Office of the Historian

144. Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, December 12, 1975.1 2

Washington, December 12, 1975

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM

December 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES [TJB initialed]

SUBJECT: Future Prospects for Indonesia in Portuguese Timor

You raised the question about the rapidity of Indonesian consolidation of control over Portuguese Timor. I asked Evelyn Colbert, the National Intelligence Officer for Japan and Pacific Asia, to prepare a memorandum on this question (Tab A). The key points which her memorandum makes are:

  • — Indonesian forces have now established control over Timor’s two principal cities, Dili and Baucau.
  • — Fretilin forces will not be able to obstruct a rapid and complete extension of Indonesian control over the remaining administrative centers of the colony.
  • — Fretilin leaders seemed to have decided to conserve men and supplies for a future guerrilla campaign.
  • — Fretilin forces will be able to carry on guerrilla activities for some time to come; however, their effectiveness is suspect.
  • — Indonesian forces already outweigh Fretilin’s by 15,000 to 5,000+, and Indonesian equipment, materiel, reinforcement, and resupply capabilities are far superior to those of Fretilin.

The main conclusion is that Fretilin-led-guerrilla activities, while causing some political and military problems, will not seriously affect Indonesian control. Fretilin will also probably attempt to make maximum international effort to publicize its cause, but over the long range such actions are unlikely to seriously disturb Indonesian control or to arouse much foreign interest.

  1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia (6). Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Tab A is attached but not published. Scowcroft wrote “Thanks” and initialed the memorandum. The same day, Granger sent Scowcroft a memorandum on Indonesian use of MAP equipment in Timor. (Ibid.)↩
  2. Barnes sent Scowcroft a memorandum on Indonesia’s future prospects in Portuguese Timor.↩