135. Telegram 225061 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, September 20, 1975, 1913Z.1 2
September
20, 1975, 1913Z
TELEGRAM
Department of State
225061
R 201913Z SEP 75
FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY
JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
STATE 225061
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, PFOR, ID, PO, PT
SUBJ: GENERAL MOERDANI’S COMMENTS ON TIMOR
- 1.
- DURING HIS VISIT HERE IN CONNECTION WITH THE INDONESIAN MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TEAM, GENERAL MOERDANI DISCUSSED INDONESIAN POLICY TOWARDS TIMOR
WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB, AS WELL AS WITH OTHER DEPARTMENT AND CIA OFFICERS. ALTHOUGH HIS STATEMENTS
VARIED SLIGHTLY DEPENDING ON HIS INTERLOCUTOR, HE WAS RELATIVELY
CONSISTENT ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:
- A.
- SUHARTO HAS ADOPTED A VERY PATIENT POLICY TOWARDS TIMOR, FREQUENTLY JUSTIFYING IT TO HIS COLLEAGUES IN QUITE IDEALISTIC TERMS SUCH AS THE IMPORTANCE OF BEHAVING CAUTIOUSLY WHILE INDONESIA IS POOR AND WEAK SO THAT THE RECORD WILL NOT HAUNT THEIR CHILDREN WHEN INDONESIA ACHIEVES GREATER STATUS. THE INDONESIANS ARE FULLY AWARE OF POTENTIAL CRITICISM AND DIFFICULTIES IN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERS AND IN THE US CONGRESS IF THEY SHOULD MOVE MILITARILY AGAINST THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE OF TIMOR.
- B.
- INDONESIA DOES NOT INTEND A MILITARY TAKE-OVER OF PORTUGUESE TIMOR AT THIS TIME, ASSUMING THERE IS NO SUDDEN DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD AFFECT INDONESIAN SECURITY. IF A DECISION WERE MADE TO MOVE MILITARILY, THE INDONESIANS ESTIMATE THAT THEY COULD PACIFY THE WHOLE OF PORTUGUESE TIMOR IN A WEEK TO A MONTH USING 1100 MEN. THEY COULD TAKE THE CITY OF DILI AND THE AIRPORT, AND ESTABLISH OSTENSIBLE CONTROL IN LESS THAN 24 HOURS.
- C.
- INDONESIA HAS OFFICERS, NCO’S, AND ENLISTED MEN OPERATING IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR WHERE THEY ARE TRYING TO BEEF UP THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE UDT AND APODETI THROUGH ARMS SUPPLY, ETC. NEVERTHELESS, NEITHER OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS IS WORTH MUCH.
- D.
- FRETILIN HAS FIVE OR SIX COMMUNIST OR STRONGLY MARXIST INDIVIDUALS IN ITS LEADERSHIP BUT ON THE WHOLE IT IS A FAIRLY REASONABLE ORGANIZATION WITH FAR MORE PROSPECT POLITICALLY THAN THE UDT OR APODETI. IF THE FRETILIN CAN BE ISOLATED FROM EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE, THEY WILL DISCOVER IN A YEAR OR SO THAT THEY HAVE NO RECOURSE EXCEPT TO DEAL WITH INDONESIA. IF THEY DO, INDONESIA MAY BE ABLE TO WORK SOMETHING OUT WITH THEM.
- E.
- THERE IS NO MAJOR THREAT OF EXTERNAL INTERVENTION. ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN A CONVINCING SIGHTING OF A SUBMARINE, WHICH BY DEDUCTION WAS SOVIET, MOERDANI IS HIGHLY SKEPTICAL OF REPORTS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE PROVIDED A LARGE NUMBER OF GUNS. MOREOVER, HE SAID THE INDONESIANS HAVE ASSURANCES FROM THE RUSSIANS OF NONINTERVENTION. HE IS SLIGHTLY LESS SURE ABOUT THE CHINESE BECAUSE OF TRAFFIC BETWEEN THE SUBSTANTIAL CHINESE MINORITY IN TIMOR AND MACAU. IN ANY EVENT, THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF EFFECTIVE SOVIET OR CHINESE INVOLVEMENT.
- F.
- AS REFLECTED IN OTHER SOURCES, MOERDANI CONSIDERS PORTUGUESE PROCRASTINATION TO HAVE BEEN UNHELPFUL AND HAS NO EXPECTATION OF AUSTRALIAN OR MALAYSIAN SUPPORT FOR MILITARY PACIFICATION.
- 2.
- MOERDANI ACKNOWLEDGED THERE WERE MANY INDONESIANS WITH A MORE ALARMIST VIEW OF THE SITUATION, AND HE DID NOT FLATLY RULE OUT A SHIFT IN SUHARTO’S POSITION. THE GENERAL IMPRESSION HE LEFT, HOWEVER, WAS OF A RATHER SKILLFUL, PATIENT STRATEGY; I.E.: (A) AVOIDANCE IF POSSIBLE OF CRUDE, LARGE-SCALE INDONESIAN MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST PORTUGUESE TIMOR, (B) RELATIVELY DISCRETE, COVERT INDONESIAN MILITARY ACTIONS TO ISOLATE AND PRESUMABLY PENETRATE FRETILIN SO THAT IT WILL BE FORCED TO COME TO TERMS WITH INDONESIA IN ABOUT A YEAR’S TIME; AND (C) CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR A QUICK SURGICAL MILITARY ACTION TO TAKE OVER IF SITUATION NECESSITATES.
KISSINGER