70. Telegram 3300 From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State, May 13, 1975, 1208Z.1 2

TELEGRAM
Department of State
VIENTIANE 3300

R 131208Z May 75
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3799

E.O. 11652: GOS
TAGS: PFOR, LA
SUBJECT: US POLICY TOWARD LAOS

REF: STATE 109710

1.
WE VERY MUCH WELCOMED REFTEL BECAUSE IT IS VERY MUCH IN ACCORD WITH OUR OWN THINKING AND ENUNCIATED POLICY FLOWS VERY WELL FROM POSTURE WE HAVE TAKE OVER PAST TWO-THREE WEEKS. WE HAVE TAKEN LINE, PARTICULARLY WITH SOUVANNA AND PHOUMI, THAT: A) U.S. MAINTAINING SUPPORT FOR PRIME MINISTER AND HIS POLICY OF INSURING A NEUTRAL AND INDEPENDENT LAOS WITHIN VIENTIANE ACCORDS; B) CLIMATE OF INSECURITY PGNU HAD ALLOWED TO DEVELOP HAD HOWEVER RAISED QUESTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING SUCH SUPPORT; C) PGNU COULD NOT ON ONE HAND ASK FOR AID AND ON OTHER HAND ALLOW VERBAL AND PHYSICAL THREATS AGAINST USAID AND AMERICANS TO GO UNANSWERED. (TO PHOUMI AND TO HIS CHIEF DE CABINET SOUBANH I ALSO MADE QUITE CLEAR THAT EVERY DIPLOMATIC OBSERVER IN TOWN BELIEVED THAT THE DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH HAD ATTACKED USAID HAD LPF/PL PATRONAGE. BOTH DISCLAIMED THIS).
2.
WITH REGARD TO THE FUTURE OF OUR AID PROGRAMS AND OF THE NATURE OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN VIENTIANE, OUR THINKING HAS BEEN ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:
A.
WE ASSUME THAT VIENTIANE SIDE, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, [Page 2] NO LONGER EXISTS AS A MEANINGFUL FORCE. NEVERTHELESS, WE ENVISAGE THE CONTINUATION OF A NOMINAL COALITION GOVERNMENT UNDER PRIME MINISTER SOUVANNA, AS FORESEEN BY THE VIENTIANE AGREEMENTS. MANIFESTLY, SUCH A COALITION WILL BE UNDER POLITICAL DOMINATION OF THE LPF. IT WILL FOLLOW A FOREIGN POLICY OF MAINTAINING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ALL “FRIENDLY” COUNTRIES INCLUDING THE U.S. AND WILL SEEK AID FROM ALL SOURCES “WITHOUT CONDITIONS.”, MEANING FEW FOREIGN ADVISERS AND MINIMUM SUPERVISION OF THIS DISPOSITION OF AID. IT WILL FOLLOW AN INTERNAL POLICY OF ESTABLISHING RIGID CONTROLS OVER THE WHOLE COUNTRY AND IN ALL FIELDS.
B.
LPF (WITH FEW EXCEPTION) HAVE VERY LIMITED UNDERSTANDING OF ECONOMIC AND ASSISTANCE PROBLEMS, AND VIEW THESE PRIMARILY IN POLITICAL TERMS. THEY ARE, HOWEVER, CONDITIONED BY A PHILOSOPHY OF NATIONAL AUSTERITY AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY. THEY ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT THIS WILL ENTAIL ON THE WHOLE FEWER SERVICES AND A LESSER STANDARD OF LIVING. (SECSTATE FOR HEALTH KHAMLIENG (LPF) TOLD USAID PUBLIC HEALTH CHIEF WHEN CONSIDERING POSSIBILITY OF CLOSING ON OF HOSPITAL: “LAO WILL HAVE TO REDUCE THEIR EXPECTATIONS AND LEARN TO LIVE MORE SIMPLY.”) THEY ARE SERIOUS ABOUT PUTTING PEOPLE TO WORK — EVEN MOVING URBAN RESIDENTS TO RURAL AREAS FOR THIS PURPOSE — AND THEY PROBABLY CONCEIVE OF FOREIGN AID AS SIMPLY A MATTER OF TURNING EITHER MONEY OR COMMODITIES OVER TO THE GOVERNMENT TO MANAGE AS IT SEES FIT. THEY CERTAINLY WANT TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF FOREIGNERS, PARTICULARLY AMERICANS. SPECIFICALLY, WE BELIEVE THAT THEY WANT ALL AMERICANS OUTSIDE VIENTIANE TO LEAVE AND A VERY MUCH REDUCED USAID MISSION HERE.
C.
