118. Telegram 1731 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, February 10, 1975, 0915Z.1 2
February
10, 1975, 0915Z
TELEGRAM
Department of State
Jakarta 1731
R 100915Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE
WASHDC 6533
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY
LISBON
JAKARTA 1731
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PO
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN INTENTIONS TOWARD PORTUGUESE TIMOR
REF: A. STATE
026805; B. CANBERRA 835; C. CANBERRA 837
- 1.
- WE TAKE SERIOUSLY REPORTS RECEIVED [text not declassified] OF INDICATIONS INDONESIA MAKING ACTIVE EFFORTS TO INCORPORATE PORTUGUESE TIMOR. WE BELIEVE GOI HAS MADE BASIC DECISION THAT AN INDEPENDENT TIMOR, SUSCEPTIBLE TO COMMUNIST INFLUENCE WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE THREAT TO INDONESIA’S SECURITY, AND THAT INTEGRATION OF TIMOR INTO INDONESIA ONLY ACCEPTABLE LONG TERM SOLUTION. SO LONG AS GOP MAINTAINS CONTROL OF TIMOR AND COOPERATES IN INDONESIA’S EFFORTS TO PERSUADE PORTUGUESE TIMORESE THAT INTEGRATION IS BEST COURSE, GOI DECISION TO USE MILITARY FORCE UNLIKELY. IF, AS NOW SEEMS CASE, GOP THINKING OF HOLDING A PLEBESCITE (WHICH PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS WOULD NOT WIN) OR SEEKING SOME OTHER METHOD END COLONIAL RULE IN NEAR FUTURE, LIKELIHOOD OF GOI’S USING AGGRESSIVE TACTICS TO INCORPORATE TIMOR IS GREATLY INCREASED.
- 2.
- WE FULLY APPRECIATE THAT INDONESIAN EFFORT TO TAKE TERRITORY BY FORCE COULD COMPOUND OUR PROBLEMS IN MAKING SMOOTH TRANSITION AWAY FROM CONCESSIONAL AID. WE FACE CRUEL DILEMMA, HOWEVER, BECAUSE U.S. POSTURE IN CLEAR OPPOSITION TO INDONESIAN OBJECTIVE OF INCORPORATING TIMOR COULD BRING REACTIONS HERE AS STRONG OR STRONGER THAN AID TERMINATION. INDONESIA CLEARLY REGARDS AN INDEPENDENT TIMOR AS A SERIOUS SECURITY THREAT. UNLESS WE’RE PREPARED TO INTERCEDE WITH PORTUGUESE TO ASK DELAY IN INDEPENDENCE OR PORTUGUESE HELP IN INCORPORATION WITH INDONESIA, AND DIPLOMATIC APPROACH ON OUR PART WHICH WOULD SEEK TO DISCOURAGE INDONESIAN ACTION WOULD HAVE LITTLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE RESENTED. WE FULLY AWARE IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM OF ANY USE U.S. EQUIPMENT IN FORCEFUL TAKE OVER, YET ANY APPROACH SUGGESTING LINK WOULD CREATE EVEN STRONGER ADVERSE REACTION. (DIRECTOR GENERAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS DEPLU QUERIED ME AT LENGTH LAST WEEK ON TURKISH AID CUT OFF; I SUSPECT HE HAD TIMOR ON HIS MIND.) LIKEWISE ANY INDICATION WE WERE FURNISHING OTHERS WITH INTELLIGENCE WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN DEMARCHES AIMED TO DISCOURAGE GOI WOULD BE DANGEROUS. [text not declassified] OFFICIALS ORALLY IN GENERAL TERMS THAT WE HAVE REPORTS FROM AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES INDICATING GOI CONSIDERING DECISION TO MOVE INTO PORTUGUESE TIMOR THIS YEAR. A POSSIBLY MORE ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TASKING WASHINGTON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO PREPARE A FINISHED INTELLIGENCE BRIEF FOR PASSAGE TO AUSTRALIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS.
- 3.
- WE WILL BE POUCHING SHORTLY TO DEPARTMENT CONTINGENCY PLAN WHICH GIVES THOUGHTS ON POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION. WHILE WE REALIZE IT IS NOT PERFECT SOLUTION, OUR STRONG RECOMMENDATION FOR POSTURE AT THIS POINT IS MAXIMUM OF SILENCE, AVOIDING ANY BASIS FOR SUGGESTING EITHER U.S. ENCOURAGEMENT OR DISCOURAGEMENT OF INDONESIAN ACTIONS. WHETHER WE CAN MAINTAIN THIS POSTURE INDEFINITELY DEPENDS ON FACTORS WE CANNOT FULLY JUDGE HERE: ESTIMATE OF LEGAL AND CONGRESSIONAL POSITIONS ON USE OF U.S. EQUIPMENT; PORTUGUESE ATTITUDES AND OUR RELATIONSHIP TO THEM; AND WHETHER BY TIME WE NEED TO RECONSIDER THIS POSTURE WE WILL HAVE HAD SUFFICIENT POSITIVE ACTIONS IN AID FD TRADE FIELD TO IMPROVE INDONESIAN RECEPTIVITY TO OUR APPROACHES ON DELICATE ISSUES. NEWSOM