229. Telegram 19002 From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, December 30, 1976, 0800Z.1 2

TELEGRAM
Department of State
TOKYO 19002

R 300800Z DEC 76

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4490
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RANGOON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USLO PEKING
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA

TOKYO 19002

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, JA

SUBJECT: YEAR-END POLITICAL MOOD

1.
EXTENDED NEW YEAR’S HOLIDAY IN JAPAN TRADITIONALLY LEAVES NATION AND ITS OBSERVERS WITH EUPHORIC PERCEPTION THAT NATION’S POLITICAL PROBLEMS HAVE DISSIPATED, EVEN IF ONLY MOMENTARILY. NEW YEAR’S 1977 IS NO EXCEPTION, BUT CONTRARY TO MOST YEARS, WHEN POLITICAL LULL TURNS OUT TO HAVE BEEN NO MORE THAN THAT, WE SENSE THAT COINCIDENCE OF DECEMBER ELECTIONS AND FORMATION OF NEW FUKUDA CABINET HAVE MADE THIS YEAR-END MORE OF GENUINE TURNING POINT IN POLITICAL CLIMATE THAN USUAL.
2.
WHEN LOCKHEED INVESTIGATIONS BUILT UP STEAM STARTING IN FEBRUARY 1976, COMMON WISDOM HAD IT THAT SCANDAL, LIKE A RUMOR, WOULD GO AWAY IN TRADITIONAL 75 DAYS, GIVE OR TAKE A FEW WEEKS. THIS, OF COURSE, TURNED OUT TO BE FAR FROM THE CASE. AT PRESENT JUNCTURE, HOWEVER, ALMOST EVERYBODY CONCERNED FEELS THEY HAVE HAD ABOUT ENOUGH. TO EXTENT WE CAN ASSESS PUBLIC MOOD, IT SEEMS TO HOLD THAT LDP TOOK ITS PUNISHMENT IN GENERAL ELECTION AND LITTLE IS TO BE GAINED BY BELABORING LOCKHEED OR BROADER QUESTIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND BIG-BUSINESS CORRUPTION. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT FURTHER DISCLOSURES WILL FAIL TO REVIVE MEDIA AND PUBLIC INTEREST, OR THAT OPPOSITION PARTIES WOULD NOT PURSUE ANY NEW LEADS OR NEW SCANDALS — THERE IS MUCH SPECULATION ABOUT WHETHER THE TWIN SPECTRES OF BOEING OPERATIONS ABROAD AND KCIA MACHINATIONS WILL HAUNT JAPAN IN 1977. SHOULD THEY DO SO, AND PARTICULARLY SHOULD THEY AFFECT MEMBERS OF NEW TEAM, CONSEQUENCES COULD BE FAR-REACHING. BUT UNLESS THEY DO, BURDEN SEEMS TO BE ON LDP TO GET ON WITH NATION’S BUSINESS, PRINCIPALLY ECONOMIC, WHILE PUTTING ITS OWN HOUSE IN ORDER.
3.
INCENTIVES FOR LDP ARE CONSIDERABLE. ELECTION SETBACK CAME AS REAL SHOCK TO ALL FACTIONS. WHILE A GOOD DEAL OF BACKBITING PERSISTS ON PART OF BOTH MIKI FACTION AND ANTI-MIKI COALITION AS TO HOW OUTCOME COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED, AT THIS JUNCTURE OVERRIDING CONCERN IS TO REUNIFY PARTY SO AS TO CONFIRM IMPRESSION THAT ONLY LDP IS CAPABLE OF GOVERNING JAPAN AND REPRESENTING IT IN WORLD FORUMS. UPPER HOUSE ELECTIONS IN JUNE WOULD HAVE PRESENTED FORMIDABLE CHALLENGE FOR LDP IN ANY EVENT, WITH BETTER THAN EVEN CHANCE PARTY WILL LOSE ITS MAJORITY, BUT AGAINST BACKGROUND OF LOWER HOUSE ELECTION RESULTS CONCERN OF PARTY LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN COMPOUNDED. WHILE FUKUDA CAN BE EXPECTED ACTIVELY TO ASSERT LEADERSHIP OF HIS CABINET — HE WILL BE UNIMPEDED BY PRESENCE OF OTHER FACTIONAL LEADERS — WE ALSO ANTICIPATE THAT TACTICS EVIDENT IN FIRST DAYS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION OF CONCILIATION AND STUDIED EFFORT TO APPEAR RESPONSIBLE IN RELATIONS WITH OPPOSITION AS WELL AS WITH OWN PARTY WILL PERSIST IN WEEKS AHEAD. IN PRACTICAL TERMS THIS COULD MEAN AVOIDANCE OF SHOWDOWNS ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES, AND