292. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 10, 1973, 10:30–11:03 a.m.1 2
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
- Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore
- Ambassador Monteiro
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
- John Holdridge, NSC Staff
- Kathleen Ryan, NSC Staff
DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, April 10, 1973 10:30 - 11:03 a.m.
PLACE: Dr.
Kissinger’s
Office
Dr. Kissinger: You have been educated at Harvard. Have you returned there this year?
P.M. Lee: Not this year, I went to Florida.
Dr. Kissinger: I have told a lot of people that you were the only positive influence at Harvard.
P.M. Lee: Well, I consider myself a radical liberal, but faced with the basic fact of meeting them in the U.S. I have to speak in terms of our interests as I see them.
Dr. Kissinger: You are looking forward to the chance, I see. What is your assessment of the situation [in Southeast Asia]?
P.M. Lee: I feel it is the best agreement you could have gotten now.
I would never have believed it possible that the North Vietnamese would agree. I did not believe it was possible. The scenario has changed. The agreement was good in principle. I think it was better to accept it with the picture as of now. I think you have succeeded.
In Cambodia, you have given over to the Vietnamese the Cambodian responsibility. You can’t act there the way you did in South Vietnam. The [Page 2] guerrillas in Cambodia want to embarrass you by threatening Phnom Penh, but why should they want to capture the town? They may capture it for a little while, but what for?
They would hold it only so long as to gain a psychological victory, and then pull out before your bombers got them. Vietnam it’s a 50-50 chance. You should have started to turn it over to the South Vietnamese themselves. Thieu should try, if possible, to give the South Vietnamese Communists, as distinct from the North Vietnamese Communists, a place in the sun. Give them a place, for they are not numerically strong. Otherwise, North Vietnam will start all over again to organize a subversive effort against the South.
Dr. Kissinger: Have you ever talked to Thieu?
P.M. Lee: No, but I have talked to his aides.
Dr. Kissinger: He’s better than his aides.
P.M. Lee: This is a new situation that he can take advantage of. Politically and militarily he is strong, with one million one hundred thousand men.
Dr. Kissinger: If there is one point you can argue, it is that we got more than most people thought. The South Vietnamese Communists got nothing. They didn’t even get their people out of jail, and obtained no share in political power. They paid a high price in the political settlement, which gave no benefits to them.
P.M. Lee: Madame Binh does not want to push reunification with Hanoi. There are differences between the Tonkinese and the Annamese.
Dr. Kissinger: What do you think of the situation in Southeast Asia and between the United States and China?
P.M. Lee: You now have, as you Americans put it, a whole new ball game. This is the inter-reaction of three great powers—great power politics involving you, China, and the USSR, in which the smaller countries are uncertain as to where they fit in.
Take Malaysia, for example. The Malaysians now want a Chinese embassy in Kuala Lumpur. As Rajaj Mohar, Razak’s Special Advisor for Economic Affairs, told one of my people, Razak believes that if Peking comes in now it will solve their total insurgency problem. They will probably [Page 3] recognize Peking within six months.
Dr. Kissinger: What advantage do they see in this?
P.M. Lee: They believe that it would represent Peking’s complete abandonment of the Communist insurgents in Malaysia.
Kissinger: However, stupidity is not a Chinese characteristic.
P.M. Lee: The new situation is also having an effect upon the Thai leadership as well. Thanat Khoman would not have been allowed to say all those things (about getting the U.S. out of Thailand) unless they had wanted him to do so. They are buying insurance, which is typically Thai. That is why I said the things I did about the Thai needing to keep the U.S. air bases—I was able to do what they couldn’t do themselves. I knew that they wanted me to. Thanom Kittikachorn and Praphat are with you and will to the whole way with you, but I think that if you shake their confidence—
Dr. Kissinger: What do you mean by shake their confidence?
P.M. Lee: By making a sudden withdrawal.
Dr. Kissinger: There is an argument being put forward by some of our bureaucrats that Thailand wants us to reduce our forces.
P.M. Lee: That is difficult to believe.
Dr. Kissinger It is the policy of this Administration, which you can count on for another four years, to stand firm. We want to protect them.
P.M. Lee: The trouble is that a process of erosion has set in, particularly in Malaysia. I blame this partly on Razak and partly on Gough Whitlam. Once the Australians began to talk about getting out of the 5-Power Defense Agreement or reducing their forces, the Malaysians began to lose confidence. As a result, in the May 1969 riots they did not act firmly enough.
Dr. Kissinger: You mean that they should have taken stronger measures?
