Office of the Historian

114. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 21, 1974, 1130–1155.1 2

Washington, November 21, 1974, 1130–1155

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: Visit of US Ambassador to Indonesia David D. Newsom with Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

  • Department of State
  • David D. Newsom -US Ambassador to Indonesia
  • Defense
  • William P. Clements, Jr. - Deputy Secretary of Defense
  • Robert Ellsworth- Assistant Secretary (ISA)
  • Morton I. Abramowitz - Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA)
  • Michael V. Connors - Assistant for Indonesia (Acting)

Time: 1130-1155, 21 November 1974
Place: Deputy Secretary’s Office, Pentagon

1.

(S) Submarines and Corvettes.

Ambassador Newsom opened by describing Indonesia’s interest in obtaining from us four diesel submarines and four corvette-type ASW vessels. The Ambassador highlighted Indonesia’s apparent willingness to pay as much as new ship procurement costs to obtain these items. The Deputy Secretary said that in principle he foresees no problems with these purchases and that we should help the Indonesians to the extent we can. He added that we should certainly not expect the Indonesians to pay new ship replacement costs if we are able to assist with the sales arrangements. The Deputy Secretary then speculated whether Congressional approval would be required for any sales of submarines, should we find that some are available. Mr. Ellsworth confirmed that legislation would be required but that it should not be difficult to obtain. Concerning Indonesia’s interest in corvettes, Mr. Abramowitz suggested considering the new Coastal Patrol Interdiction Craft (CPIC) which Korea is purchasing. The [Page 2] Deputy Secretary noted there have been some problems with the CPIC project and it is possible that the Indonesians might not be interested in these vessels. The Ambassador said that it is important that we be as helpful as we can with these Indonesian requests, particularly in view of our rapidly diminishing MAP program.

2.

(S) MAP Reductions.

The Ambassador stressed the importance of providing Indonesia with at least some MAP grant assistance in FY 1975. President Suharto attaches great importance to our MAP program and a total cutoff this year could raise serious problems. Mr. Ellsworth briefly reviewed the very serious constraints on worldwide MAP, noting that while the Indonesia program was certainly not being singled out for termination, it may well be that there just will not be enough money to go around after higher priorities in Cambodia and elsewhere are served. It was agreed that in these difficult circumstances, the best tactic to follow with the Indonesians would be to state frankly that we just don’t have the MAP assistance we would like to provide but that we will be as helpful as we can in other ways—for example, in arranging purchases of those specific military items Indonesia wants or hopefully in providing excess equipment.

3.

(S) Military Sales.

Ambassador Newsom noted that we should make special efforts (1) to obtain FMS CR for a second C-130 and (2) to locate some C-7s from Vietnam or elsewhere. Mr. Abramowitz said that a survey team is currently reviewing equipment requirements in Vietnam but that he is not optimistic that C-7s will be available there. Ambassador Newsom said that the OV–10 sales program is going well. The Indonesians now have twelve and want to purchase four more. The Deputy Secretary emphasized that our most important policy objective in Indonesia is to build a stable and enduring relationship. He agreed, however, with the Ambassador’s observation that the military sales program we develop with Indonesia will be the basis of our ongoing relationship with the Indonesian military. Moreover, the sales program offers an excellent mechanism through which we can maintain close, continuing contact with the military.

4.

(C) Portuguese Timor.

The Deputy Secretary asked about the situation in Portuguese Timor. The Ambassador said that to date Suharto has prevented his military from moving to take over Timor. Foreign Minister Malik has made clear, however, that Indonesia would not want Portugal to try to do in Timor what it did in Goa. If the Portuguese do persist in holding on to Timor, eventually the Indonesians will begin to agitate.

5.
(C) DAO Aircraft.

The Deputy Secretary inquired about the adequacy of the DC-3 and C-117 which the DAO currently uses in Djakarta. Ambassador Newsom described the problems of trying to get along with these aging aircraft. The Deputy Secretary said that he would contact DIA about obtaining a Convair which should better meet the requirements of the mission.

Memorandum of Conversation Prepared by: Michael V. Connors
Approved by: [unclear]
Date: 29 Nov ’74

DISTRIBUTION:
DEPSEC
ASD (ISA)
DASD (ISA/EAPA)
DASD (ISA/SA)
DSAA
JCS (J-5)
CINCPAC (J-8)
CHDLG, Indonesia
State Department
AMEMB Djakarta AD (3)
RC (2)

  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–77–0054, Indonesia, 333, 1974, November 29. Secret. Drafted by Connors and approved by Ellsworth. The conversation took place in the office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense.↩
  2. Newsom and Clements discussed military aid and Portuguese Timor.↩