163. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, August 25, 1976, 8 a.m.1 2
The Secretary’s 8:00 a.m. Staff Meeting
Wednesday, August 25,
1976
Participants
- M - Mr. Eagleburger
- AF - Mr. Seelye, Acting
- ARA - Mr. Shlaudeman
- EA - Mr. Hummel
- EUR - Mr. Hartman
- NEA - Mr. Dubs, Acting
- INR - Mr. Kirk, Acting
- S/P - Mr. Lord
- EB - Mr. Boeker
- S/PRS Mr. Funseth
- PM - Mr. Ericson
- IO - Mr. Lewis
- H - Ambassador McCloskey
- L - Mr. Aldrich, Acting
- S/S - Mr. Borg Conference Reporter
[Omitted is material unrelated to Indonesia.]
MR. HUMMEL: Sir, we are going to have to disappoint the Indonesians who would like to get a brief on the standard missile system — the reason is, no one wants to do this.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don’t know what the “standard missile system” is.
MR. HABIB: A ship-to-ship missile, which is now a sort of almost obsolescent ship-to-ship missile.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, we have to do it: First, because they are friends .
But what is the second reason?
[Page 3]MR. HUMMEL: No, the first reason is that this thing is highly classified and the Indonesians could leak it.
And the additional reason, and perhaps the more powerful, is that this could, introduce a more powerful tool into a country where we are not introducing sophisticated weapons — it is also an area close to the Indonesians neighbors — but the Congress —
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I didn’t know we were taking that position with the Congress.
MR. HUMMEL: Yes, sir, we are tied up.
MR. HABIB: Congress is taking the position with us.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Did I mishear? Didn’t somebody say something about it being obsolescent?
CHORUS: Oh, yes, obsolescent.
MR. HABIB: There is an advanced version called “Harpoon” which is what everybody really wants. The “standard” is the precedent to the Harpoon. Am I correct, Dick?
MR. ERICSON: Correct. But the Harpoon is a more sophisticated one — there is no question about that; but there are also great elements of sophistication in the standard missile.
[Page 4]MR. HABIB: And we have only given the standard to whom? Iran?
MR. ERICSON: Iran, Turkey, Korea — and various others.
MR. HUMMEL: Australia and NATO nations, and Japan — but we have not given them to a country like Indonesia and we would certainly have a lot of Congressional flak over it.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Whether we have Congressional flak or not depends on how much we want to defend it.
MR. HUMMEL: Well it imparts on our non-transfer policy, now professing the intention of not contributing to the arms races, and mutual escalation.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Whom is Indonesia racing against? What race is Indonesia engaged in?
It is a tremendous contribution of $35 million a year to a country with a population of 120 million and who wants to protect its own security — and who used to get $300 million a year from the Russians, and probably will get it again after they have approved our high moral principles and we drive them out in that direction.
What race, with whom, are we preventing by this?
[Page 5]MR. HUMMEL: Two neighbors, quite likely would try and both could get the money — Malaysia and Singapore and —
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I thought they are all on our side. Did I miss something?
MR. HUMMEL: No —-
MR. HABIB: No, we haven’t lost them yet.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: How does it disadvantage the United States to have those countries armed, or better armed, when they are not racing against each other?
MR. HUMMEL: I can’t quarrel with that. But that is not what we have said in our announced ample strength — and overstrengths —
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don’t recall that the announced: ample strength policy was cleared with me. Who announced it?
MR. HUMMEL: Where does that stand, Dick?
MR. ERICSON: I don’t know it’s all that clear.
We have been trying to help Indonesia — gave them grant aid — but we would simply prefer not to give this type of missile to them.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: On what grounds?
[Page 6]MR. ERICSON: On the grounds Mr. Hummel cited - Congressional difficulty.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Congressional difficulties are my problem.
MR. ERICSON: And then secondly, of course, is the security question. I don’t think the missile emplaced is obsolete.
MR. HABIB: I didn’t say, “Obsolete,” it was —
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, did the Pentagon raise the security question?
MR. HABIB: The Pentagon doesn’t want to give it to them. They said so very flatly, that is the problem. The Pentagon argues that it is totally —
SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is hard to hear the Pentagon express themselves against the gnashing of teeth and weeping of our people here who say that you can’t do that to us.
MR. HABIB: On the contrary we went to the Pentagon on it, and generally they say that we give what we can to Indonesia; but the Pentagon said, “You can’t give this to them, it is too sophisticated and the security is not good in Indonesia and the missile security will be threatened.”
And when I said, “Obsolescent,” what I meant is “advanced version.”
[Page 7]But the concern is that the guidance systems of the missile will not be protected. The only people we have given it to are our allies.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Have we given it to the South Vietnamese?
MR. HABIB: No —
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I will have to talk to Clements.
MR. HABIB: — but the Pentagon does feel strongly about it and that is what has tipped the balance, more than Clements — so that you would have to have a club over their heads to make them agree.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Just wanted to find out what the people really think.
MR. LORD: Was the Pentagon against giving it in Viet-Nam?
MR. HUMMEL: The main fear was that the Indonesians would not protect the security of this thing. That is the argument. And it is probably true.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, you better not send this until I have a chance to think about it.