3. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, August 1, 1973,1 2

MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION

August 1, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Military Strategy for Asia

The Defense Program Review Committee has completed a review of our military strategy and planning for Asia in the aftermath of the Vietnam war. The study covered a full range of strategic questions and has recommended that guidance be distributed on several issues. Four issues were considered ready for decision:

  • — the broad objectives of Security Assistance planning for Asia;
  • — basic strategic guidance for our conventional forces in Asia;
  • — our tactical nuclear planning;
  • — long term deployment planning.

Security Assistance

The issue here is to determine the objectives of our Security Assistance program planning for Asia.

The study finds that an economically feasible goal would be to build allied capabilities aimed at defending against local non-PRC threats. Trying to build allied capability against an attack by the PRC would be beyond allied economic capabilities.

Their recommendation is to focus on building sufficient allied capabilities against local threats with an emphasis on providing adequate ground forces. Once self-sufficiency against local threats is attained, additional efforts could be applied to improving ground forces against PRC-type attacks but this would not be set as an explicit goal for our Asian programs.

Approve [RN initialed]
Disapprove

[Page 2]

Strategy Guidance for U.S. Forces

The current guidance for Asia, issued in 1969, calls for planning forces adequate to support an allied defense against an attack by the PRC and its ally in either Northeast or Southeast Asia as well as a non-PRC attack in the other Asian theater. Despite the diplomatic changes that have occurred since 1969, the committee believes the strategy guidance remains appropriate. They, therefore, recommend reaffirming the existing guidance. In view of the infeasibility of building allied capabilities to withstand a PRC size attack without U.S. ground forces, they also recommend planning an Asian reinforcement capability that includes the air, sea, and ground forces.

Approve [RN initialed]
Disapprove

U.S. Deployment Planning

The study found that the maintenance of an adequate U.S. Asian military presence to be critical to preserving Asian stability and confidence in a continued U.S. commitment. The committee, therefore, recommends that we plan to maintain essentially constant levels of Asian deployed combat units for the foreseeable future. Only minor changes in support and manning would occur and we would plan on notifying Korea, Japan, and the Philippines of these plans. Deployments on Taiwan and Thailand would be kept under continuous review.

Approve [RN initialed]
Disapprove

If you approve of these recommendations, I will sign the attached NSDM (Tab A).

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize me to sign the attached NSDM at Tab A.

Approve [RN initialed]
Disapprove

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–242, NSDMs, NSDM 230, Folder 2. Top Secret. Sent for action. Nixon initialed all four “approve” options, regarding security assistance, strategy guidance for U.S. forces, U.S. deployment planning, and the issuance of Tab A, the attached NSDM, which when signed became NSDM 230.
  2. Kissinger recommended that Nixon approve the issuance of a NSDM on military strategy for Asia.