91. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- US-Saudi Dialogue: Possible Invitation to Prince Fahd
You are aware of the proposal from Mr. Rush to send a mission to Saudi Arabia [Tab B]. You now have a memo from Peter Flanigan urging that King Faisal be invited on a visit here in late August or September instead. [Tab A]. The purpose of this memo is to propose an alternative to both.
I fully understand your reservations about sending a mission to Saudi Arabia—especially now that Love, Simons, Clements, Casey, Rush and Sisco all see themselves going. At the same time, there is still a strong argument for carrying on serious discussion with key Saudis about a common strategy for the area. We have major interests there and every reason to try to establish a realistic basis for cooperation.
Thus the issue is not whether we should have a political dialogue with the Saudis—but how we can have a rational dialogue without getting bogged down in Faisal’s anti-Zionist emotionalism.
Sending the kind of people who are available to Saudi Arabia to talk to King Faisal does not offer great hope of success. We would [Page 334] have to supplement it with a back-channel effort in any case. Sending a person who could speak authoritatively for the President would be productive, but apart from you I don’t know who that would be.
Since you are the obvious one to do the job, the alternative to a mission to Saudi Arabia is to find a good Saudi to talk with here. You have indicated your willingness to do this with Yamani, but he is a technocraft with a limited political role.
The two candidates for a visit here are Prince Fahd—Deputy Prime Minister, Interior Minister and the likely successor to Faisal—and Defense Minister Sultan. Both have visited and called on the President in the past four years.
[less than 1 line not declassified] Fahd would be interested in coming to the US. In addition to his broad role as Deputy Prime Minister, he is also Chairman of the Supreme Petroleum Council, and he could be invited in connection with the decisions Saudi Arabia is making on future oil production. At the same time, he could have the necessary political talks with you and the President. You will see in the first [less than 1 line not declassified] reports at Tab C that Fahd is complaining that the US has never as a government approached him to discuss our future oil requirements.
[3 lines not declassified] Fahd is the right person to talk to as far as we are concerned both on oil policy and on political issues. His concern is clear from the second of the [less than 1 line not declassified] reports at Tab C. [1 line not declassified] Incidentally, you will recall that Fahd and Sultan were the two the Shah mentioned as the best candidates for cooperation with Iran.
A possible solution to this problem—if you wanted to invite Fahd—would be [less than 1 line not declassified] sound Fahd out informally on whether he would accept an invitation and on how we should handle it with Faisal. I know Sisco thinks a Fahd visit would be a good idea, [1 line not declassified]. My own recommendation would be to decide in principle that we would receive Fahd [less than 1 line not declassified].
The one other point you should have in mind as you make this decision is that Fahd will expect to see the President if he comes. I am reluctant to submit a formal schedule proposal to the President at this preliminary stage, but you will want to consider whether you think the President would see him for 30–45 minutes (with interpretation) if he came.
As I said to you a week ago, there are some important points to be made to the Saudis right now:
—Foremost among them is the point you make—that neither their interests nor ours will be served by their becoming more intimately [Page 335] involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute. This requires an authoritative statement of what we are trying to do.
—A second is to establish at the highest level our interest in cooperating closely with the Saudis in enhancing the stability of the Peninsula and Gulf. This would be a complement to your talks with the Shah.
—A third is that we are ready to work with them on the economic problems related to increasing oil production.
A visit by Fahd might be a good way to get these points made—and also to lay to rest the idea of a political mission to Saudi Arabia now. There will still be technical economic issues that should be discussed, but those could be handled by a lower level economic mission at the appropriate time.
RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize me to do the following:
1. [less than 1 line not declassified] explore with Fahd whether he would come to the US in September or October and how this should be handled with Faisal.
2. Tell Peter Flanigan that we think his idea of a visit here is a good one, but that we think it would be better to have Prince Fahd over in the first instance and are exploring that.
[1½ lines not declassified]
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Summary: Saunders recommended against proposals from the Departments of State and the Treasury for a high-level economic and political mission to Saudi Arabia, as well as a White House proposal that King Faisal be invited to Washington. Saunders instead proposed inviting Prince Fahd to meet with Kissinger.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 630, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Volume IV, May-December 31, 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Sent for action. Odeen concurred. Brackets are in the original. Kissinger approved both recommendations. In an attached note, Scowcroft commented: “Unless you are committed to Shultz to send Simon, this is not a bad idea. To my mind, it is the only way we can guarantee maintaining control.” Attached at Tabs A and B, but not published, are Flanigan’s July 17 memorandum to Kissinger and Rush’s July 2 memorandum to Nixon. Attached but not published at Tab C are [name not declassified] July 25 and 26 memoranda to Kissinger, relaying messages from Fahd concerning his “frustration” that the U.S. Government never defined “its national requirements for petroleum in the years ahead,” and noting that he was “currently giving his personal attention to strengthening U.S.-Saudi relations.” In a July 2 memorandum to Kissinger, Scowcroft deprecated a proposed Simon mission: “There is great danger having economic types running around this area unguided when the really important aspects (even of oil) are political.” (Ibid., Volume III, September 1 1971–April 1973) Shultz continued to press for an economic mission in an August 13 memorandum to Kissinger. (National Archives, RG 429, Records of the Council on International Economic Policy, 1971–77, Central File, 1972–77, Box 26, 52669–52709, August 7–15, 1973, 52697) Fahd did not visit the United States in 1973.
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