P.M. Lee: Yes. Is it true that the sentiment in Washington is to get out of Thailand?
[Page 4]Dr. Kissinger: Our Congress is hopeless but not well enough organized to enable us to get out of Thailand. They talk about withholding military appropriations, but their ability to do this is something else again.
What is your honest judgment about our foreign policy? Are we weakening our friends rather than paralyzing our enemies?
P.M. Lee: Initially the Vietnam Agreement upset a lot of people.
Dr. Kissinger: We had to do it. Otherwise, we would have been voted out of Vietnam.
P.M. Lee: What you did was right, and nobody really believes that there was any alternative. There are only a few exceptions on this—Thanat Khoman goes around saying that once the Americans are gotten rid of, all will be well. This is what he even said to me. But you must stay on.
Dr. Kissinger: Thanat Khoman used to be one of our greatest friends.
P.M. Lee: Yes he was, but he finally went too far on some of the things he was doing and was edged out. This included trying to move toward Peking and speaking in favor of neutralization. I remember that in November 1971 he attended an ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting and signed a declaration calling for neutralization which had been proposed by Malaysia. The Malaysians try to posture all the time, and have taken the position that the three super powers should guarantee the neutrality of Southeast Asia. This is not realistic.
About the Thai, though, if the unthinkable does happen and they find themselves with communist countries on their borders, then the present generals will simply pack their bags and a new set of leaders will come up. This could happen even if the game is not lost in Vietnam, but if Laos and Cambodia become satellites of the North Vietnamese. The Thai want no part of a real insurgency.
Dr. Kissinger: And what would they say toward Hanoi and Peking?
P.M. Lee: “Please leave us alone.” Thanat Khoman would be able to say that all this lining up with the Americans took place under Field Marshal Sarit, and “I was wrong, please forgive me.” The Thai would say, too, that it was the previous leaders who had given help to the Malaysians against the Malayan Communist Party.
[Page 5](At this point Prime Minister Lee digressed briefly to note that the Thai actually claimed the northernmost states of Malaysia, which had been traded to the British in exchange for British political support.)
Another thing which the Thai could say would be that “we are not really against the Communists so long as they don’t upset the internal structure of Thailand.”
Dr. Kissinger: What about the possibility of keeping Thailand on our side if Laos and Cambodia become Communist satellites?
P.M. Lee: it depends on the time scale — what clicks in the psyche and on the nerves of the people in charge. You don’t want too drastic a change, or one which comes too soon.
Dr. Kissinger: What should we do?
P.M. Lee: Quietly spread the word, not among Thanom Kittikachon and Praphat or other older leaders, but among the younger ones, that it would be possible for them to live with a Communist Laos and Cambodia.
Dr. Kissinger: And what about our presence there?
P.M. Lee: Scale it down, but keep a hard core of U.S. squadrons.
Dr. Kissinger: And if there is a massive attack by the North Vietnamese in Vietnam, what we should we do?
P.M. Lee: Do you mean one in which the North Vietnamese were openly involved, such as by infiltrating?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I mean massive involvement.
P M. Lee: As far as the North, it would be sufficient to launch a barrage against it by the 7th Fleet. But, you should make sure that there are no POWs in the North. Your 500 or 520 POWs have caused you great political difficulty.
Dr. Kissinger: I know, it is absurd. 50,000 dead, and such a fuss over 500 POWs.
P.M. Lee: That is the American tradition and ethos.
[Page 6]Send your bombers over the South. In the South, even if you do get shot down you can bail out in pretty safe territory.
Dr, Kissinger: You would go back to bombing in the South?
P.M. Lee: I would say that if they knew that you would be prepared to do this, it would be a deterrent. Why shouldn’t you?
Dr. Kissinger: If you were they, would you believe it?
P.M. Lee: I would. They are watching closely. Look at 68-72, when they waited for anti-war sentiment to work on you. Another three or four years, maybe five, and they can hope for a change in their favor. They can easily wait for a new President.
Dr. Kissinger: That I understand. But for them to assume that this President is going to accept a defeat is quite a gamble. They could be hit, and it makes no difference what Congress says.
P.M. Lee: I don’t believe it will happen in the next few months.
Dr. Kissinger: They will not be in a position for a massive attack until next January.
P.M. Lee: Anything less than a massive attack will not crack South Vietnam’s morale, and that is the important element.
Dr. Kissinger: That is the principle reason why we did it. After the mining, South Vietnamese military activities became more aggressive. We will probably do something like it again if they do.