THERE IS A PERSPECTIVE ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH A PL-DOMINATED PGNU THAT WE MUST KEEP IN MIND. A GROUP OF 15 COUNTRIES AND SEVEN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MET WITH PGNU REPRESENTATIVES, INCLUDING PL VICE MINISTER OF FINANCE IN MANILA AND EXPRESSED POSITIVE INTEREST IN ECONOMICALLY ASSISTING THE PGNU. ATTITUDES OF OTHER DONORS ABOUT THEIR CONTINUING INTEREST IN PROVIDING SUCH ASSISTANCE CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE INFLUENCED NEGATIVELY [Page 3] OR POSITIVELY BY U.S. ATTITUDE AND ACTIONS VIS-A-VIS THE COMPOSITION OF POLICIES OF THE NEW PGNU. AN IMMEDIATE AND PUBLICLY NOTICEABLE REDUCTION IN USAID PROGRAM SHOULD GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THE THEORY THAT THE AMERICANS WERE WILLING TO SUPPORT THE PGNU ONLY SO LONG AS ITS “IMPERIALIST LACKEYS,” THE RECENTLY DEPARTED SENIOR VIENTIANE SIDE LEADERSHIP, WERE PART OF THE COALITION GOVERNMENT. THIS ATTITUDE WAS MADE VERY CLEAR TO ACTING USAID DIRECTOR RAMSEY BY ONE OF THE LEADERS IN THE “21 ORGANIZATIONS” GROUP IN A MEETING LATE AFTERNOON ON MAY 9, FOLLOWING THE DEMONSTRATION AT THE U.S. EMBASSY. SOME THINKING GROUPS IN LAOS CONSIDER CONTINUANCE OF AID A TEST OF U.S. SINCERITY AND GOOD INTENTIONS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE U.S. WILL HELP LAOS TO DEVELOP IN PEACE AS MUCH AS IT HELPED RLG SURVIVE IN WAR.
D.
ON THE BASIS OF THE ABOVE AND THE FURTHER ASSUMPTION THAT THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST LIES PRINCIPALLY IN MAINTAINING A NEUTRAL AND INDEPENDENT LAOS AS A BUFFER STATE, THE COUNTRY TEAM CONSIDERS THAT THE ROLE OF U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE SHOULD SHIFT IN EMPHASIS. FIRST, WE SHOULD FULFILL ALL ONGOING USAID COMMITMENTS UNLESS PGNU ASKS US TO DO OTHERWISE. SECOND, NO NEW ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS WILL BE UNDERTAKEN EXCEPT AT THE SPECIFIC REQUEST OF THE PGNU UNDER NEW GROUND RULES THAT INEVITABLY WILL EVOLVE. WE SHOULD ALLOW RECOGNITION OF NEED FOR NEW ASSISTANCE TO BE GENERATED FROM WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND THEN UNDERTAKE AN OVERALL NEGOTIATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF PROGRAMS AND OUR FUTURE USAID MISSION WITH THE PRINCIPAL MINISTERS, INCLUDING THE FOREIGN MINISTER. THEORETICALLY, THIS COURSE COULD LEAD TO ELIMINATION OF OUR USAID MISSION AND A PHASEOUT OF OUR AID. WE SHOULD ACCEPT THIS POSSIBILITY COLD BLOODEDLY. THIRD, THE U.S. WILL, AS A MATTER OF POLICY, ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST OTHER DONORS, PARTICULARLY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES, IN CARRYING OUT HUMANITARIAN, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN LAOS THAT THEY NEGOTIATE WITH THE PGNU.
E.
AS REGARDS MILITARY ASSISTANCE, WE RECOGNIZE AT PRESENT NO RPT NO OBJECTIVE THAT IT CAN SERVE UNDER [Page 4] THE NEW PGNU. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT FOR THE TIME BEING, RPT FOR THE TIME BEING, WE SHOULD MAINTAIN AS IN THE PAST THE FLOW OF CONSUMABLES: RICE, POL, AND MEDICINE. (WE HAVE ALREADY STOPPED DELIVERY OF AMMUNITION AND MILITARY HARDWARE.) TO CUT OFF THESE COMMODITIES ABRUPTLY WOULD MEAN THAT SOME 50,000 ARMED MEN AND THEIR FAMILIES WOULD BE SUDDENLY WITHOUT SUPPORT WHICH THE PGNU COULD NOT EASILY CONTROL, AND WHICH COULD IMMEDIATELY BE TURNED AGAINST ALL AMERICAN PERSONNEL.
F.
WE SHALL SEND SPECIFIC AND DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS SEPARATELY BY USAID AND DAO CHANNELS. WE SHALL ALSO SEND OTHER MESSAGES ON THE PROPOSED SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF A U.S. MISSION IN VIENTIANE.

CHAPMAN

  1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 12, Laos, State Department Telegrams, To SECSTATE, Nodis. Secret; Nodis. Telegram 109710 is Document 69. The Department of State report, “Issues Paper on Laos,” May 14, prepared by Rives and Henderson, contains lengthy coverage of the situation in Laos. According to a covering memorandum, May 14, the Department prepared the report, not published, for Secretary Kissinger’s May 15 meeting with President Ford. Kissinger and Ford did not discuss the topic on May 15. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 12, Laos)
  2. Chapman responded to telegram 109710 from the Department of State on the future of U.S. policy toward Laos.