Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

324. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (William Colby) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Godley), Washington, July 6, 1973.¹ ²

Washington, July 6, 1973

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20505

6 JUL 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable G. McMurtrie Godley
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Department of State

SUBJECT: An Assessment of the Political and Economic Situation in the Philippines

1. [text not declassified]

2. We are now seeing in Manila, the major urban center of the country, what appears to be the beginning of a current of discontent with life under martial law. It is a current, not just a few isolated examples of unhappiness. Discontent, at this point at least, does not appear to be solely politically or socially motivated. It arises initially from economic factors. Although these factors may have, in fact, very little to do with the martial law administration of President Marcos, in the eyes of most he is to blame for the problems.

3. Prices on all basic commodities, including rice, are increasing despite price control efforts. School textbooks and paper are more expensive this year than in previous years. Unemployment and underemployment continue at about the same level as in pre-martial law days. Wages, however, have remained fixed at minimum levels established by law at least three years ago. Crime in the greater Manila area, particularly crimes against property, are at the same level they were in the weeks preceding martial law. Caught between rising prices and stagnant wages, urban residents across the board are beginning to express their discontent with life under martial law.

4. An aggravating factor in the current of dissatisfaction is the pervasive distrust of the President and his motives. This results from the widely publicized activities of both Marcos and his lady in the pre-martial law era. It is especially noticeable in the greater Manila area, where many have the attitude that martial law may be acceptable but not the man who has imposed it. Still, the great majority who hold this view are also unprepared to do anything about the situation, at least for the time being. They realize that the President now holds all the cards and that they must wait for him to lose or misdeal some before they dare make any moves.

5. In contrast to the urban population, rural residents appear to be more or less content with their current economic lot. Price hikes have apparently been less dramatic in the provinces. Rural residents have also from the outset been much less concerned than their more sophisticated big city brothers about the “legality” of martial law. Infrastructure improvements which have been either initiated or announced (e.g., roads, bridges, etc.) all tend to reflect the President’s emphasis on the provinces and undoubtedly have buoyed the peasants’ confidence in future improvements. If asked to weigh and compare the situation as it exists today with the days of the pre-martial law era, it is probable that the rural resident, particularly on the island of Luzon, would conclude that he is now slightly better off. The rural population, though, is exhibiting signs of confusion over the political methods used to usher in the new Constitution in January 1973. One of the President’s closest advisors recently commented that Barrio residents appear not to fully understand which constitution is in effect today and are now asking questions about elections.

6. The Marcos administration is aware of the appearance of discontent and questioning and of the several causes for these developments. We can anticipate, therefore, that in the coming months Marcos will take actions to mute these problems. In the economic field, these will probably be swift, largely cosmetic moves aimed at creating the impression that solutions to problems facing the urban population are imminent. We can also anticipate several moves in the political field—e.g., convening of the Citizens’ Assemblies, reshuffling of the Cabinet, convoking the interim National Assembly, talking generally of elections at some future date—all designed to create the impression of gradual return to democratic normalcy, to reinforce the acceptance of the new Constitution and perhaps more important, to provide Marcos with a fresh mandate, weak as it may\be from a legal point, to continue ruling the Philippines after 30 December 1973 when his tenure as President under the 1935 Constitution expires.

7. The absence of an independent press or of any forum in which problems, failures, or progress of the Republic can be discussed freely and without fear, the continuing backing by the armed forces, the apparent endorsement of the regime by the U.S. Government, the dismemberment of the political opposition, the weakening of the pro-Chinese Communist Party (CPP/ML) and its military arm, but above all, the absence of a leader of stature around whom the opposition can coalesce are all factors which help ensure Marcos1 continued control of the situation. Barring a substantial failure of the economy or a gross misjudgment in action—shooting of food rioters would be an example—the Filipino masses, including those of urban centers, are not prepared to move against the regime at this juncture even though they are discontented for various reasons. For the next six months or so, we would expect the discontent to continue to ferment but certainly not to manifest itself in any appreciable fashion. Many Filipinos have pointed out Filipinos are a very patient people. That, combined with a general aura of fear, is enough at this point to keep matters essentially under control.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

Theodore G. Shackley
cc: Colonel Richard T. Kennedy, Deputy Assistant to the President For National Security Affairs

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–192, Folder 1, NSSM 155 [2 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive. Richard Kennedy also received a copy. Theodore Shackley, the Chief of the Far East Division, Directorate of Operations, CIA, sent this memorandum on behalf of Colby.
2. The CIA assessed the political and economic situation in the Philippines.