Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

121. Telegram 3570 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, March 26, 1975, 0455Z.¹ ²

March 26, 1975, 0455Z

TELEGRAM
Department of State
JAKARTA 3570

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7225
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR JOHN NORTON MOORE
E.O. 116521: GDS
TAGS: PLOS

SUBJECT: LOS NEGOTIATIONS WITH INDONESIA
RE: JAKARTA 3542

1. FOLLOWING ARE EMBASSY’S COMMENTS ON CURRENT SITUATION RELATING TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH INDONESIA ON LOS. IN SUMMARY, WE BELIEVE ATTITUDE NOW PREVAILS IN GOI WHICH FEELS EARLY AGREEMENT WITH U.S. ON ARCHIPELAGO AND STRAITS NOT IN GOI INTEREST. MINISTER JUSTICE MOCHTAR NOW CLEARLY IN CHARGE AND MAY BELIEVE U.S. WILL ULTIMATELY ACCEPT LESS THAN DETAILED AGREEMENT ON DEFINITION IN EXCHANGE FOR SUPPORT ON STRAITS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE FEEL WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR AT HIGHEST INDONESIAN LEVELS EFFORTS WE HAVE MADE, BUT NOT PRESS FOR EARLY AGREEMENT WITH GOI AT GENEVA. U.S. OPPOSITION TO ARCHIPELAGO MAY BE REQUIRED, BUT IT SHOULD NOT BE OF NATURE WHICH WILL CAUSE BILATERAL PROBLEMS OR WILL CLOSE DOOR TO ULTIMATE AGREEMENT END SUMMARY.

2. FROM OUTSET OF EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH INDONESIA ON ARCHIPELAGO AND STRAITS, WE HAVE FACED OPPOSING ATTITUDES WITHIN GOI. ONE HELD LARGELY IN HANKAM, HAS RECOGNIZED U.S. MILITARY TRANSIT REQUIREMENTS AS BEING IN INDONESIA’S INTEREST AND HAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE CANNOT BE MEANINGFUL ESTABLISHMENT OF ARCHIPELAGO PRINCIPLE WITHOUT AGREEMENT OF MAJOR MARITIME POWERS AND PARTICULARLY U.S.

3. OTHER ATTITUDE, REPRESENTED BY MINISTER JUSTICE AND WORKING LEVELS IN FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, DOES NOT DISPUTE DESIRABILITY TRANSIT RIGHTS FOR U.S. SHIPS AND PLANES AND NEED FOR MARITIME POWER AGREEMENT TO ARCHIPELAGO PRINCIPLE BUT PROBABLY BELIEVES THESE OBJECTIVES CAN BE OBTAINED WITHOUT DIRECT AND DETAILED AGREEMENT WITH U.S. ON ARCHIPELAGO AND STRAITS WHICH WOULD RISK DAMAGING INDONESIA’S SUPPORT IN THIRD WORLD. THIS GROUP WOULD MUCH PREFER HAVING MARITIME POWERS ACCEPT ARCHIPELAGO CONCEPT “IN PRINCIPLE” FOLLOWING WHICH DETAILED UNDERSTANDINGS ON TRANSIT WOULD BE WORKED OUT ON BILATERAL BASIS. THEY BOLSTER THEIR ARGUMENT BY POINTING OUT TWO MARITIME POWERS, U.K. AND U.S.S.R. ALREADY ACCEPTED ARCHIPELAGO PRINCIPLE “IN PRINCIPLE” IN 1958.

4. MARSHAL SOEDARMONO OF HANKAM HAS SHOWN CONSIDERABLE COURAGE AND APPARENT INITIATIVE IN DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES WITH US. WHEN HE AGREED TO DRAFT MEMORANDUM WITH MOORE (JAKARTA 14917), HE MAY WELL HAVE ANTICIPATED THAT HE COULD GAIN ACCEPTANCE OF POSITION ON KEY ISSUES AS HE PUT THEM FORWARD. ITS SEEMS OBVIOUS HE HAS NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL.

5. RECENT CONTACTS WITH GOI OFFICIALS AND WHAT WE KNOW OF THEIR NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS SUGGEST MOCHTAR ATTITUDE CURRENTLY PREVAILING. THERE IS THUS RELUCTANCE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH U.S., RELUCTANCE TO BE INVOLVED IN ANY UNDERSTANDING ON WARSHIP PASSAGE AND OPPOSITION TO TRADING SUPPORT FOR ARCHIPELAGO FOR SUPPORT ON STRAITS.

6. WHAT HAS BROUGHT ABOUT THIS DEVELOPMENT? MOCHTAR’S EXPLANATION IS THAT TALKS WITH SOEDARMONO WERE PURELY “TECHNICAL” AND NOT INTENDED TO SUGGEST WHAT INDONESIA’S “POLITICAL” POSITION WOULD BE. THERE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY OTHER FACTORS. CONSULTATIONS INDONESIA HAS HELD WITH NUMEROUS COUNTRIES HAS DISCLOSED COMPLEXITY OF PROBLEM OF GAINING SUPPORT FOR ARCHIPELAGO. SHOWA MARU INCIDENT INCREASED SENSITIVITY ON STRAITS TRANSIT QUESTION. TIMOR PROBLEM HAS MADE INDONESIA MORE SENSITIVE TO THIRD WORLD OPINION. ALLEGED COMMENTS BY U.S. REPRESENTATIVES THAT SOME AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED WITH INDONESIA MENTIONED MOCHTAR AND SOEDARMONO (JAKARTA 2793) ALSO NOT OBVIOUSLY NOT HELPFUL. REPORTS MAY ALSO HAVE CAUSED SOME EMBARRASSMENT TO MARSHAL SOEDARMONO. MOCHTAR IS UNDOUBTEDLY USING THEM ALSO AS ARGUMENT TO DELAY AGREEMENT WITH US. HE MAY WELL BELIEVE THAT IN LAST ANALYSIS WE MAY HAVE TO JOIN OTHER MARITIME POWERS IN ACCEPTING ARCHIPELAGO CONCEPT IN PRINCIPLE WITHOUT INDONESIA’S HAVING TO MAKE COMMITMENT ON STRAITS. HE MAY ALSO FEEL OUTCOME OF CONFERENCE SO UNCERTAIN THAT INDONESIA HAS LITTLE TO GAIN BY MAKING CONCESSIONS TO US AT THIS TIME.

