266. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 28, 1975, 11 a.m.1 2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 28, 1975
Time: 11:00 A.M.

SUBJECT: U.S.-Korean Relations

PARTICIPANTS:

  • Kim Dong-Jo, Minister of Korea
  • Pyong-choon Hahm, Korean Ambassador to the U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • Richard L. Sneider, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea
  • Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia
  • W.R. Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC

Kim Dong-Jo: I have had a good talk with Mr. Buffum. We exchanged views on the UNC problem at the upcoming United Nations General Assembly and on UNC reorganization. I told him it was necessary to deal with the presence of others, like the French. We are worried about the United Nations General Assembly prospects, especially because of the non-aligned.

Secretary Kissinger: We are going to take a tougher line at the United Nations this year with the group of 77.

Habib: You started last year. It helped in Cambodia.

Secretary Kissinger: We will be tougher. The constellation of events is not to our advantage, but we will do all we can. We may lose on the Korean resolution. We should keep in touch and coordinate.

I think the American people have been pushed around enough. The President will make a major-speech in two weeks.

[Page 2]

Kim Dong-Jo: It is necessary to fix the UNC issue and the arrangements for operational power in the joint command. It can be done in about two months.

Secretary Kissinger: (Turning to Habib) Is that a good idea?

Habib: I’m not sure. We should consult with the Defense Departments and get their judgments.

We may have a better position in the UN General Assembly if we have a small command.

Secretary Kissinger: But our opponents are fighting the principle of the UN Command. It does not matter whether that Command is large or small.

Habib: A small Command puts us in a better posture.

Ambassador Hahm: That was why we talked to Buffum. We need a contingency plan on what to do if we lose.

Secretary Kissinger: We will not withdraw our troops just because there is a vote against the UNC.

Habib: Only the Security Council can end the UN Command.

Secretary Kissinger: We do not want to abolish the Command.

Ambassador Hahm: Maybe we can make our position stronger if we say that we are willing to have the UNC abolished in exchange for other arrangements.

Secretary Kissinger: That was our position last year.

Kim Dong-Jo: But it can make a difference. Maybe we can reorganize the joint command. We need to think about what we do if we lose.

Habib: (To the Secretary) You should know that the Republic of Korea has offered to help on Cambodia and Vietnam. We have just received a telegram offering LST’s.

Secretary Kissinger: That is very good.

[Page 3]

Kim Dong-Jo: One problem at the United Nations is that North Korea is now trying to become part of the non-aligned group. That could hurt us.

Secretary Kissinger: We have to do something about the nonaligned. If Cuba and North Korea are both in the non-aligned group, we will have to make clear to that group that we do not regard them as non-aligned.

Kim Dong-Jo: They have to have a consensus. Maybe we can tell them what we think.

Secretary Kissinger: We should get out a message to some of the non-aligned that North Korea is not a non-aligned power.

Kim Dong-Jo: It would be disastrous to our UN policy if the Lima conference says that North Korea is non-aligned.

Secretary Kissinger: Let’s send a cable to some of them saying that we regard it as totally inappropriate.

Kim Dong-Jo: We would like to improve relations with the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger: I will mention it to them again.

Kim Dong-Jo: The Chinese ignore us completely, as if there were no North and South Korea.

Ambassador Hahm: Domestically, we are worried that North Korea gets more relations with other countries whereas we do not. This has a serious impact on the people of South Korea. There is a fear that we will be surpassed.

Secretary Kissinger: Do we say anything about this to our allies?

Habib: Yes, we do. We have spoken to the Japanese, with some effect. The West Europeans, however, have gone ahead. So has Australia, despite our effort.

Kim Dong-Jo: Thailand is going ahead also. I spoke to their Ambassador last night.

Habib: That is related to China.

[Page 4]

Secretary Kissinger: It is also related to Indochina.

Ambassador Hahm: What about Pakistan?

Secretary Kissinger: We have talked to them many times. I have done it myself. We have had no luck.

Ambassador Hahm: Now Sri Lanka is doing it.

Habib: They had a bad experience earlier.

Ambassador Hahm: They are still going ahead.

Kim Dong-Jo: We need a contingency plan for the UN matter.

Secretary Kissinger: Can I get one?

Habib: We will get you one.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123–1061. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Smyser and approved by Gompert.
  2. Kissinger and Foreign Minister Kim discussed South Korea’s international position.