147. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, December 23, 1975, 8:12 a.m.1 2
In Attendance -Tues., December 23, 1975
- Secretary of State Kissinger Chairman
- P Mr. Sisco
- E Mr. Robinson
- M Mr. Maw
- M Mr. Eagleburger
- C Mr. Sonnenfeldt
- AF Mr. Schaufele
- ARA Mr. Rogers
- EA Mr. Habib
- EUR Mr. Hartman
- NEA Mr. Sober (Acting)
- INR Mr. Saunders
- S/P Mr. Lord
- EB Mr. Enders
- S/PRS Mr. Funseth (Acting)
- PM Mr. Stern (Acting)
- IO Mr. Lewis
- H Mr. McCloskey
- L Mr. Leigh
- S/S Mr. Springsteen
- S Mr. Bremer
- S Mr. Adams
[Omitted is material unrelated to Timor.]
Phil?
MR. HABIB: The United Nations Security Council yesterday passed a resolution unanimously on the question of Timor. The substance of it is, (1), it deplores the Indian action sending its troops in. It regrets the Portuguese ability to continue fighting and calls upon Indonesians to withdraw.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Calls what?
MR. HABIB: Calls upon Indonesians to withdraw from Timor.
One other thing: It calls upon the Secretary-General to send a representative to Timor to protect [Page 3] these rights of the Timorese people. The Indonesians have accepted it and the Portuguese have accepted it. The Indonesians have said they would cooperate with the representative.
Now, I think what that cooperation will entail will probably be that the Indonesians read it that they will withdraw their forces when order and stability and the proper care of the —
SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is the military situation there?
MR. HABIB: The military situation is that there are approximately 15,000 troops on the ground in Timor. They’ve got the entire border area bordering on Portuguese Timor. They’ve got a sizable fleet offshore which is available for supply.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do you mean “they’ve got the entire border area bordering on?”
MR. HABIB: Well, East Timor is only half the island. The other half is Indonesian. So what they’ve done is moved across the border and they’ve gone about 10 or 15 miles inland. It’s entirely taken over by Indonesian forces. There’s also an enclave in Portuguesan Timor which is completely taken over and they’ve established [Page 4] an Indonesian-managed local government.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do you mean? They took over an enclave in their own territory?
MR. HABIB: There was an enclave in Portuguese Timor —
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh.
MR. HABIB: — which was in their own territory, which is inside the border area.
Generally speaking, the people who are opposed to it have taken to the hills where three or four groups, three or four names, who are Indonesian-organized Timorese, are beginning to sort of assume the civil administrative functions — the fighting, basically.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: What’s the theory — that Timor is going to become independent?
MR. HABIB: The theory is that after a period of time, after the Timorese have decided that things are well under control, they will pull their troops out. So anybody who didn’t want to join Indonesia won’t be around or won’t be in the hills. That is, I would say, roughly the scenario that the Indonesians plan.
So, in any event, I think this is a development [Page 5] which suits our general interests, suits the general interests of the area in the sense that I think this will reduce within a couple of weeks the level of fighting. By that time the Indonesians should have mopped up all the areas that are really important and will have taken all the crossroads of their enemies up in the hills The Indonesians are quite good in anti-guerrilla work there. It was not exactly the smoothest operation since Caesar cross the Rubicon — or whoever it was — but it’s the level that’s going on now.
There’s some fighting going on between the Indonesian troops. Nobody sees anything. There’s no press there. They don’t allow the press in. And they’ve had the same kind of running battle up in Kalimantan, up in Borneo, in that area, for years. They can deal with that kind of running sore.
I’m putting it so that the best circumstances are to our interest.
Now, the worst circumstances — if you want to give it that — would be a head-on class between the UN representative — whoever he may be — and I haven’t seen him — have you seen him? (Addressed Mr. Lewis.)
MR. LEWIS: No
[Page 6]MR. HABIB: He’s supposed to get out there soon. I mean a head-on clash between him and the Indonesian authorities. Those guys are tough and mean. There are all sorts of reports, like: “Kill all the frontal leaders you can find so we can get rid of them once and for all” — things like that.
We are continuing to take a hands-off attitude. We’re limiting our comments to the absolute essential — that is to say nothing —
MR. LEWIS: We made no statement in the Council at all.
MR. HABIB: We made no statement in the Security Council at all. The Chinese tried to move a few controversial amendments to the resolution, but there was nothing to it. They didn’t pursue it.
The only other item, unless we have some further questions — the only other item I have is Sonny Montgomery’s group—
SECRETARY KISSINGER: What should I say at my press conference today?
MR. HABIB: Well, I think the only thing you should do is call attention to the UN resolution and say that you think the matter is taken care of in the [Page 7] international forum and the United States will await the results of that.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do I say if they ask me about the use of American equipment?
MR. HABIB: I think the answer should be that you have the matter under study, at this stage.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: That’s what I said on Turkish aid.
MR. HABIB: Well, they’ve come out with a statement saying they have captured U.S., Australian and British arms from Indonesian troops. The Indonesians have a debate among themselves whether to admit their troops should be there, with Malik and the Foreign Office wanting to continue to deny it. Everybody knows.
We have a letter from Senator Hart asking about the use of our equipment —
SECRETARY KISSINGER: So what should I say — we are studying whether their troops are there and after we have determined that we will determine whether they have any American equipment?
MR. HABIB: If they press you, you can then say there is an assumption that some American — we haven’t told the Indonesians we’re going to say this — we know there is [Page 8] some American equipment there. We know that three of the destroyers that were used to shell Dili —
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, let’s not overdo it now.
MR. HABIB: — that we know — but are they still there? Maybe.
MR. SISCO: Maybe you could say the probability that American weapons —
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I don’t want to leave the implication inevitably that if U.S. equipment was used it’s illegal. I don’t accept that either.
MR. SISCO: That’s right.
MR. HABIB: I’d stress the UN resolution. You then have a situation in which the Indonesians have committed themselves and have accepted to withdraw. And that doesn’t change the validity of the other argument that there was a defense element in the action of the Indonesians. After all, there were actions across the Indonesian border into Indonesian Timor on the part of the rebels. And the idea of a chaotic situation in an archipelago — half an island —
SECRETARY KISSINGER: O.K., I get the point.
MR. HABIB: — I think would be basically undefended.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 9. Secret. Habib referred to a letter from Gary Hart to Rumsfeld. The letter, December 16, asked whether U.S. weapons were used in the Indonesian invasion of East Timor and whether U.S. officials possessed foreknowledge of the Indonesian plans. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia [6])↩
- Kissinger and his aides discussed the situation in East Timor.↩