410. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 17, 1975, 11:21–11:40 a.m.1 2
Senior Review Group Meeting
October 17, 1975
Part II of II
Time and Place: 11:21 a.m. - 11:40 a.m., White House Situation Room
Subject: Force Reductions in Thailand Participants:
Chairman: Henry A. Kissinger
STATE: Robert Ingersoll
Philip
Habib
Robert Miller
Richard B. Finn
DOD: William
Clements
Amos Jordan
Morton Abramowitz
JCS: Gen. George S.
Brown
Lt. Gen. William E. Smith
CIA: William Colby
William
Christison
Theodore Shackley
NSC: Lt. Gen. Brent
Scowcroft
Thomas J. Barnes
Col. Clinton E. Granger
Michael
Hornblow
Secretary Kissinger: We do not need a long session. In our discussions we don’t want to be driven by the Embassy and the latest hysterical outburst by the Thais. I just want us to understand what we want to do. Bill, do you have a briefing?
(Mr. Colby briefed from the attached text. )
Secretary Kissinger: As I understand it this paper gives three options. The first provides for 3800 personnel spaces, the second for 300 spaces and the third for 3000 spaces. The first two do not seem to be real options. My first question is -- what are we trying to accomplish in Thailand?
Mr. Colby: [text not declassified]
Gen. Brown: [text not declassified]
Secretary Kissinger: The option for 300 spaces is an eyewash option -- right?
Gen. Brown: I hope option two is not a serious option.
Secretary Kissinger: Option #1 you don’t want to do. Option #2 is absurd and thus we are driven to Option #3.
Mr. Habib: Everybody agrees that Option #3 is the most desirable option. We have been saying this for months.
Secretary Kissinger: Why is it wrong to keep a small combat unit?
Mr. Colby: The Prime Minister doesn’t want it.
Gen. Scowcroft: The problem is that he has publicly said it.
Mr. Habib: In fact they don’t want all of us out.
Secretary Kissinger: What would we get out of 6 F-4’s at Utapao?
[Page 3]Gen. Brown: If we were to have another Mayaguez incident or something else the capabilities of expansion would be there if we ever wanted it.
Secretary Kissinger: Why not try for it?
Gen. Brown: Our druthers would be to keep it there. However, its utility is not high and the conditions under which we use it are not good.
Mr. Habib: In negotiating with the Thais we should go in only for what we really want. They may resist our keeping U-2’s at Utapao but they could be brought around.
Secretary Kissinger: Option #2 is absurd and I don’t understand why it is in there.
Mr. Habib: The options were set up four months ago.
Secretary Kissinger: The difference between Options 1 and 3 is that Option 3 calls for [text not declassified] 6 F-4’s. The F-4’s are the only issue. The question is do we maintain a small combat capability if the Thais let us. Phil says that even asking the Thais this would cost us.
Mr. Habib: There is no point in asking for something we don’t use. The P-3’s are more important.
Secretary Kissinger: Do we want to stand by and drop our combat capability in East Asia? Why do we have to lead the charge of getting our combat units out of Southeast Asia? If the Thais asked us we would have no choice.
Mr. Habib: They have asked us.
Secretary Kissinger: About the F-4’s?
Mr. Habib: We should not let the F-4’s interfere with other more significant things we need.
[Page 4]Secretary Kissinger: Should we work through the Foreign Minister when he comes here on a visit?
Mr. Habib: No. We should work through Khukrit. Ambassador Whitehouse will go in for a talk.
Secretary Kissinger: Would the discussion be based on Option #3 or #1.
Mr. Colby: I am principally concerned with Ramasun.
Secretary Kissinger: Shouldn’t we assume the initiative and bring this up quietly with the Thais?
Mr. Colby: You always have the danger of [text not declassified] Chatchai going to the press.
Mr. Habib: I agree. [text not declassified]
Gen. Scowcroft: How about an approach to the military?
Mr. Habib: Yes, but what would the traffic bear regarding a U.S. military presence, and what would the Thai reaction be to our approach? The 6 F-4’s just don’t give us anything.
Gen. Brown: Don’t forget we still have the 7th Fleet and that is much more important that the F-4’s.
Secretary Kissinger: Bill, could you get us a study analyzing what the Thai reaction would be to our approach on the F-4’s.
Mr. Colby: Their perception of the situation is not dictated by the 6 F-4’s. I can get something to you in a few days. But speaking off the top of my head I can tell you if we were to approach Khukrit he would be concerned about the combat presence and would be worried also because he does not want to stir up the streets.
Mr. Habib: We are now in a good position to get the things we want. Let’s not mess things up by asking for things we don’t want. Option #3 has some very plausible arguments in it. Now is the time to move.
[Page 5]Gen. Brown: Yes. I read a cable from Whitehouse saying that time is working against us.
Mr. Habib: The quickest and best deal we can get is Option #3.
Secretary Kissinger: Let me think about it for a couple of days.
- Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–24, Meeting Minutes, SRG, June–October 1975. Top Secret. The text of Colby’s briefing on the situation in Thailand, October 16, is attached but not published. A message from Scowcroft to Kissinger, October 20, contains the response to Kissinger’s request to Colby for an analysis of the likely Thai reaction to a continued U.S. combat presence. Colby estimated that Thailand would reject a U.S. combat presence beyond March 1976. (Backchannel telegram 51999, October 21, from Scowcroft to Kissinger; ibid., National Security Adviser, Trip briefing Books and Cables for HAK, Kissinger Trip File, Box 15, October 19–23, 1975, People’s Republic of China, TOSEC [5]) ↩
- The Senior Review Group met to discuss force reductions in Thailand.↩