344. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 10, 1976, 11 a.m.1 2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 10, 1976
11:00 a.m.
The Secretary’s Office

SUBJECT: Military Base Negotiations with the Philippines; the Secretary’s Meeting with General Carlos P. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Philippines, April 12, 1976

Participants:

  • The Secretary
  • Assistant Secretary Philip C. Habib
  • Ambassador William H. Sullivan
  • Mr. Benjamin A. Fleck, Country Director, Philippines (Note-taker)
  • Mr. Paul Barbian

Distribution:

The Secretary: Imelda Marcos is one woman I have totally failed with — she never answered my note.

Amb. Sullivan: She is trying to be designated as successor to President Marcos.

The Secretary: Why would he do a thing like that?

Amb. Sullivan: He doesn’t want to. But she maneuvered things in such a way that he had no choice but to appoint her as Governor of Greater Manila, even though he had not originally wanted to appoint her to that position.

The Secretary: Is there a final limit on Marcos’ term of office?

Arab. Sullivan: No, but someone might shoot him.

The Secretary: Is there a file I should have for this session?

Mr. Barbian: Yes sir, right there on your desk.

[Page 2]

The Secretary: What’s the issue?

Amb. Sullivan: If I may lay out the scenario — you will open the session with a few remarks, pointing out that we are not meeting in a spirit of confrontation, and then turn the floor over to Romulo. He had told us that he will enunciate a series of principles. We do not know exactly what they will be but we do have a previous informal paper which was given us which we believe contains the probable Philippine position. That position is outlined on page two of the briefing memorandum.

The Secretary: We can agree to principles one and two, can we not?

Amb. Sullivan: We can agree to most of them, which are legitimate demands. Rather than ask them to prepare a formal negotiating document, which I fear would be a horrendous document, our tactic is for you to listen to Romulo’s principles and then to lay on the table our draft of a new agreement to be negotiated.

The Secretary: That should stop the negotiations. They will want to read it.

Amb. Sullivan: That’s right. Then we will adjourn back

to the Philippines, where the negotiations will take place.

The Secretary: Wouldn’t it have been more polite, especially to me, to have distributed it in advance, so that we all would know what it says?

Amb. Sullivan: No. The idea is not to negotiate at this session. You should table the draft only at the end of the meeting.

The Secretary: In other words, we will be operating from a document which they haven’t read and which I haven’t read. Even I can do that! Are there any talking points?

Amb. Sullivan: Yes sir. At Tab 4, there are talking points for the anticipated Philippine positions: As you see, the first one listed is the question of paying rent for the bases.

The Secretary: Are we willing to enter into a Security Assistance Agreement?

[Page 3]

Amb. Sullivan: The Filipinos want to terminate the Military Assistance Group in the Philippines and set up a purchasing mission here instead. They would like us to pay rent for the bases. The Department of Defense is opposed and would prefer the Turkish pattern. I think the Filipinos in due course would accept that. The Department of Defense objects to payment of rent because it would have to come out of the defense budget.

The Secretary: We have just told the Greeks and the Turks that we won’t pay rent.

Mr. Habib: Yes, but we have agreed to a multi-year commitment to the Turks. Can we get Congressional approval for it?

The Secretary: Probably not.

Amb. Sullivan: It would require review of the agreement every four years with the Filipinos; that would be difficult. We need to thrash this question of rent versus multi-year assistance around within the U.S. Government.

The Secretary: Why is Romulo coming, if not to reach an agreement?

Amb. Sullivan: It’s theater; part of the lubrication process. We’re going to have television cameras and reporters, and Romulo is being invited to call on the President. It’s mainly for show.

Mr. Habib: On the next point, sovereignty, we can be very forthcoming.

Amb. Sullivan: The question of command is a tough one. It will be more difficult now than it might have been a few weeks ago, before the Turkish agreement was published. That agreement sets some very tough precedents.

