73. Telegram 3953 From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State, June 3, 1975, 0725Z.1 2

TELEGRAM
Department of State
VIENTIANE 3953

O 030725Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4208

VIENTIANE 3953

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB DEPT
PASS BANGKOK FOR HABIB

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EAID, MASS, US, LA

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON FUTURE LAOS POLICY
REF: STATE 127430

1.
I HAVE HAD THOROUGH DISCUSSIONS WITH MISSION STAFF DURING MY VISIT TO VIENTIANE AND HAVE ALSO HAD BENEFIT OF THINKING OF PRIME MINISTER SOUVANNA PHOUMA AND FOREIGN MINISTER PHOUMI VONGVICHIT. THE PRIMARY REQUIREMENT FOR OUR MISSION HERE IS POLICY GUIDANCE ON WHERE WE ARE HEADED IN LAOS. THE MISSION HAS DONE EXTREMELY WELL UNDER VERY TRYING CIRCUMSTANCES OVER THE PAST MONTH BUT IS CONFRONTED NOW WITH A SITUATION WHICH REQUIRES THE MOST URGENT DECISIONS FROM WASHINGTON. A GREAT DEAL OF THIS STEMS FROM THE PRACTICAL TAKEOVER OF THE PGNU BY THE PATHET LAO AT THE OPERATING LEVEL AND WITH ALL MILITARY STRENGTH UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL.
2.
I CONCLUDE THAT THE PRIMARY IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO CLEAR THE DECKS OF PAST PROGRAMS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, THUS PERMITTING A REDUCTION OF MISSION STAFF TO A LEAN, 50-ODD LEVEL. COMPLETE TERMINATION OF AID AND MAP PROGRAMS IS ESSENTIAL TO THIS OBJECTIVE. EMBASSY IS SUBMITTING ALTERNATIVE PLANS AND TARGET DATES TO GET TO THAT STAFFING LEVEL. IT MAY NOT BE NECESSARY TO HOLD TO THE JUNE 5 TARGET DATE FOR STAFF REDUCTION TO 50, BUT REDUCTION OF PERSONNEL AND TERMINATION OF PREVIOUS AID PROGRAMS SHOULD BE COMPLETED WELL BEFORE JUNE 30. THE ONLY EXCEPTION WOULD BE A CONTINUING FLOW, FOR THE TIME BEING, OF MAP RICE AND (SMALL QUANTITIES) OF MAP POL TO THE FAR UNDER THE FY 75 BUDGET ALLOCATION. THESE COMMODITIES WILL BE NEEDED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE IF WE ARE LITERALLY NOT TO STARVE THE ARMY WHICH WE HAVE SUPPORTED FOR SO LONG, AND THUS AROUSE LAO REACTION WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE THE REMAINDER OF OUR ACTIONS. THE MILITARY AID PROGRAM IS SUCH THAT WE CAN TURN IT OFF ON VERY SHORT NOTICE, AND THAT IS WHAT I PROPOSE WE BE PREPARED TO DO AT JUST THE RIGHT MOMENT WITH REGARD TO OUR OTHER INTERESTS. WE HAVE NO NEED OR DESIRE TO SEE THE FAR RETAINED AS A FORCE. IT IS WORTHLESS FROM ALL MILITARY VIEWPOINTS.
3.
THE USAID SITUATION IS MUCH MORE COMPLICATED. WE HAVE EQUIPMENT, FACILITIES AND PROJECTS SCATTERED ALL OVER. THE MANNER IN WHICH THE PGNU IS APPROACHING THE TURNOVER LEAVES US OPEN TO THE MOST NIGGLING AND UNNECESSARY NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH TAKES A GREAT DEAL OF TIME AND MANY SCARCE MAN-HOURS. IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL IN A MATTER OF DAYS PROVE HOPELESS, EITHER BECAUSE THE PGNU WILL INSIST ON TREATING THE EXTRANEOUS ISSUES THEY INTRODUCED JUNE 2 OR BECAUSE THEY WILL INSIST ON INVENTORYING EVERY LAST ITEM THAT USAID BROUGHT INTO THIS COUNTRY. AT THAT POINT THE ACTING USAID DIRECTOR SHOULD BE ABLE TO WALK OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT ANOTHER WORD AND ABANDON EVERYTHING — ALL USAID ASSETS — WHETHER COVERED BY PROGRAM AGREEMENTS OR NOT; ALL THE FURNITURE; AND ALL THE REAL ESTATE. HE DOES NOT NOW HAVE SUCH AUTHORITY AND SHOULD BE GIVEN IT IMMEDIATELY. (HE IS REQUESTING SUCH AUTHORITY IN A TELEGRAM TO ADMINISTRATOR PARKER JUNE 3.)
4.
MEANWHILE, THE MISSION SHOULD TEST THE ASSURANCE SOUVANNA GAVE ME YESTERDAY AND REPEATED LATER IN PHOUMI’S PRESENCE: THAT MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND OTHER EXTRANEOUS QUESTIONS WILL BE DIVORCED FROM THE TURNOVER NEGOTIATIONS ACTING USAID DIRECTOR RAMSEY IS CONDUCTING WITH AN UNWIELDY TEAM OF 21 FROM MOST OF THE MINISTRIES IN TOWN (HE DOES NOT EVEN HAVE PROJECT AGREEMENTS WITH SOME OF THEM). IF THESE NEGOTIATIONS NOW GO FORWARD AMICABLY AND IN A BUSINESSLIKE MANNER, FINE; IT WILL BE WORTH KEEPING THE 30-PLUS USAID PEOPLE FOR A FEW MORE DAYS, BECAUSE THOSE NOT INVOLVED IN THE MEETING ROOM WITH RAMSEY WILL BE WORKING ON SEVERANCE PAY FOR LOCAL EMPLOYEES, OUTBOUND HHE SHIPMENTS AND SO FORTH. IF THE NEGOTIATIONS BOG DOWN, THE SAME 30-ODD USAID OFFICERS CAN SIMPLY GET ON A PLANE AND LEAVE, PROVIDING AUTHORITY MENTIONED PRECEDING PARAGRAPH HAS BEEN GRANTED.
5.
AT THIS TIME I DO NOT BELIEVE IT WISE TO SEND GALEN STONE HERE WHEN HE IS CONFIRMED, OR IF THE CONFIRMATION HEARINGS HAVE NOT BEGUN THEY MIGHT BE POSTPONED. WE NEED MAKE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT, BUT THAT DECISION SHOULD AWAIT DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS. STONE’S ARRIVAL SHOULD BE DIRECTLY RELATED TO EVIDENCE THAT THE PGNU INTENDS TO BEHAVE IN A MORE RESPONSIBLE MANNER THAN IT HAS RECENTLY, AND WHEN IT APPEARS MORE CERTAIN THAN IS NOW THE CASE THAT THE U.S. WILL HAVE AN ACCEPTABLE AND DIGNIFIED ON-GOING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP WITH LAOS.
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, State Archiving System. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Habib visited Vientiane from June 2 until 3. The Embassy in Laos relayed background papers to Habib in telegrams 3864 and 3876, May 30. (Ibid.)
  2. Habib reported on his visit to Vientiane.