Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

32. Telegram 3139 From the Embassy in Australia to the Department of State, June 6, 1973, 0820Z.¹ ²

June 6, 1973, 0820Z

TELEGRAM
Department of State
CANBERRA 3139

R 0608207 JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1050

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AS, PFOR, MARR

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER WHITLAM’S VISIT TO THE US

1. ACTING PRIME MINISTER AND DEFENSE MINISTER LANCE BARNARD CALLED AT RESIDENCE TODAY. HE EXPLAINED THAT THIS UNUSUAL CONFIDENTIAL VISIT IN ADVANCE OF MY CREDENTIALS PRESENTATION WAS HIS PERSONAL INITIATIVE. NEITHER PRIME MINISTER NOR OTHER MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT WERE AWARE OF HIS ACTION, HE SAID.

2. BARNARD DISCUSSED THE HIGH IMPORTANCE HE AND WHITLAM ATTACHED TO AUSTRALIA’S ALLIANCE WITH THE U.S. THEY WERE CONVINCED OF THE ESSENTIALITY OF U.S. DEFENSE AND SCIENTIFIC FACILITIES IN AUSTRALIA. THEY HAD PROTECTED THESE FACILITIES AGAINST STRIDENT LEFT WING CRITICISM AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. AT THE FEDERAL LABOR PARTY CONFERENCE IN EARLY JULY U.S. FACILITIES WOULD AGAIN BE UNDER ATTACK BUT WHITLAM WOULD AGAIN SUCCESSFULLY PRESERVE THEM.

3. HOWEVER, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT PRESIDENT NIXON WOULD RECEIVE PM IN WASHINGTON HAD BECOME AN EMOTIONAL ISSUE IN AUSTRALIA. IF AT CONFERENCE WHITLAM WERE STILL UNABLE TO STATE THAT HE WOULD MEET WITH PRESIDENT, THIS FACT WOULD BE UTILIZED BY LEFT OPPONENTS AT CONFERENCE TO CAST DOUBT UPON IMPORTANCE U.S. ITSELF ATTACHED TO ALLIANCE AND TO BASES. BARNARD WAS CONFIDENT THAT EVEN IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WHITLAM WOULD SUCCEED IN DEFENDING AMERICAN FACILITIES. BUT THE DEBATES WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND WOULD ATTRACT WIDE ATTENTION THROUGHOUT COUNTRY.

4. HE AND WHITLAM COULD HANDLE SUCH ATTACKS EITHER FROM WITHIN LABOR PARTY OR FROM OPPOSITION. HOWEVER, THE AVERAGE AUSTRALIAN WAS NOW BECOMING WORRIED ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF U.S./AUSTRALIAN RELATIONS BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTY OVER WASHINGTON RECEPTION OF PM, THIS CONCERNED BARNARD DEEPLY. WITH GREAT SINCERITY HE URGED THAT PRESIDENT NIXON AGREE TO RECEIVE PRIME MINISTER, EVEN MOST INFORMALLY. IF WHITLAM COULD MAKE CLEAR THAT HE WOULD MEET WITH PRESIDENT DURING HIS TRIP TO NORTH AMERICA, THE DAMAGING DEBATES COULD BE MINIMIZED AND THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC COULD BE REASSURED ABOUT THE HEALTH OF THE ALLIANCE.

5. BARNARD SAID HE WELL UNDERSTOOD THAT U.S. GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENT NIXON HAD BEEN OFFENDED BY COMMENTS FROM AUSTRALIA AT TIME OF NORTH VIET NAM BOMBING RESUMPTION. THE STATEMENTS MADE WERE INDEED OFFENSIVE. PERHAPS WE DID NOT KNOW THAT HE AND WHITLAM HAD CALLED THE THREE OFFENDING MINISTERS BEFORE THEM FOR STERN DRESSING DOWN AND WARNING. BARNARD ADDED THAT IN HEAT OF DEBATE PM SOMETIMES MADE COMMENTS HE LATER REGRETTED. HE HOPED THAT WASHINGTON WOULD READ WITH CARE EXPRESSIONS OF CONSIDERED AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT POSITION SUCH AS PM’S MAY 24 FOREIGN POLICY ADDRESS. BARNARD SAID HE HAD CALLED PRIVATELY AT HIS OWN INITIATIVE TO SET FORTH THE FACTS WHICH MIGHT BE DIFFICULT FOR THE PM HIMSELF TO COMMUNICATE.

6. I TOLD BARNARD I WAS HONORED BY HIS VISIT AND IMPRESSED BY THE EVIDENT SINCERITY AND HONESTY OF HIS REMARKS. I AGREED WITH HIM THAT SOME OF THE STATEMENTS EMANATING FROM CANBERRA HAD INDEED BEEN INSULTING AND UNFORTUNATE. I SAID THAT PRESIDENT NIXON ALONE WOULD DECIDE ABOUT A MEETING IN WASHINGTON. I ASSURED HIM I WOULD RELAY THIS MESSAGE.

7. COMMENT: THIS WAS A MOVING AND, I BELIEVE, ENTIRELY CANDID DISCUSSION. BARNARD DID NOT ATTEMPT TO BLACKMAIL US BY CLAIMING THE FUTURE OF OUR INSTALLATIONS WAS AT STAKE. I WILL ANALYZE THE SITUATION IN AUSTRALIA IN SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES AFTER I HAVE TALKED WITH OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS AND WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON JUNE 8.

GREEN

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 7 AUSTL. Confidential; Nodis. Kissinger approved a memorandum from Froebe, July 6, which approved a draft State cable directing Green to respond orally to a confidential letter of June 15 from Australian opposition party leaders recommending that Nixon receive Whitlam. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 504, Country Files, Far East, Australia, January 1972-December 31, 1973)
2. Green described his and Barnard’s discussion about a possible visit by Whitlam to the United States.