Mr. Habib: This is one of the sticking points with the Department of Defense.

Amb. Sullivan: This is the one on which we have had most difficulty with Defense. There is a bit of sophistry here. The article provides for a Philippine installation commander

[Page 4]

but the facilities used by U.S. forces would be under a U.S. commander. At some places, such as Clark Air Base, the installation and the facilities are coterminous, If the Filipinos really desire to participate in the administration of the bases, then we would have problems. Otherwise, the provisions regarding the Philippine installation, commander have no substance. I think the jurisdiction article will be ok. The next point has to do with flying the Philippine flag.

The Secretary: We certainly aren’t going to torpedo the agreement just because they want to fly their flags. There’s no point in sticking on that.

Amb. Sullivan: The provision for return of baselands is ok. [text not declassified]

The Secretary: This April 12 session is going to tax my mind!

[Page 5]

Mr. Habib: They could come in with a few surprises.

The Secretary: Don’t give me any of that Lebanese nonsense! I suppose it’s good for my ego to have a session like this. We may end up with Philippine flags flying over Pearl Harbor! What is this about commercialization?

Amb. Sullivan: A year ago there was great concern about the possibility that we would leave the area and. the bases. That would have thrown 40,000 employees on the bases out of work and stopped the flow of more than $150 million annually into the Philippine economy. Therefore, they began drawing up plans for commercialization of the bases and the excess capacity which they thought was going to come into existence. The man responsible for this idea has since been fired from the Philippine Government. In one sense commercialization is a straw man. But in another sense it is a legitimate concern because several years ago the Navy just walked away from Sangley Point Naval Air Station and it took the Philippine Navy quite some time to pick up the pieces. In contrast, the British made a gracious exit from Singapore. The Filipinos may want to preserve commercialization as a contingency plan but right now it is not feasible, practical or necessary.

Mr. Habib: The remaining issues are not serious.

The Secretary: Tell me about them.

Amb. Sullivan: Under the present agreement, we have tenure at the bases until 1991. In this new draft, we propose to make the agreement coterminous with the Mutual Defense Treaty, which is open-ended. But the Filipinos will want the right of review every few years.

The Secretary: I was not aware that the two presidents had agreed to exclude the Mutual Defense Treaty from the negotiations.

Amb. Sullivan: Yes, yes, don’t you remember?

The Secretary: Were talking points provided to the President on this?

Amb. Sullivan: Oh yes. I’m afraid meeting Imelda has eclipsed your memory of what happened. On military

[Page 6]

assistance, as I said earlier, the Filipinos would prefer to get rid of the JUSMAG. Do you really feel that rent is a non-starter?

The Secretary: Yes. I have had a lot of experience with other base agreements.

Amb. Sullivan: What about sentiment on the Hill?

The Secretary: They of course prefer to appropriate yearly. Rent would bypass this process. I would much rather have it in the defense budget than in appropriation. The Democratic liberals will be much more influential after the elections, even if they lose.

Mr. Habib: We have to remember the human rights issue also. They’ve amended the 1976 legislation to make it much tougher in the human rights field.

Amb. Sullivan: You may remember that the two presidents also agreed not to submit this agreement to the present Congress. It certainly won’t be ready before Congress has acted on the Turkish agreement.

Mr. Habib: And the Greek agreement?

The Secretary: The Turkish agreement will fail because of Cyprus. But the Greek and Spanish agreements will pass.

Mr. Habib: Can the Greek agreement pass without the Turkish?

The Secretary: Yes.

Mr. Habib: But what will that do to our Eastern Mediterranean policy?

The Secretary: It will be a shambles. There is no chancre of the Turkish agreement being approved without the Greek agreement. The Greeks are asking for outrageous sums. They want the same as the Turks — one billion dollars over four years. The maximum we can give is $700 million, including economic aid.

Amb. Sullivan: As a result of all this, the Philippine appetites are getting bigger. One last point: we think

[Page 7]

it would be preferable to handle this as an executive agreement rather than as a treaty.

