Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

373. Memorandum From John A. Froebe and William L. Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 20, 1973.¹ ²

Washington, July 20, 1973

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION

July 20, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. [JAF initialed]
WILLIAM L. STEARMAN [WLS initialed]

SUBJECT: U.S. Military Presence in Thailand

At Tab A is a draft State cable instructing Embassy Bangkok to respond to recent increasing Thai Government (RTG) pressures for a reduced U.S. military presence after the Cambodia bombing halt August 15 by undertaking a dialogue with the RTG on this question.

Since the August 15 Congressional moratorium on bombing in Cambodia was passed, the RTG has made increasingly clear to us, both publicly and privately, that they want a reduction in our military presence in Thailand to follow the bombing halt.

• — About two weeks ago a high-level RTG Foreign Ministry official told our Charge that the RTG, while not wanting to eliminate the U.S. military presence, did want to “regularize” it, and, as soon as possible, to reduce it.
• — On July 11 the Deputy Foreign Minister stated RTG policy on this point: “Should there be a cessation of bombing, the strength of American military forces would have to be reduced.”
• — On July 18, the RTG formally asked for our response to three questions (Bangkok 11025 at Tab B):
• — What are U.S. intentions regarding Cambodia after August 15?
• — What are U.S. intentions regarding future use of air bases in Thailand?
• — What are U.S. plans for re-equipping Thai armed forces? (This development occurred after the State draft cable came to us for clearance. State is preparing a separate reply to the first and third questions, but believes strongly that a reply on our military presence in Thailand should not be delayed. We agree.)

The RTG has not been specific as to the size, timing or rate of a reduction in our military presence, noting only that it should be “orderly and gradual.”

RTG motivation for the requested reduction probably centers on:

• — The need to dampen domestic political criticism, which has been on the increase since early this year. Our continued sizeable military presence in the face of the Vietnam settlement has provided one issue that former officials such as Thanat and students have seized on to attack the government.
• — Our military presence as one factor in the current RTG reassessment of Thai foreign policy in the light of the Indochina settlement, U.S. Congressional restrictions on our military efforts there and military assistance generally, and Thai efforts to normalize relations with Peking and Hanoi.
• — A continued RTG effort to extract a higher price for our military presence, particularly in the face of decreasing U.S. military assistance.

The draft State cable instructs Ambassador Unger to initiate a dialogue with the RTG on a possible reduction in our military presence after August 15 to avoid having the RTG levy specific demands for a reduction on us. He is cautioned that we must not give Hanoi indications subject to misinterpretation. The specific points to be made to the RTG are:

• — The USG is presently reviewing the level of our military presence in Thailand, not wanting to maintain a level in excess of that required by our common interests.
• — In light of changing security conditions in the area, we are tentatively considering the removal from Thailand of a few units for reasons of economy and efficiency, but do not want to do so in a way that will be misinterpreted by Hanoi. (We have made a minor change in the wording of State’s draft on this point to remove the implication that we now have units in Thailand that are of questionable (“marginal”) military value.)
• — We have not yet decided on more substantial future reductions, but contemplate these as soon as security conditions in the area permit. We do, however, want to retain a sufficient capability to respond to foreseeable contingencies.
• — Looking toward the emergence of a more peaceful, stable situation, we believe it is in both our interests to retain some form of limited U.S. presence or contingency basing arrangement in Thailand.

The State draft is acceptable, except that it does not emphasize strongly enough that the maintenance of a U.S. military presence is in Thailand’s security interest as well as that of the U.S. The Thai have a tendency to downplay their own interest in our military presence, probably in order to extract a higher price for this presence. We have included additional language to take care of this defect.

Recommendation:

That you approve the State draft cable at Tab A as amended.
Approve
Disapprove

Concurrences:
Mr. Eagleburger
Col. Pinckney

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Volume 10, 1973–. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. Concurred in by Eagleburger and Pinckney. Kissinger initialed the “approve” option. The Department of State sent Tab A, attached but not published, to the Embassy in Bangkok as telegram 144716, dated July 23. Tab B, July 18, is also attached but not published.
2. Froebe and Stearman reported to Kissinger on the Thai Government’s requests for a reduced U.S. military presence, and they recommended that Kissinger authorize a Department of State telegram in response.