395. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, February 6, 1975, 8 a.m.1 2

Secretary’s 8:00 a.m. Staff Meeting
Thursday, February 6, 1975

PRESENT:
THE SECRETARY OF STATE - HENRY A. KISSINGER
D - Mr. Ingersoll
E - Mr. Robinson
T - Mr. Maw
M - Ambassador Brown
C - Mr. Sonnenfeldt
AF - Mr. Mulcahy, Acting
ARA - Mr. Rogers
EA - Mr. Habib
EUR - Mr. Hartman
NEA - Mr. Atherton
INR - Mr. Hyland
S/P - Mr. Lord
EB - Mr. Boeker, Acting
S/PRS - Mr. Anderson
PM - Mr. Vest
IO - Ambassador Blake, Acting
H - Mr. Jenkins, Acting
L - Mr. Leigh
S/S - Mr. Springsteen

[Page 2]

[Omitted is material unrelated to Thailand and Burma.]

MR. HABIB: I have got a lot of other things. But I just want to say one short thing. While our attention is focused on Cambodia and Vietnam — we should also be aware that there are all sorts of things going on in places like Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Burma, which are all in some position of impending difficultly.

[Page 3]

In Thailand, for example, you are about to get the greatest rip-off of an election I have ever seen with the military-backed parties ganging up and appearing to be — they are going to exclude the party that won the greatest share of the votes. That is not yet firm. But that looks to be in the making.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can we stay out of that one?

MR. HABIB: We not only can but we must stay out of it. But by staying out it means we must not support any of the military efforts to make this kind of rigmarole.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What does that mean?

MR. HABIB: I always worry about who is talking to the military in a place like that. But I will follow up on it — who might be urging them on. We have always had a very friendly relationship with the military in Thailand. They are easier to see. They all speak English.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But why the hell can’t we — why is it such a disaster for us if the military —

MR. HABIB: It is not going to be a disaster for us. What will probably happen is you will get this new government on some basis of stable internal support. It is going to be immediately launched in a period in which it will receive considerable and substantial resistance from within the entire body politic. It is their problem.

[Page 4]

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That depends on the perception of the Thai body politic — which may not be true.

MR. HABIB: No. I think the party that did as well as that democratic party in the election, if it is frozen out of power, will not sit still.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is it going to do f it does not sit still?

MR. HABIB: You have the whole business of students, who are sitting and waiting in the wings.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Only as long as they are not opposed. I don’t think Thai students are more heroic than ours. This is the first time I hear of it. It is one of the great values of these staff meetings —- that I get informed on current problems.

MR. HABIB: Well, the latest development happened last night. Unless you got up seven o’clock in the morning and read the cable, you would not know about this one. Until today the coalition has been put together, including the major party. Last night there was a rapid move, including the purchase of a substantial number of votes in the National Assembly by —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Outrageous. We cannot sit still for this.

[Page 5]

MR. HABIB: I think it is fascinating.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The first time in history this has happened.

MR. HABIB: Yes— in some ways you are right, It is the first time in Thai history it happened because they have not had the kind of circumstances, not because they haven’t got the proclivities.

But the Philippines is another problem.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is going on there?

MR. HABIB: The rebellion is getting serious. Marcos is quite concerned. They are now approaching us for arms to equip separate battalions.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is our position — conciliation and not confrontation?

MR. HABIB: That cable also came in just early this morning.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Do we say conciliation and not confrontation with the rebels?

MR. HABIB: He tried conciliation in a meeting.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No — just to get you know my sympathy. I was being sarcastic. I am in favor of giving him arms.

MR. HABIB: I would be prepared to promote [Page 6] conciliation if possible.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I want you to promote giving him arms.

MR. HABIB: This is one of those circumstances that unless he shows a bit of strength —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I agree with you.

MR. HABIB: — he is not going to resolve this question; especially when the rebels are getting their arms from Libya.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Sullivan can’t be ambassador somewhere without having a war. Did you ship him his uniform?

MR. HABIB: He doesn’t get any uniform for this.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What are you doing about arms?

MR. HABIB: These are battalion level, small arms. They are willing to pay cash for them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In what time frame can you do it?

MR. HABIB: Tomorrow.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is going on in Korea?

MR. HABIB: In Korea you have the referendum due on 12 February, a referendum in which everybody [Page 7] stands up and says “We think he is just great.” The referendum is very interesting. Nobody can stand up and say that you cannot vote for that referendum. Everybody is allowed to vote. By law you are prohibited to campaign against the referendum, to make any public statement against it, to have a meeting against it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Like the Democratic caucus.

MR. HABIB: So we have about ten days to two weeks of some problems of internal politics. But he will keep the Army tight enough so it won’t get completely out of hand.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But what is the point of a referendum?

MR. HABIB: It shows that it is democratic and the people support him.

MR. MAW: He wouldn’t tell anybody what day it was going to be.

MR. HABIB: By law you only have to tell them ten days in advance. He gave them eleven days. That’s not bad. But in any event, quietly, in its own little way, Burma is also under martial law. But nobody pays much attention to Burma. And we really don’t worry much about that. Except for Congressman Wolfe who worries about [Page 8] the narcotics.

I always talk to you about Vietnam and Cambodia. I thought I would talk to you about something else.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But you start from the presupposition that it is in American foreign policy interest to intervene in martial law cases.

MR. HABIB: I never said that. I just wanted to add to the current briefing. As a matter at fact, I think in every one of these cases, except in the case of the Philippines, where there is some action for us to take, in all the others there is no action for us to take.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Who is our Ambassador in Burma?

MR. HABIB: Dave Osborn

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh, yes.

[Omitted is material unrelated to Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, and Korea.]

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 6. Secret.
  2. Kissinger and his staff discussed the situations in Thailand and Burma.