PERHAPS MORE THAN LIP SERVICE TO WILLINGNESS TO ENTERTAIN OPPOSITION PROPOSALS FOR COMPROMISE. DESIRE TO AVOID CONFLICT ON DOMESTIC FRONT MAY BE ADDITIONAL STIMULUS FOR FUKUDA TO SEEK INITIATIVES ON INTERNATIONAL SCENE THAT MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO ACCRUE LARGE MEASURE OF POPULAR SUPPORT — LIKELY CANDIDATES ARE RENEWED EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON PEACE TREATY WITH PRC AND POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD EARLY ADVANCED-NATION SUMMIT.
4.
OPPOSITION PARTIES FIND THEMSELVES IN SOMEWHAT UNEASY POSITION OF ENHANCED INFLUENCE. IT IS NOT IN NATURE OF SOCIALISTS (JSP) TO AVOID TROUBLE, BUT THEY ARE CONSTRAINED BY NEW-FOUND SUCCESS OF MORE MODERATE OPPOSITION FORCES, I.E., KOMEITO, DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS (DSP) AND NEW LIBERAL CLUB (NLC), WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE STRUCK RESPONSIVE CORD WITH ELECTORATE. FUNDAMENTAL DILEMMA JSP WILL FACE AS MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTY IS WHETHER, DESPITE PREVAILING MOOD OF MODERATION, IT SHOULD ASSUME MORE RADICAL POSTURE IN ORDER TO REESTABLISH ITSELF AS PARTY WITH DISTINCTIVE POLITICAL COLORATION, OR WHETHER IT SHOULD EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES OF OPPOSITION COALITION. IN PRACTICE IT IS LIKELY TO TACK IN BOTH DIRECTIONS: STRIKE INTERMITTENT MILITARNT JPOSES ON ISSUES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN, E.G., RIGHT TO STRIKE, BUT AVOID PROLONGED PARLIAMENTARY FACTIONALISM THAT WOULD LABEL PARTY AS UNRECONSTRUCTED.
5.
IF ELECTION SHOCKED LDP, IT PROBABLY EQUALLY SHOCKED ALL PARTI OF LEFT WING, WHICH REALIZED IT WAS AS ILL-PREPARED AS EVER TO OFFER NATION ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP, AND THAT EVEN IF LDP HAD LOST ITS MAJORITY, JAPAN WAS YEARS FROM POINT WHERE ANYTHING SHORT OF LDP-DOMINATED ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE IN POSITION TO GOVERN. WHILE MUCH WILL DEPEND ON UNFORESEEN EVENTS, WE WOULD GUESS THAT MONTHS AHEAD WILL SEE ALL OPPOSITION PARTIES, INCLUDING JSP, VIE WITH EACH OTHER IN TAKING “RESPONSIBLE” POSTURES. WE WILL ALSO SEE MUCH COMING AND GOING BETWEEN THE OPPOSITION PARTIES, BUT WE DOUBT WHETHER THE END-PRODUCT WILL GO MUCH BEYOND HIGH-SOUNDING AGREEMENTS FOR TACTICAL COOPERATION IN DIET, AND LIMITED ARRANGEMENTS TO WORK TOGETHER IN PARTICULAR ELECTION SITUATIONS.
6.
ON BALANCE THEN, WE BELIEVE THAT EVEN AFTER JAPAN RETURNS TO WORK NEXT YEAR, ALMOST ALL POLITICAL CIRCLES AS WELL AS PUBLIC WILL BE PREDISPOSED TO A PERIOD OF RELATIVE POLITICAL CALM, WITH ATTENTION BEING FOCUSED ON BUDGET DEBATE AND MEASURES DESIGNED TO STEP UP ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. SHOULD LOCKHEED-LIKE DEVELOPMENTS OCCUR, THE POLITICAL WATERS WILL QUICKLY BECOME ROILED ONCE MORE, BUT NO DESIRE TO SEE THIS HAPPEN IS EVIDENT.

HODGSON

NOTE BY OC/T: PARAGRAPH 4. AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

  1. Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential. Repeated for information to the Embassies in Bangkok, Bonn, Canberra, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, London, Manila, Paris, Rangoon, Rome, Seoul, Taipei, Vientiane, to the Consulate in Hong Kong, to the Liaison Office in Beijing, to CINCPAC in Honolulu, and to COMUS Japan in Yokota.
  2. The Embassy analyzed Japanese politics.