383. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 22, 1974, 10 a.m.1 2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 21, 1974

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador William Kintner
General Brent Scowcroft
W.R. Smyser

DATE, TIME, PLACE: May 22, 1974; 10:00 a.m.
The White House

Ambassador Kintner said that he had been very disturbed when he had learned that the press had found out about our P–3’s flying from Thailand to Diego Garcia. He said we had told some Thai about this but not very many, so that it came as a surprise in Bangkok. He said he would worry because there were lots of skeletons in the closets in Thailand where one or another office had made some arrangement which only a few Thai officials knew. Any of those skeletons might pop up at any moment and it was impossible to control them because there was no central office in the Mission or in the Thai government that had a complete record.

Ambassador Kintner thought it might be better for the P–3’s to fly out of Singapore. He thought the Singapore government was more interested in Diego Garcia than the Thai, and might therefore be more receptive.

General Scowcroft said that the NSC had not been advised of the P–3 flights. We were in the dark on this and were very surprised when it came up.

In a more general vein, Ambassador Kintner observed that there was a large gap between what we asked of Thailand and what we were prepared to offer. He said we were pouring a lot of money into Indochina but much less into Thailand and the Thai were well aware of the difference.

General Scowcroft said that he agreed there was a gap between our aid to Thailand and our expectations or our hopes for Thai cooperation. He said he hoped the Thai would understand that the Indochina countries were at war and therefore had larger needs.

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Ambassador Kintner said that the cutback in our MAP program was a particular problem. It looks as though we will be cutting Thai money very drastically.

General Scowcroft said that we were at the bottom of the barrel with our aid money and were simply not in a position to give more. We had the same problem everywhere, not just in Thailand.

Ambassador Kintner observed that we were now even being difficult about giving Thailand formal title to a destroyer escort vessel that they had been using on loan for years. He said this seemed particularly questionable, since the amount involved was only $84,000.

General Scowcroft said we were looking into this and would try to help.

Ambassador Kintner also said he would like to be able to have Thailand get another squadron of OV–10’s.

General Scowcroft said this was difficult because the Air Force was still buying OV–10’s.

Ambassador Kintner wondered whether it might be possible for the Air Force to shift its planning requirements, temporarily reducing the number of OV–10’s in its planning inventory for one year and then raising them again after we have given some of the aircrafts to Thailand.

General Scowcroft observed he was not certain that this would work.

Ambassador Kintner asked if we had yet made our plans on how many forces we would pull out of Thailand over the next dry season. He felt that by 1976 we should have closed or put on a standby basis all our bases except Utapao and Sattahip. He thought that we could get reentry rights if we need them and that we should be planning for a considerable reduction next year. He asked if this was in accord with NSC views.

General Scowcroft said that he believed we might want to rotate units in and out and that this might be even better than keeping them in Thailand.

Ambassador Kintner asked if Dr. Kissinger agreed with this. He also thought it should be discussed with Secretary Schlesinger.

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General Scowcroft agreed.

Ambassador Kintner said he felt we should also make up our minds what we wanted for a permanent presence in Thailand. He asked if any studies had been done on this.

General Scowcroft observed that we were asking for some figures on this.

Ambassador Kintner then outlined a plan for using hydrogen as an energy source. The plan had been developed by a Thai inventor. He said that he had sent General Haig a note on it and hoped that it would be taken seriously.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 566, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Volume 11, October 1973–. Secret. Drafted by Smyser. Froebe’s talking points for Scowcroft, May 21, are ibid.
  2. Scowcroft and Kintner discussed U.S.-Thai relations.