We don’t know what they’re coming with.

Iklé: But maybe if they won’t join a conference we can work with them bilaterally. But France is preparing to export reprocessing plants, and there is no way to prevent diversion of materials from these.

President: Do they have the technical people—Israel, Pakistan, etc.?

Iklé: They are developing it, and the expertise is transferable from other (such as reactor) areas.

President: What do we do now?

Iklé: We must develop proper safeguards, such as we have in the export of reactors to Israel and Egypt.

President: What do they think of Vladivostok?

Iklé: They think the dropping of FBS was real progress. Some of them want the levels brought down and additional limitations added. Most of them feel this is a turning point. It will be important as we flesh out the treaty to deal with verification. We can’t be trapped into promising absolute verification, but within limits. If we promise further negotiations, that will be important in getting the academics on board.

President: But first we must get this one signed. I think the opposition is dying, isn’t it?

Iklé: Several of them want to know how much we will save.

President: If the sense-of-the-Senate resolution about renegotiating goes through, I will tell the Senators they should add a clause promising the five to ten billion dollars that will be necessary if they destroy the agreement by forcing a renegotiation.

Iklé: In the last analysis, few of them will want to destroy the agreement. Do you have time for a minute on MBFR?

President: Yes.

Iklé: The talks are somewhat stalemated. There are three key elements: One, the nuclear package. It shouldn’t follow too closely on Vladivostok. But the Nunn amendment requires the Secretary of Defense to report on reductions in overseas nuclear deployment. Two, the Soviet pressure for European reductions. Three, the connection with CSCE. It would look bad if there were no progress in MBFR. While there is no formal coupling, there is an informal political coupling. We don’t care about CSCE, but we do care about MBFR. It would be embarrassing if one moves without the other.

President: Is MBFR stalemated?

Iklé: We do have tentative agreement on adding air manpower. We may be able to combine stages one and two into one, to help the USSR. In the last analysis, if there is no agreement, we should have at least made a proposal that is convincing to the Congress.

President: I think the new House will be worse than the last. It would be bad to be forced to give something without getting anything in return. With the new Congress reconvening, we have to have a story of pushing hard.

Any change of attitude on the part of the Europeans?

Iklé: The Germans are not pushing for reductions, but as you know, the Brits are. We have to be careful a landslide doesn’t start, because Congress wants American, not European reductions.

President: How about the Threshold Test Ban?

Iklé: The talks start in February. The big issue is PNEs above the threshold. It has implications for the NPT. As a personal judgment, if we can’t get PNEs restricted to below the threshold, we may not want to sign the TTB and submit it to Congress. The Soviets probably wouldn’t want it submitted if it would be defeated.

President: I appreciate your bringing me up to date. I hope we can give Resor some forthcoming recommendations. It would be a disaster to have to give things away without getting anything in return.

Thanks for coming in. Keep me posted through Henry or Brent and I’ll see you at the next NSC meeting.

1. Summary: Iklé updated President Ford and Scowcroft concerning the Senate ratification of the Geneva Protocol and the signatory status of the Non-proliferation Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

   Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 281, Memcons, Presidential File. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. At the end of Iklé’s first comments, an unknown hand wrote: “[A ceremony was held on January 22.]” On January 22, Ford signed the instruments of ratification for the Geneva Protocol at a White House ceremony; for his remarks, see Document 114.