371. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Rush to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 18, 1973.1 2
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 18, 1973
The Honorable
Henry A. Kissinger,
Chairman, Senior Review Group
for NSSM-159,
The White House
Dear Henry:
Pursuant to the provisions of National Security Study Memorandum 159, dated September 9, 1972, I am submitting the enclosed study on “U.S. Counter—insurgency Support for Thailand.”
As directed by NSSM-159, an interagency ad hoc group was organized by Under Secretary of State Curtis W. Tarr to oversee and direct the preparation of this study. Representatives from the National Security Council Staff, the Departments of State and Defense, the Agency for International Development, OMB and the Central Intelligence Agency served as members of the ad hoc group. In addition, they provided staff support both for the preparation of the study and for consultations which took place with the Country Team in Bangkok during the month of November 1972.
The enclosed assessment of the dimensions of the insurgency problem and policy and program choices available to the U.S. Government has been reviewed and endorsed by the participating representatives from the Departments and Agencies having an operational concern with Thailand. All support the primary conclusion of [Page 2] the study — to wit, the insurgency is basically one which the Thais themselves must solve and the U.S. role should be supplementary. The decisive factor in bringing about an effective Thai performance against the insurgency in the future will be the attitude of the Thai leadership. The resources and organization are at hand; the critical element has been and will continue to be the willingness of the Thai leadership to give due attention, emphasis and action to the process of countering the insurgency.
With respect to the nature of the threat from the insurgents, the Central Intelligence Agency has prepared a special study which concludes that the insurgency after seven years of communist effort “remains small, vulnerable and, for the most part, limited to the periphery of the Thai nation and society.” The CIA also notes that future prospects for the insurgency and movement depend in large part on how the Thai Government views and treats it.
As pointed out in the NSSM terms of reference relating to the U.S. role in promoting a more effective Thai counter-insurgency effort, the study concludes that we possess an “uncertain ability to leverage even marginal changes in Thai” direction and performance. The paper assesses various priorities that could be established by the Royal Thai Government in attempting to cope with the problem, future levels of U.S. Government assistance, and possible changes in program emphasis.
I forward this study to you with the recommendation that it be given the earliest possible consideration by the Senior Review Group.
Kindest regards,
Sincerely,
[signed]
Kenneth Rush
Acting
Secretary
Enclosure:
Study on U.S. Counter-insurgency Support for Thailand
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–193, NSSM 159. Secret; Nodis. The paper, dated March 30, is attached but not published. For NSSM 159, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XX, Southeast Asia, 1969–1972, Document 174.↩
- Rush submitted the study on U.S. counterinsurgency support for Thailand written in response to NSSM 159.↩