340. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, September 22, 1975, 8 a.m..1 2

In Attendance - Monday, Sept. 8, 1975

  • Secretary of State Kissinger - Chairman
  • P - Mr. Sisco
  • E - Mr. Robinson
  • T - Mr. Maw
  • C - Mr. Sonnenfeldt
  • AF - Mr. Davis
  • ARA - Mr. Rogers
  • EA - Mr. Habib
  • EUR - Mr. Hartman
  • NEA - Mr. Sober (Acting)
  • INR - Mr. Hyland
  • S/P - Mr. Lord
  • EA - Mr. Enders
  • S/PRS - Mr. Anderson
  • PM - Mr. Stern (Acting)
  • IO - Mr. Buffum
  • H - Mr. McCloskey
  • L - Mr. Leigh
  • S/S - Mr. Springsteen
  • S - Mr. Bremer
  • S - Mr. Barbian
[Page 2]

[Omitted is material unrelated to the Philippines.]

MR. HABIB: Well, the problem I was facing was, first of all, the Philippines. The decision now of the White House is to cut grant aid to the Philippines.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do you mean “decision at the White House?” Now, what does that mean operationally?

MR. HABIB: I was told the President signed off on a piece of paper.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That can happen only if the President didn’t keep me informed. There’s no way the President would sign off on a piece of paper without telling me.

MR. STERNS: On the Philippines, Scowcroft was given the choice of two levels — 25 million and 19.6. He took 19.6.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But don’t you come to me crying after a Presidential decision. This is something I can handle three times a week if it’s brought to my attention.

[Page 3]

MR. HABIB: Well, it came to my attention when I was told that of a Presidential decision. We had requested 25 million. I was told by PM that our position was rejected. And so my point is to raise it. That’s why I’m raising it with you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That happens only because you guys constantly negotiate. If it’s brought to me it cannot be rejected. There’s no way that the President can rule on a six-million-dollar items against me. I mean that just cannot happen, unless you let it go up through the whole damn procedure.

MR. HABIB: Our procedure is to put in simply what we want. I don’t know what goes on there.

They don’t keep us informed until a decision is made—am I correct?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: “They” is the NSC staff, to whom I have some relationship; and “they” is the President, to whom I can talk every morning. So don’t tell me.

If I understand the 25 million is important to the Philippines, it never gets to be an issue. When have we ever lost an argument when I can focus on it?

MR. HABIB: That’s what I’m hoping.

MR. STERN: Against OMB.

[Page 4]

MR. STERN: It’s OMB. And the way to handle that —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: NOW, the President will have to overrule a decision he’s already made and that’s going to create a lot of bad feelings that are totally unnecessary.

MR. SOBER: Well, Mr. Secretary, sometimes we don’t really know. The same way last week — we learned about it after the action was taken.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do you have to do with the Philippines?

MR. SOBER: Well, it’s not the Philippines, but at the same time the President made a decision about a decision you had made about some small aid to CENTO. You had said something to the CENTO Ministerial Meeting. And we learned after the President acted that it hadn’t been submitted or knocked out, and we’re trying to go back and get it restored, but it’s in the same process.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It’s the Department’s business to know what’s going on over there bureaucratically. There’s no way that I can be asked to be overruled on which there was already a Presidential decision. There’s no way on which these decisions could go.

MR. HABIB: Well, the Bureau found out what decision was made in advance of the decision. That way I just [Page 5] don’t know.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course the NSC knows.

MR. HABIB: Our feeling is we’ll just have to work a little more closely with the NSC, so we understand every time a decision is coming up and we recommend it. We’ve got to be told in advance.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You’ve got to tell me if it’s important or if we don’t care how the decision goes.

I’m not saying we have to win every time. But if it’s important enough to ask me to go to the President to overrule a decision that’s already made, then it sure as hell is important for me to go to him ahead of time.

(Mr. Robinson leaves the room.)

MR. HABIB: We’ve got some other things taken out that we don’t find objectionable. For example, we cut the Thai out of that program by 25 million dollars. But I’m not arguing. I think we can shift some of that over to grant. But on the Filipino one, I think it’s worth going back because of the base negotiations. If it weren’t for the base negotiations, I wouldn’t raise it.

[Omitted is material unrelated to the Philippines.]

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 8. Secret.
  2. Habib told Kissinger about a cut in U.S. aid for the Philippines that the White House had approved.