Office of the Historian

244. Telegram 5409 From the Embassy in the Republic of Korea to the Department of State, August 15, 1973, 0326Z.1 2

August 15, 1973, 0326Z

TELEGRAM
Department of State
SEOUL 5409

P 150326Z AUG 73

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9498
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

SEOUL 5409

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, KS, JA

SUBJECT: KIM TAE CHUNG CASE

1.
AS CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ABDUCTION OF KIM TAE CHUNG CONTINUE TO EMERGE, MY EARLIER OPINION THAT THIS WAS PROBABLY AN ROKG-MANAGED OPERATION IS INCREASINGLY CONFIRMED. I NOW VIEW IT AS A PRIME EXAMPLE OF STUPID GOVERNMENTAL THUGGERY.
2.
FULL CONSEQUENCES WILL PROBABLY EMERGE SEQUENTIALLY OVER TIME. THERE WILL BE DOMESTIC REVERBERATIONS AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES. AT THIS STAGE KIM HAS WIDESPREAD SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT IN KOREAN CIRCLES FOR THE EXPERIENCE HE UNDERWENT. GOVERNMENT HAS IN EFFECT INCREASED THE STATURE OF ITS ONLY SERIOUS POLITICAL OPPONENT. WE BELIEVE THAT NO ONE WITH ANY SENSE OF INDEPENDENT THOUGHT ACCEPTS THE GOVERNMENT’S EXPLANATIONS OF ITS INNOCENCE. THE SO-CALLED QUOTE SAVE THE NATION UNION UNQUOTE AND QUOTE PATRIOTIC YOUTH FEDERATION UNQUOTE WHICH ALLEGEDLY CARRIED OUT THE OPERATION ARE TYPICAL OF THE SORT OF APPARATUS CONTRIVED BY THE ROK/CIA.
3.
WE DEFER TO EMBASSY TOKYO’S APPRAISAL OF THE REACTION IN JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, DIET AND PRESS CIRCLES. ROKG APPARENTLY INTENDS TO STICK BY ITS DECISION NOT TO LET KIM RETURN TO JAPAN FOR INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSES. TO DO SO WOULD ONLY TURN HIM LOOSE WITH GREATLY HEIGHTENED PRESTIGE TO CONTINUE HIS ATTACKS ABROAD AGAINST THE PARK GOVERNMENT.
4.
AT THE PRESENT TIME THE GOVERNMENT IS ALLOWING EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF THE CASE IN LOCAL PRESS AND INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES ARE MAKING A GREAT SHOW OF TRYING TO GET TO THE BOTTOM OF THE AFFAIR. I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF THEY WERE FORCED TO TURN UP SOME OF THE GUILTY PARTIES WHO WILL GO TO JAIL PROTESTING THEIR PATRIOTISM AND THE FACT THEY ACTED ON THEIR OWN AND NOT ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT. THIS HAS OCCURRED BEFORE IN KOREAN HISTORY WITH ABOUT THE SAME AMOUNT VALIDITY.
5.
KIM TAE CHUNG WILL NOW SEEK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIS POSITION, TRY TO GO ABROAD, AND MAY EVEN BE BOLD ENOUGH TO TRY TO MOUNT SOME DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT. AT THAT POINT I SUSPECT THE PRESS COVERAGE IN KOREA WILL DIMINISH SHARPLY AND HIS ACTIVITIES WOULD BE RESTRICTED. THERE STILL HANGS OVER HIM AN OLD CHARGE OF VIOLATING ELECTION LAWS IN 1968 AND SUBSEQUENTLY, BUT IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD RESURRECT THEM EXCEPT IN THE MOST DESPERATE CIRCUMSTANCES. I DO NOT, HOWEVER, EXCLUDE THIS POSSIBILITY.

HABIB

  1. Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated for information to Tokyo. On August 8, Republic of Korea intelligence agents kidnapped opposition politician Kim Dae-jung from a hotel in Tokyo, allegedly with plans to assassinate him.↩
  2. The embassy analyzed the circumstances and consequences of the abduction of Kim Dae-jung.↩