Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

18. Memorandum From John A. Froebe of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, July 21, 1975.¹ ²

Washington, July 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION

July 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR [JAF initialed]

SUBJECT: Recent Australian Initiative on SEATO

State (EA) has sent you an options memorandum on the recent Australian initiative to terminate SEATO forthwith. I differ with State’s definition of the policy options, and I would also attach greater importance to two aspects of the description of the policy problem.

The Policy Problem

I would place greater emphasis than State has on two points:

• — Whitlam, embattled at home politically, is probably trying to produce a dramatic foreign policy breakthrough. He may also hope that, by seizing on SEATO, he can eliminate a regional security pact he has long described as an anachronism and can further distinguish Australian foreign policy from that of the U.S. Even if he now wants to do away only with the SEATO organization but not the Pact (this seemed ambiguous in his government’s original representation), Whitlam could be expected to claim that he had further diffused the situation in Southeast Asia.
• — The U.S. still has a substantial interest in SEATO as the embodiment of our security commitment to Thailand. The Thai NSSM now in process is considering how much effort and resources we should devote to preservation of our alliance with Thailand — in terms of the potential regional impact if Thailand shifted toward neutralism. We do not want to see the precipitate end of SEATO as an organization nor as a treaty until we have been able to sort this situation out and have consulted with the Thai. Particularly in the wake of Indochina, SEATO’s early termination could be destabilizing.

The Policy Options

In contrast to State’s options, we would:

• — Define the options in a way that gives greater emphasis to our Thai interests in SEATO and to Thailand’s interest in the Treaty Organization. State’s options tend to submerge the Thai interest in a consideration of SEATO members attitudes generally — which in effect gives greater relative weight to the Australian view than we believe the present context justifies.
• — Recognize that the Philippines is likely to acquiesce in Thailand’s position on whether SEATO is to be continued and if so in what form. The State options assume that, even if Thailand wants to continue SEATO for at least the near term, the Philippines might well side with Australia to oppose SEATO’s continuation.

We would base our options on the assumption (1) that Thailand for at least the next one to two years will want to continue the SEA TO organization in some form (the Thai have pulled back recently from their effort to normalize relations with Hanoi, possibly because of their success in normalizing with Peking); and (2) that the Philippines, if Thailand wants to retain SEATO for the near term, will at least not oppose continuation of the organization and the treaty. If this assumption is invalid, then our policy presumably would be — as you indicated in your Japan Society speech — to phase the SEATO organization and treaty out as quietly as possible.

Option 1

That we support continuation of the SEATO organization as well as of the Pact.

— This would demonstrate U.S. resolve to continue commitments desired by their beneficiaries, and would strengthen the hand of the Thai senior military leadership in current Thai foreign policy debate. On the other hand, this would probably involve us in another contentious round of foreign policy differences with the Whitlam Government.

Option 2

That we agree to disassemble the SEATO organization quietly, but to preserve the military pact.

— This would preserve the legal embodiment of our security relationship with the Thai, and thus would not undercut our professions that we will maintain a security presence in Southeast Asia. It would reduce the potential for a confrontation with the Whitlam Government since Canberra now indicates it will not oppose the pact for the near term at least. On the other hand, this option could raise some questions about the strength of our security resolve in Southeast Asia.

Option 3

That we agree to phase out both the SEATO organization and the Manila Pact.

— This would avoid almost any chance of confrontation with the Australians. On the other hand, it could raise substantial serious questions about our security resolve in Southeast Asia.

My View

I favor Option 1. The Thai, in preparing for Prime Minister Khukrit’s meeting with President Marcos in Manila on July 21, have indicated to Embassy Bangkok that they want SEATO to continue in its present form at least for the near term. The Marcos Government, though it recently has become interested in SEATO’s gradual demise, is not likely to side with Australia against Thailand on this issue. New Zealand has given no indication that it wants to alter SEATO at this point. If we do not take a strong position against further immediate alteration of SEATO (we cooperated with the de -emphasis last year on SEATO’s purely military aspects), our position could easily be misread in Southeast Asia generally as well as by the conflicting groups in Thailand’s internal foreign policy debate.

Tactically, we should try to isolate the Whitlam Government quickly on this issue, and to make clear to Whitlam that his timing is bad. One means of doing this could be to demonstrate continued U.S. flexibility on SEATO by agreeing to discuss in general terms at the September SEATO Council meeting the question of SEATO’s future.

That you approve Option 1.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE

That we express willingness, when asked, to discuss SEATO’s future at the SEATO Council meeting in September.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 1, Australia (5). Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger did not initial a decision; a handwritten notation on the first page of the memorandum reads, “OBE.” At Kissinger’s staff meeting of July 22, Habib said, “The Australians have pulled away from the recommendations to dissolve SEATO.” Kissinger asked, “Would it be so bad for us if SEATO got dissolved, as long as we don’t do it?” Habib replied, “I think it’s important—what the Thais want—because the Thais are the ones that receive—they’re the only members of SEATO that don’t have a mutual security pact with us. And the Thais have indicated that they want very much for it to continue. There may be a halfway step where you keep the Manila Pact, where you don’t have the SEATO organization itself.” (National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 8)
2. Froebe recommended that the United States resist an Australian initiative to terminate SEATO.