96. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Prince Fahd ibn ’Abd al-’Aziz, Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
- James Akins, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
- Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
- Isa Sabbagh, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy Beirut (Interpreter)
Fahd: I don’t want to overburden Your Excellency by taking up more of your time, but I want to express appreciation for your visit.
Kissinger: I want to thank you, Your Highness. I was looking forward to welcoming you to the U.S.
Fahd: I’m very pleased, and still look towards it.
I would like to take this opportunity to express the hope that the friendship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia which was strong in the past will remain strong.
Kissinger: This is our hope.
Fahd: And these things that have come between us I would like to consider as things that are transitory and not permanent in nature.
And of course I appreciate listening to your explaining so brilliantly to His Majesty the King the difficulties for the U.S. and the particular difficulties that would not be understood by those who do not know the U.S.
And I would assure Your Excellency that I for one will be instrumental among those who will help you on the path you have marked out.
[Page 351]Kissinger: If this cannot be done, my path will be immeasurably more difficult. Because when the whole atmosphere in the U.S. becomes focused on what will appear as a domestic problem, it will be impossible to mobilize ourselves for a difficult foreign struggle.
Fahd: That’s actually what I am saying—that while we feel at ease hearing you outline the steps you have embarked upon, I feel inevitably the results will be good. And we appreciate the fact that things cannot be done overnight and have to be done step-by-step, but expeditiously.
Kissinger: I appreciate your understanding.
Fahd: I’m known for looking at things from a practical point of view, not in the clouds.
Kissinger: That is the only way to get things solved.
Fahd: And now we are beginning to feel in the air, after a long time, the thread of a solution that would be acceptable to the Arabs and Israel.
Kissinger: I have the same sense. A year ago I thought the time was not right; now I feel the time is right.
Fahd: Of course I appreciate that difficulties will be felt by people in Japan and the United States and Europe. But every cloud has a silver lining—the thread has now appeared.
Akins: I want to emphasize one point that the Secretary said to His Majesty—that the present effort did not begin when the war started, but before the war started, and certainly before this boycott. I was with the Secretary in New York and he said specifically that we would make a major effort.
Kissinger: Thank you.
Fahd: I heard that declaration myself and was very impressed.
The first step, as the Secretary said, was easing of relocation of the Third Army.
Kissinger: Right. And it was very difficult.
Fahd: It was very difficult. Because these are exactly the kind of steps that themselves could be used for telling our friends: Look at what the U.S. has done, and the U.S. is willing to do more.
Kissinger: Yes.
Fahd: And we hope that at the peace conference that you mentioned will be the first of next month, a further tangible step will come that will help further.
Kissinger: Inevitably. I’m looking at it from the diplomatic point of view. But please tell His Majesty that if we are to move effectively at the conference, it will help if some easing had already taken place. Otherwise it will get confused in our domestic problem.
Fahd: I appreciate that. I will personally do what I can to bring this about.
[Page 352]Kissinger: It will help tremendously in our common effort.
Fahd: I appreciate that very much.
This is something touching on the situation in Saudi Arabia, and in Iraq and southern Arabia. We have evidence that keeps coming to us—certifiable—that there seems to be a pincer movement around Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. The Chinese from the south, the Soviet Union from Iraq. That is why we anticipate that once this immediate problem is solved, the Communists will contrive something to happen in Saudi Arabia.
Kissinger: That is why it is essential that between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia there be no misunderstanding. You are the principal target. If you isolate yourselves you are losing one of your best supporters. I told His Majesty at dinner that we are prepared to be helpful with respect to the threat from the south. And of course we can cooperate with regard to the threat from the north. Perhaps when Your Highness comes to the United States we can consult further on this.
Fahd: In fact we are in dire need to organize our armed forces—the army, navy, air force—not with any aggressive intent but to defend ourselves.
Kissinger: Exactly.
Fahd: I had intended to talk with President Nixon about our Navy, which is a special problem.
Akins: They have a money problem.
Kissinger: A money problem!
Akins: We told them first that the program would cost $200 million. Then we said, “Sorry, there’s been a miscalculation. It will cost $650 million.” Then we said later, “No, it will be $900 million.” They think we’re not serious.
Kissinger: I don’t have the facts. But we take this very seriously. We intend to strengthen your forces. In fact, we will send our Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements here, who is a great lover of Saudi Arabia. When do you intend to visit the U.S.?
Fahd: When you get a chance to relax. I want to give you a chance to relax first.
Kissinger: That may not be so soon!
Fahd: Seriously, when you sense and I feel that things are moving in the right direction again.
Kissinger: Some time in the next month, then.
Fahd: I don’t want to burden you. I will do my utmost to remove the obstacles to strengthened relations.
Kissinger: I’ll do my utmost to work in the direction and spirit that I have described.
[Page 353][With warm handshakes, the meeting ended. Secretary Kissinger accompanied the Prince downstairs to the door, where the Foreign Minister was waiting.]
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Summary: Kissinger and newly-appointed Ambassador to Saudi Arabia James Akins met with Prince Fahd.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 139, Country Files, Saudi Arabia (3). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held at the Royal Guest House in Riyadh. In a November 21 letter to Fahd, Kissinger also referred to the Arab embargo: “I continue to feel that it will be very difficult for us to be as helpful as we would like in the negotiations ahead if we remain under the threat of a continuing oil boycott.” (Ibid., Country Files, Kissinger Trip to Middle East, November 5–10, 1973) Kissinger also met with King Faisal on November 8 to discuss the war. See footnote 2, Document 238, in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974. Kissinger returned to Riyadh in December, meeting with both Faisal and Fahd on December 14. For that conversation, see ibid., Document 267.
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