108. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 15, 1974, 12:45–1:15 p.m.1 2
UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
MEMORANDUM OF
CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
- U.S.
- Secretary Kissinger - Department of State
- Ambassador Scali - USUN
- Mr. J. Dobbins - USUN
- (notetaker)
- Indonesian
- Mr. Adam Malik - Foreign Minister
- Dr. B.S. Arifin - Dir. Gen. for Foreign Economic Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Alex Alappas - Director of the Office of the Foreign Minister
Time and Place: 12:45-1:15, April 15, 1974
U.S. Mission to the UN
Foreign Minister Malik: Thank you Mr. Secretary for seeing me. I also wish to extend greetings from President Suharto. Before leaving Indonesia, Ambassador Newsom had a meeting with me and President Suharto. He told us then that there may be some decrease in U.S. aid. This was disconcerting news. We had hoped that foreign aid, particularly U.S. aid, would not be reduced. I admit that Indonesia now has additional oil revenues. But we don’t know how long this will last. Our five year plans, as you know, have always been modest, because we didn’t wish to raise unfounded hopes. Now, with the increased oil income, we hope to be able to raise our targets.
The Secretary: Our problem is with the Congress. We are afraid that they will cut this aid entirely. Many Congressmen believe that the oil revenues will eliminate the need for aid to Indonesia entirely. In any case the proposed reduction in U.S. aid is not all that great.
[Page 2]Mr. Malik: It is not the specific amount, but the momentum that is of concern. If the U.S. reduces its aid, so will other countries. In addition, Indonesia is facing large increases in its expenses for importing rice and fertilizers.
The Secretary: Let me review the question, and let you know if there is anything we can do. We do have a real Congressional problem.
Mr. Malik: We fully understand your situation, and your reasons. But we are convinced that the American example in cutting aid will lead others to do the same.
The Secretary: Let me speak to World Bank President McNamara, whom I will be seeing later this week, to get his views on how the U.S. action may affect other donors. Our goal has been and continues to be to see that Indonesian development succeeds. President Nixon has, as you know, assured President Suharto of this. I will talk with McNamara, and try to see that our decision does not have a multiplier effect.
Mr. Malik: President Nixon sent us a special envoy, Mr. Moore, to discuss Law of the Sea questions. We had good talks.
The Secretary: This is an important subject. Too rigid an application of certain principals could have the effect of closing the Indian Ocean to maritime traffic. (Laughing) Perhaps we will see toll booths erected along the way to the Indian Ocean. I recently told the Indian Ambassador, by the way, that we were going to rename the Indian Ocean the Indonesian Ocean. Every time we send a ship there, I receive a letter of complaint from the Indians. But after all it’s not their Ocean. Perhaps, if we rename it, it will then be you who writes.
Mr. Malik: Let’s call it the Peace Ocean.
The Secretary: As long as it is open to our aircraft carriers.
Mr. Malik: The Law of the Sea is one issue which we hope can be worked out bilaterally with the U.S.
The Secretary: I have not read the papers on this recently. How are the discussions going.
[Page 3]Mr. Malik: Progress is being made. The trouble is that anything we give to the U.S. will also be demanded by the Soviets.
The Secretary: That is probably right. We after all can not insist that only our own ships go through.
Mr. Malik: The only other item I wish to raise is a small point. I want only to assure you that the reduction of the Indonesian contingent in South Vietnam from 290 to 200 men has been done solely for reasons of economy. Our UNEF contingent is being kept up to strength.
The Secretary: As one of the few countries in the world acceptable to everyone, Indonesia will soon have forces scattered all around the globe. This is the newest form of imperialism.
Mr. Malik: I want to assure you that we will do whatever we can to promote cooperation in the Middle East.
Amb. Scali: As you know, Mr. Minister, the Security Council will be meeting this afternoon, at Lebanon’s request. We fear that Lebanon, for its own domestic purposes, may try to have the Security Council pass a resolution. We hope they can be dissuaded from insisting on any such resolution. That could only create more difficulties in the Middle East.
The Secretary: Our problem in the next 2-3 weeks is to get Israel to make some concessions to Syria. Any action which further upsets Israel will only delay the process.
Mr. Malik: We will do whatever we can.
The Secretary: We understand the difficulties of your position as a Moslem country. But in setting up UNEF we had insisted on the inclusion of Indonesia, because we knew that, of all the countries proposed, Indonesia would be the most objective.
Mr. Malik: I have nothing further to raise and I won’t take any more of your time Mr. Secretary. Thank you again for seeing me, and please remember my invitation to visit Bali on your next trip to the Far East.
Drafter: JDobbins
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1028, Presidential/HAK Memcons, 1 March 1974–8 May 1974 [2 of 4]. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Dobbins. Kissinger followed up this meeting with a message to Malik explaining he would do all he could to support aid for Indonesia. (Telegram 083508 to Jakarta, April 24; ibid., Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)↩
- Kissinger and Malik discussed foreign aid, the Law of the Sea, Indochina, and the Middle East.↩