151. Telegram 1250 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, January 28, 1976, 0928Z.1 2
January
28, 1976, 0928Z
TELEGRAM
Department of State
JAKARTA 1250
R280928Z JAN 76
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE
WASHDC 2421
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINS, ID, PO, PT, AS
SUBJECT: INDONESIA AND TIMOR
REF: A JAKARTA 1160 b JAKARTA 1157
- 1.
- IN PRIVATE MEETING WITH ME JANUARY 28 FOREIGN MINISTER MALIK ESTIMATED THAT AS MUCH AS SIX MONTHS WOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE “INDONESIAN VOLUNTEERS” COULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM TIMOR AND ANOTHER SIX MONTHS BEFORE ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION POSSIBLE.
- 2.
- IN RESPONSE TO MY EXPRESSION OF INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING VISIT OF UN REPRESENTATIVE, MALIK BEGAN WITH HISTORICAL ACCOUNT. HE EMPHASIZED THAT INDONESIA HAD TRIED HARD TO KEEP PORTUGUESE INVOLVED AND TO AVOID ANY DIRECT INDONESIAN INTERVENTION. WHEN PORTUGAL APPEARED LIKELY RECOGNIZE FRETILIN AND WHEN LATTER SOUTH RECOGNITION FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, INDONESIA FELT IT HAD NO CHOICE AND, ON DECEMBER 7, “WENT IN.”
- 3.
- ACCORDING MALIK, UN REPRESENTATIVE WINSPEARE GUICCIARDI HAD VISITED FIVE CITIES IN TIMOR BUT DID NOT FEEL HIS MANDATE WOULD BE FULLY CARRIED OUT WITHOUT CONTACT WITH FRETILIN LEADERS INSIDE TIMOR. HE HAD DELAYED DEPARTURE AND AS OF JANUARY 28 WAS STILL IN JAKARTA. NEITHER AUSTRALIAN NOT INDONESIAN CIVILIAN AIRLINE BELIEVED IT COULD GUARANTEE SAFETY FOR FLIGHT TO SAME AS SUGGESTED BY [Page 2] FRETILIN REPRESENTATIVE HORTA IN NEW YORK. INDONESIANS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT TRIP AND SUSPECTED ALSO THAT IF UN REPRESENTATIVE LANDED IN SAME, FRETILIN LEADERS WOULD TRY TO USE AIRCRAFT TO ESCAPE. MALIK SAID HE HOPED SITUATION WOULD BE SUCH SOON THAT UN COULD VISIT SAME.
- 4.
- MALIK SAID HE WAS PUSHING TO ENCOURAGE AS RAPID CONSOLIDATION OF POSITION OF PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AS POSSIBLE. HE EXPECTED THREE MORE KEY TOWNS WOULD BE TAKEN SOON: VIQUEGUE, LOS PALOS AND SAME. THIS WOULD COMPLETE MAJOR MILITARY ACTION BUT THREE TO SIX MONTHS WOULD BE REQUIRE BEFORE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE ADMINISTRATION IN PLACE AND TRAINED POLICE AND MILITIA TO STAND ON ITS OWN FEET.
- 5.
- INDONESIA THEN FELT THAT ANOTHER SIX MONTHS WOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE SITUATION SUFFICIENTLY ORDERLY TO PERMIT ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN WHATEVER FORM PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT FELT BEST. IN THIS CONNECTION, INDONESIA WAS ENCOURAGING PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT TO BRING AS MANY MODERATE FRETILIN PEOPLE AS POSSIBLE INTO ADMINISTRATION AND THIS WAS BEING DONE. IDEA WAS TO ISOLATE RADICAL FRETILIN LEADERS IN INTERIOR AND OUTSIDE COUNTRY.
- 6.
- IN DISCUSSING MILITARY CONSOLIDATION, MALIK EXPRESSED SOME IMPATIENCE WITH PAST OPERATION AND SAID HE READILY UNDERSTOOD DESIRABILITY OF QUICK ACTION AND EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF “VOLUNTEERS.” HE SUGGESTED EMBASSY MILITARY ATTACHE SHOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HANKAM SINCE HANKAM APPARENTLY NEEDED SOME EQUIPMENT IN ORDER TO ENABLE FASTER CONSOLIDATION. HE SAID AIR FORCE HAD NOT YET BEEN USED AND PERHAPS THIS WAS AREA WHERE EQUIPMENT NECESSARY.
- 7.
- COMMENT: INDONESIAN’S TIMETABLE OBVIOUSLY DOES NOT GIVE PROMISE OF
EARLY CONCLUSION. I DOUBT THERE IS MUCH WE CAN DO TO ACCELERATE IT
ALTHOUGH PERHAPS WE CAN KEEP QUIET PRESSURE ON THROUGH AUSTRALIANS
AND UN. I DO NOT INTEND FOLLOW-UP ON
SUGGESTED CONTACT WITH HANKAM. LAST THING WE NEED AT PRESENT MOMENT
IS FURTHER COMPLICATION OF SUPPLYING EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT TO COMPLETE
MOP UP OF TIMOR.
NEWSOM