116. Backchannel Message 179 From the Ambassador to Indonesia (Newsom) to W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff, Jakarta, January 13, 1975, 1139Z.1 2
0 131139Z JAN 74 FM JAKARTA
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
131139Z JAN 73
from AMBASSADOR NEWSOM, JAKARTA 179
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR: MR. SMYSER
SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES. ONLY DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS
REF: SMYSER MESSAGE OF JANUARY 11, 1975
MY STRONG RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE THAT IN VIEW OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES HERE SINCE SECRETARY LAST MET WITH INDONESIAN GENERALS, I PUT MATTER BEFORE MINISTER OF STATE GENERAL SUDHARMONO WHO IS CLEARLY CLOSEST AND MOST DISCREET CHANNEL TO PRESIDENT. SINCE EVENTS OF LAST JANUARY, PRESIDENT KEEPS CARDS CLOSE TO CHEST AND NEITHER NICHLANY, HABIB, NOR MUTROPO APPEAR HAVE HIS FULL CONFIDENCE. MY APPROACH TO SUDHARMONO WOULD CLEARLY GIVE HIM GREATEST FLEXIBILITY TO DECIDE HOW AND WITH WHOM HE WISHED FOLLOW UP SUGGESTION.
I WARMLY WELCOME SECRETARY’S INTEREST IN INVITING INDONESIANS AT THIS STAGE. MEETING WOULD GIVE OPPORTUNITY AT PRESTIGIOUS LEVEL OF SECRETARY IN HIS NSC CAPACITY TO REASSURE INDONESIANS CONCERNING OUR INTEREST AND ANSWER TWO QUESTIONS THAT ARE CURRENTLY UPPERMOST IN THEIR MINDS.
- 1.
- FUTURE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCES: I BELIEVE! THAT PROVIDED WE CAN SATISFACTORILY FINESSE IGGI PROBLEM, OURS TRANSITION STRATEGY ON ECONOMIC AID IS WORKING. PRESIDENT SUHARTO, HOWEVER, HAS ATTACHED MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE, BOTH AS MEANS LESSENING DEGREE TO WHICH HE MUST DIVERT OTHER FUNDS TO MILITARY PURPOSES AND AS INDICATION U.S. SUPPORT FOR INDONESIA GENERALLY, WE CONTINUE TO BE TOLD THAT NEITHER PRESIDENT NOR PANGGABEAN UNDERSTAND WHY WE ARE CUTTING MAP, EVEN THOUGH EMBASSY AND FREQUENT VISITORS HAVE EMPHASIZED CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEM AND CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES. IF SUBSTANTIAL MAP CUT INEVITABLE, MEETING WITH SECRETARY WOULD PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY EXPLAIN AT THAT LEVEL WHILE DEFINING AREAS WHERE WE CAN BE HELPFUL IN MILITARY FIELD.
- 2.
- VIET NAM: INDONESIANS SEE SOLUTION TO CURRENT IMPASSE IN VIET NAM, INCLUDING ICCS OF WHICH THEY ARE A PART, IN TERMS OF RENEWED U.S. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WITH HANOI, SECRETARY’S REITERATION OF IMPORTANCE OF ICCS AND REALISTIC DESCRIPTION OF [Page 2] DIFFICULTIES OF INITIATING NEW DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WHEN THERE IS NO RESPONSE FROM OTHER SIDE WOULD BE HELPFUL AT THIS POINT. WE HAVE EVERY IMPRESSION INDONESIANS TAKING HARD LOOK AT WHETHER TO REPLACE CURRENT ICCS CONTINGENT WHEN IT ROTATES IN APRIL.
SECRETARY MIGHT ALSO WANT TO CONSIDER TAKING SOUNDINGS ON POSSIBLE SUHARTO VISIT. SINCE OUR DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON, | HAVE LEARNED THAT SOME THOUGHT BEING GIVEN BY SUHARTO TO VISIT TO CANADA THIS YEAR. IN SUCH CASE, WE WOULD, I BELIEVE, WANT TO EXPRESS PRESIDENT FORD’S INTEREST IN INVITING HIM TO WASHINGTON IN COURSE HIS TRIP TO NORTH AMERICA.
RE TIMOR, THERE IS NO DOUBT SOME IN INDONESIAN MILITARY GROWING IMPATIENT WITH LACK CLEAR SOLUTION TIMOR FUTURE AND ARE ADVOCATING SOME TYPE OF UNILATERAL ACTION. PRESIDENT SUHARTO, SO FAR, HAS HELD OFF HAWKS. IF QUESTION SHOULD ARISE I BELIEVE WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WHILE NOT BEING OPPOSED TO PEACEFUL INCORPORATION INTO INDONESIA IF THIS WAS CLEARLY WILL OF PEOPLE WE WOULD NOT FAVOR UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION. (FYI: EMBASSY PROCESS OF PREPARING CONTINGENCY PLAN ON WHAT WE SHOULD DO IF INDONESIANS TAKE UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION, USE OF MAP EQUIPMENT COULD AUTOMATICALLY INVOLVE U.S. IN EMBARRASSING PROBLEM.)
- Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience File, Box 7, Backchannel Messages, Southeast Asia, Incoming, 1/75. Secret. The undated text of the January 11 backchannel message from Smyser to Newson, initialed by Scowcroft with a note that it was sent, is ibid., Outgoing, 1/75.↩
- Newsom responded to Smyser’s backchannel telegram about a proposed meeting between Kissinger and Indonesian emissaries.↩