The Secretary: By all means.

The Secretary (to Mr. Habib): What about that Indonesian action?

Mr. Habib: I had an agreement with Mr. Maw.

The Secretary: Never mind about any agreement, just answer the question. Whenever I ask a question, they always start telling me about agreements they have made among themselves.

Mr. Habib: Mr. Maw is responsible in this case. The stuff has been pre-positioned and as soon as the 1976 appropriation bill passes, it will begin to flow.

The Secretary: Why has it been held up? Why have my instructions not been carried out?

Mr. Habib: The appropriation bill includes military aid for Indonesia. That will put a Congressional stamp of approval on such aid.

The Secretary: Will the bill be passed before the Easter recess?

Mr. Habib: Yes.

The Secretary: You’re going to carry out my orders. On April 15 the operation will start, regardless of whether Congress has passed the bill or not. When do I meet Malik?

Mr. Habib: Either before or after the Islamic Conference. I think the date we have suggested is either May 10 or 12.

The Secretary: What about August?

Mr. Habib: Let’s try this. If it doesn’t work, we can shift it. We thought we would give Malik one more chance.

[Page 8]

Amb. Sullivan: I’d like to raise one final point. President Marcos asked me to arrange a private meeting between Romulo and yourself. We thought it would logically fit in between the luncheon and the 3:00 p.m. negotiating meeting.

The Secretary: Alone?

Amb. Sullivan: He said “away from the negotiating panels.” I suggest that the subject may be Marcos’ desire to visit the United States.

The Secretary: What is our view? He’s a friend, isn’t he; we can’t avoid it.

Amb. Sullivan: There may be some anti-Marcos demonstrations here. But have him come when the Congress is not in session.

Mr. Habib: That would mean after the fall adjournment.

The Secretary: I believe they intend to adjourn during the summer for two weeks for each political convention. Well, if he doesn’t specify a date, I can agree in principle.

Mr. Habib: Will you want a note-taker present?

The Secretary: Ask him.

Amb. Sullivan: I’ll find out tomorrow when I meet him. You know you will be seeing Marcos in Nairobi.

The Secretary: I will? (to Mr. Barbian) Have the African Bureau do a scenario of my Nairobi visit. There are certain receptions I’ll have to attend and some bilaterals, such as that with Marcos, that will have to be scheduled.

Amb. Sullivan: In Nairobi, Marcos will be wearing his third world hat rather than his U.S.-ally hat. He will act as a member of the third world rather than as a bosom ally.

Mr. Habib: But he wants to be helpful.

[Page 9]

Arab. Sullivan: If the subject Romulo is going to take up with you concerns a Marcos visit to the U.S., the subject may arise again in Nairobi.

The Secretary (to Mr. Habib): Does this mean that you and the Country Director will have to go to Nairobi?

Mr. Habib: No indeed! I have placed a ban on travel, especially my own.

The Secretary: What is the date for the Malik meeting?

Mr. Habib: I don’t recall; I will check. It’s either before or after the Islamic Conference.

The Secretary: When I make the ANZUS trip, I plan to visit a few countries in your area I haven’t been to, including Malaysia and Singapore.

Mr. Habib: We’re planning on your going to New Zealand.

Amb. Sullivan: How about Papua-New Guinea?

The Secretary: I thought I might return by way of Europe.

Mr. Habib: It will give you a good chance to visit Thailand. The new government there looks very good.

The Secretary: Who is the new Prime Minister?

Mr. Habib: Seni, Kukrit’s brother.

The Secretary: I’ll take a look.

  1. Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Secretary of State Kissinger’s Lot File, E5403, Box 16. Top Secret; Nodis. Fleck drafted the memorandum. The meeting occurred in Kissinger’s office.
  2. Kissinger, Habib, and Sullivan discussed the U.S. base negotiations with the Philippines.