166. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, January 24, 1973.1 2

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 24, 1973
PLACE: Tokyo

SUBJECT: US-Japan Security Relations; Sino-Japanese Relations


  • Mr. Fumihiko Togo, Deputy Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Richard L. Sneider, EA
  • COPIES TO: EA - Mr. Green
  • EA - Mr. Sneider
  • ACA
  • ROC
  • ISA - Mr. Doolin
  • Ambassador Ingersoll
  • Minister Shoesmith
  • Amembassy Tokyo - Pass to Lt. Gen. Pursley
  • Amembassy Hong Kong
  • CINCPAC - Admiral Gayler
  • CINCPAC for POLAD - Mr. Armstrong
  • Amembassy Taipei

1. US-Japan Security Relations

Togo expressed some concern about the forthcoming Diet session in terms of US-Japan security relations. He anticipates a more subtle line of attack on US bases in Japan, based upon local difficulties. He feels, however, that these attacks can be handled by a combination of a more positive posture on the part of the Tanaka government and efforts on both the part of the US and Japanese Governments to avoid undue local problems. He also thought that the ending of the Viet-Nam war would reduce the emotional context of anti-base attacks, and in this respect be helpful.

I mentioned to Togo the problems involved in providing for contingencies after the US consolidates and reduces its bases. He said that he had recognized this as a problem, and recalled our previous conversations on this subject. I then raised with him the question which we had discussed in the past of some form of emergency re-entry rights. He advised against any formal approach on this problem for the present and probably for the next two years. He did not think that the Japanese Government was ready to face this issue and feared that it might result in opening up all [Page 2]aspects of the SOFA rather than just those provisions regarding emergency re-entry. He urged that we not open up SOFA until the Japanese Government was in a position to deal with the pressures to revise only those few aspects which would permit emergency re-entry but not other aspects which it would not be desirable to open up.

2. Sino-Japanese Relations

Togo felt that at the present stage in Sino-Japanese relations it was important to organize embassies in Tokyo and Peking, and take care of the initial agreements, trade and aviation, etc. However, Japan should be prepared to use the opening of relations to raise more important substantive issues, such as Korea and Viet-Nam. There was no point in having relations with Peking, he commented, unless Japan was prepared to discuss these issues with Peking. He thought that perhaps after another six months or so, once the new Japanese Ambassador was well set up in Peking, there would be an opportunity to begin probing Peking on these more important political problems.

Togo also mentioned that the PRC had been most adamant in refusing to take over the site of the GRC embassy. Despite all the Japanese Government efforts to provide for transfer of the Chinese embassy site, the PRC has insisted upon locating their embassy in a different area. The Japanese Government was now faced with both the disposal of the former Chinese embassy and finding a new acceptable location for the PRC embassy.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 4 Japan-US. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Sneider.
  2. Togo and Sneider discussed U.S.-Japan Security Relations and Sino-Japanese relations.