P.M. Lee: I hope they believe that. But you can’t use American forces.
Dr. Kissinger: What do you think of aid to North Vietnam?
P.M. Lee: It is a masterpiece of good politics. They are not foolish. They know that China and Russia will never be able to rebuild their economy. Furthermore, they have no Ho Chi Minh and are operating with a system of collective leadership. I believe they are having a hell of a debate now over whether of accept the ceasefire or have another go at it.
Dr. Kissinger: I have always said that you see things very clearly. I agree that they are debating what to do. My own experience with them is that [Page 7] they are morbidly afraid of being tricked. They will never accept the first proposal. Even if we were to give them what they asked for, they would stop to see where they were somehow being taken advantage of.
P.M. Lee: I agree. But I was terrified that they would have accepted your offer of May 8—a ceasefire in situ, followed by a withdrawal in four months. They might have said “right, but just pull out in two months.”
Dr. Kissinger: It was always my belief that they would do nothing until September, when they could see how McGovern was doing. They were hoping for a McGovern victory, and had always believed he would win. Le Duc Tho thought I was a lying capitalist pig, when I told him McGovern didn’t have a chance. He spoke of a famous figure in America of whom I knew nothing about—some fellow who set fire to himself in front of the United Nations. I don’t even remember his name. Do you?
P.M. Lee: No.
Dr. Kissinger: They were waiting for McGovern. If they and accepted our [May 8] proposal, we would have been in bad straits.
P.M. Lee: Proposals terrify them.
Dr. Kissinger: We could always get ahead of them by making a reasonable proposal we knew they wouldn’t accept. Speaking frankly, in May 31, 1971 we made a proposal at a secret meeting which if they had accepted would have put us in very difficult circumstances. There was haggling for months.
P.M. Lee: A critical factor is whether they can continue to get supplies.
On economic assistance, they must have argued amongst themselves. China and Russia can’t help. They would like American aid and don’t want to get things only from Russia and China. How it will turn out, I do not know. It depends on which faction carries the lead.
Dr. Kissinger: My sentiments also.
P.M. Lee: You have not abandoned South Vietnam. If South Vietnam wins, a lot of Americans will see that it was right in 4 or 5 years.
Dr. Kissinger: And Indonesia?
[Page 8]P.M. Lee: Indonesia is preoccupied at the moment with getting more money for development. But the generals are mesmerized with getting rich.
Dr. Kissinger: Personally, or for the sake of the country?
P.M. Lee: Personally, I regret. They have no concept of identifying their future with the country.
[The Ambassador and Mr. Holdridge leave and P.M. Lee and HAK talk]
P.M. Lee: As a final point, who does the contingency planning? I would like to talk to him.
Dr. Kissinger: How long will you be here?
P.M. Lee: Until tomorrow morning. Do you have any free time this afternoon?
Dr. Kissinger: I will try to get some. Where are you staying?
P.M. Lee: At the Madison Hotel.
Dr. Kissinger: You know there are so few leaders with whom I am interested in talking to. Most leaders, if not Prime Ministers, I don’t want to spend an hour with.
P.M. Lee: One needs a long term view of things.
Dr. Kissinger: May be I can see you a half hour before dinner.
P.M. Lee: I believe that if Vietnam can be held, Thailand will hold.
Dr. Kissinger: What do you think the Chinese are up to?
P.M. Lee: For the next four years they are going to respond to you. They want to be friends with the Americans. Technology is what they want. They will buy Boeings from you and VC-10s from the British. They want no one single supplier. They don’t want a recurrence of their Russian experience for dependence on foreign technology.
Their second strike capability will not be effective for 15 years.
[Page 9]Dr. Kissinger: I don’t want to be in office when they have their second strike capability.
P.M. Lee: They will have grown up by then.
Dr. Kissinger: The Chinese psychology is that if Southeast Asia is not unified, their interests are safe, because they are afraid that it may otherwise lean toward Russia.
P.M. Lee: Their attitude is that SEA will lean on Russia. But they want to keep it in a fluid situation. They want room for maneuver, more time in which to deploy, and more military aid to give.
Dr. Kissinger: I think 8 - 10 years is the time span for what you describe. Is that fair?
P.M. Lee: Yes, I think so.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 938, VIP Visits, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, April 10, 1973. Secret; Sensitive. The conversation took place in Kissinger’s office in the White House. Holdridge’s talking points for Kissinger, April 9, are ibid.↩
- Kissinger and Lee discussed the international situation in East Asia.↩