7. MOCHTAR PROBABLY NOW HOLDS KEY TO INDONESIAN POSITION. FOREIGN MINISTER MALIK MAY BE CLOSER TO MARSHAL SOEDARMONO BUT WE DOUBT HE CARRIES MUCH WEIGHT. PRESIDENT SUHARTO MAY LEAN TOWARD HANKAM POSITION BUT IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO ARGUMENTS THAT INDONESIA SHOULD NOT BE ISOLATED FROM NON-ALIGNED WORLD AND THAT NOW IS NOT PROPITIOUS TIME FOR AGREEMENT WITH U.S. AND OTHER MARITIME POWERS. LESSENING U.S. AID AND UNCERTAINTIES REGARDING OUR ROLE IN AREA MAY ALSO MAKE HIM LESS AMENABLE OUR CONCERNS.

8. GIVE THE CIRCUMSTANCES, OUR OPTIONS ARE:

A. TO SEEK TO APPROACH PRESIDENT SUHARTO ON BASIS LATEST U.S. MEMORANDUM AND URGE HIS SUPPORT FOR EARLY AGREEMENT. WE DOUBT THIS WOULD WORK AT THIS STAGE. MEMORANDUM FORWARDED BY GENEVA’S 2019 IS LESS FAVORABLE THAN MOORE-SOEDARMONO MEMORANDUM ON KEY ISSUE OF WIDTH OF SEA LANES AND LESS DEFINITE ON OVERFLIGHT.

B. VARIANT WOULD BE TO SEEK MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SUHARTO TO EXPLAIN EFFORT WE HAVE MADE TO REACH AGREEMENT, TO ADVISE HIM THAT WE MAY HAVE TO OPPOSE ARCHIPELAGO CONCEPT AT SOME STATE, BUT THAT WE STAND READY AT ANY TIME TO RESUME EFFORTS AT AGREEMENT. (WE INTEND, IN ANY EVENT, TO INSURE THAT MINISTER OF STATE SUDHARMONO IS AWARE OF THIS POSITION.)

C. THAT AMBASSADOR MOORE PRESS FOR EARLY MEETING WITH MOCHTAR AFTER HIS ARRIVAL AT GENEVA IN ORDER TO MAKE FURTHER EFFORT AT AGREEMENT.

D. THAT AMBASSADOR MOORE MAKE KNOWN HIS READINESS TO MEET WITH MOCHTAR AT ANY TIME, BUT THAT USDEL NOT PRESS FOR FURTHER MEETINGS WITH INDONESIANS AT THIS TIME.

9. EMBASSY WOULD OPT FOR COMBINATION OF OPTIONS B AND D AT THIS TIME. WE DOUBT FURTHER EFFORTS TO RESOLVE REMAINING DIFFERENCES LIKELY TO BE FRUITFUL AT LEAST UNTIL LATER IN CONFERENCE. IN INTERIM, OUR OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO MINIMIZE DAMAGE TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS ARISING FROM ANY POSITIONS WE MAY HAVE TO TAKE AGAINST ARCHIPELAGO CONCEPT AND TO KEEP DOOR OPEN FOR FRUITFUL DISCUSSIONS WHEN TIME IS RIPE. OPPORTUNITY TO SEE PRESIDENT SUHARTO WILL PROBABLY ARISE DURING VISIT OF CHAIRMAN OF JOINT CHIEFS BROWN, TENTATIVELY APRIL 5-7, AT WHICH TIME OUR POSITION WITH RESPECT LOS CAN BE MENTIONED. GENERAL BROWN SHOULD BE APPROPRIATELY BRIEFED.

10. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE WARNED INDONESIANS OF POSSIBLE U.S. OPEN OPPOSITION TO ARCHIPELAGO CONCEPT, THIS IS STILL SENSITIVE MATTER. WE WOULD HOPE USDEL COULD DELAY MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION, AT LEAST UNTIL WE HAVE HAD CHANCE TO SEE PRESIDENT SUHARTO. IN EVENT WE MUST MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION, INDONESIAN REACTION WOULD DEPEND IN PART ON WHETHER WE ACTIVELY SOUGHT OTHERS TO OPPOSE AS WELL, WHETHER WE WERE ISOLATED IN OUR OPPOSITION AND ON WHETHER WE MADE ANY MENTION OF OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH INDONESIANS. OUR OPPOSITION WILL NOT BE UNEXPECTED; IT MAY, BRIEFLY, BE WELCOME, BUT IF IT IS DONE IN MANNER WHICH AWAKENS INDONESIAN RESENTMENT, DOOR COULD WELL CLOSE TO ULTIMATE AGREEMENT WITH THEM.
NEWSOM

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia, State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE, NODIS (2). Secret; Immediate, Nodis; Stadis. Repeated immediate to the Geneva Mission.
2. The Embassy reported on the Law of the Sea Negotiations with Indonesia.