416. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, March 5, 1976, 8:05 a.m.1 2
In Attendance - Friday, 3/5/76
Secretary of State Kissinger - Chairman
D - Mr. Ingersoll
P - Mr. Sisco
E - Mr. Robinson
T - Mr.
Maw
M - Mr. Eagleburger
C - Mr. Sonnenfeldt
AF - Mr.
Schaufele
ARA - Mr. Rogers
EA - Mr. Habib
EUR - Mr.
Lowenstein (Acting)
NEA - Mr. Atherton
INR - Mr.
Saunders
S/P - Mr. Lord
EA - Mr. Greenwald
S/PRS - Mr.
Funseth
PM - Mr. Vest
IO - Mr. Lewis
H - Mr. McCloskey
L
- Mr. Leigh
S/S - Mr. Borg
S - Mr. Barbian
[Omitted is material unrelated to Thailand.]
MR. SCHAUFELE: Phil?
MR. HABIB: We have an incipient problem developing in Thailand, which you’re aware of. The Thai are setting certain conditions for the retention of our residual force in Thailand which are just not acceptable, and we’re going to have to do something.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Like what?
MR. HABIB: They’re wanting us to agree to their definition of what community troops we would retain before they will agree to their retention.
Now, this is in effect a welching on a previous agreement they made with us. The Prime Minister indicated himself the procedures that we’re following that are acceptable, but the bureaucrats have gotten into the act and it’s an attempt to sort of wipe the slate clean on previous agreements and say that they want new agreements governing the presence of our troops.
(Secretary Kissinger is handed message and thereupon [Page 3] leaves room. He returns to conference room several minutes later.)
MR. HABIB: Further on that, what we’re doing is convening sort of a stump group from Defense and ourselves to go over this today to see just how far we can go to meet their needs on the privileged remaining community troops.
In other words, what we can’t do is have any conditions under which our troops are there. Otherwise they could just arrest them; we would have no juridical basis for the privileges and amenities of our men. And it could be a substantial problem in terms of a residual force.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: But why are they doing it? What’s their real reason?
MR. HABIB: We have a strong feeling that the bureaucracy is not satisfied with what has been negotiated politically on the residual force. They haven’t been satisfied for many years in the way we deal with the Thai Government. They’re trying to regularize —
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ours or theirs?
MR. HABIB: Theirs — very definitely theirs. (Laughter.) There’s no question it’s theirs. We thought [Page 4] it was all nailed down, and what they’re trying to do is to require us to agree to their version of what privileges and amenities will be granted to our troops. And they’re just not acceptable because what it would do is to allow them to be tried quite freely by the Thai courts. It would remove all free privileges. It could create a situation which our people are not prepared to handle there on the troops question. And it could, in effect, threaten the continuing presence of the residual force there.
There’s no question about that because at least the Thai bureaucracy is being very hard-nosed. They’re saying, “If you don’t agree to this by March 20th, then all the troops will have to go.” Now, the Prime Minister — we can’t believe they mean it. The Prime Minister is saying that.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Ambassador doesn’t want to go to the Prime Minister?
MR. HABIB: No. As a matter of fact, he did go to him and he did get the Prime Minister to agree to what he wants.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Just a minute. Three weeks ago?
[Page 5]MR. HABIB: No. He went four days ago.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Did he go back?
MR. HABIB: Well, that’s the first thing we’re going to do — have him go back to the Prime Minister and tell the Prime Minister what’s going on and see if he can get him to enforce the different —
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, if the Prime Minister agreed to it, what’s the sense of fighting with the bureaucracy?
MR. HABIB: That’s the problem, because you’re in the midst of an election and the Prime Minister is reluctant to fight the bureaucracy because in the meantime the bureaucracy is leaking the thing to the press.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: It’s almost inconceivable. (Laughter.) It’s so hard to feel your way into such a system of government.
MR. HABIB: The leader of the bureaucratic group got in touch with the Ambassador to Washington, who learned a few lessons. (Laughter.)
It’s going to be a difficult thing, but we’ll have a paper up to you before the day is over indicating what we think should be the initial step. And the first step should be to go back to the Prime Minister. At least, that’s [Page 6] my feeling.
Defense and CIA are very much involved in this thing because of the nature of the residual force, and we’ll consult with them.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: But you will have a recommendation by the end of the day.
MR. HABIB: I hope so. We’re meeting this afternoon, and I’ll get something up to you by the end of the day or the first thing in the morning.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The first thing in the morning I won’t be here.
MR. HABIB: Then we’ll get it up to you later.
[Omitted is material unrelated to Thailand.]