The principal issue is how to define the strategies. This has been
difficult and there has not been agreement. This summary will describe
the issue. At sub-tabs in the attached State paper you will find
alternative formulations—one is State’s, the other is mine.
Thus, the paper concludes that the Soviets lay claim in the Middle East
to at least equal influence with the US and in South Asia probably feel
that they are entitled to preeminence. Their success in the final
analysis will depend on how well they satisfy the aspirations of the
[Page 53]
individual countries there. On
this, the prospects do not look bright, at least without cooperation
rather than competitive rivalry with the West and the US in
particular.
Historically, the US has formulated its policies toward this region on
the basis of two perceptions, often held simultaneously, never fully
reconciled and sometimes in conflict:
The paper points out that a further characteristic of the US view of this
region has been a tendency to compartmentalize our approach into sets of
largely, though not exclusively, separate subregional policies in South
Asia, the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf, the Arab-Israeli area and the
Horn of Africa. While we have tended to a compartmentalized view of the
region, the leaders and governments in the area often do not see it this
way. It is one of the new elements on the scene that there is a complex
of cross-regional relationships that suggest that we need to broaden our
perception of the region in recognition of that fact that our
compartmentalized view does not accord with the perceptions of many of
those in the area.
One other major new element in the equation of US-Soviet relations in
this region is the presumed Soviet desire to avoid situations that will
seriously jeopardize US–USSR bilateral
relations and détente in Europe and could foster the coalescence of a
US-Chinese community of interests in this region. The priority the
Soviets attach to these new considerations and the price they are
prepared to pay for them in this region in terms of modifying their
traditional policies remain to be seen.
Since there is disagreement on how alternative strategies might be
formulated, you will find one formulation in the attached State paper
under the sub-tab marked “State Strategy” and a second possible
formulation which I have written under the sub-tab marked “Alternative
Strategy.”
The shortcoming of these formulations is that they are not real
alternatives. One says we should counter the Soviets and the other says
we should counter the Soviets by reducing local tensions. It seems to me
(Saunders) that one can
assume that we will be working to increase our influence relative to the
Soviets and that the issue is how to do it. Therefore, I have tried two
different formulations and put them under the State paper as an
alternative ending to the paper. My formulations would go as
follows:
These may not provide the most desirable formulations of possible US
strategies, but they do seem closer to what is going on in the area and
what we have to work with there.
I would recommend that we and State take another crack at these
formulations after hearing your views. It would help to know what issues
concern you in relation to your dealings with the Soviets and Chinese on
global issues.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of State
A U.S. STRATEGY
FOR THE REGION OF THE SOVIET SOUTHERN FLANK, FROM THE
SUBCONTINENT TO THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND HORN OF
AFRICA
I. How the Soviets See
the Region
In an area as diverse as the Region from the Subcontinent to the
Eastern Mediterranean and Horn of Africa, no power can have a
totally unified view of the Region or a single policy toward it.
Both the U.S. and the USSR do, however, take actions that
affect the Region in the broader sense, and fit its component parts
into some sort of framework for analytical purposes. For a variety
of reasons, the Soviets probably have less of an integrated concept
of the Region than do we. Over the last two years we have more and
more looked at the Middle East, Persian Gulf, Arabian Peninsula and
South Asia in overall strategic terms, while recognizing each of the
aforementioned areas has problems unique to its own immediate
concerns in an increasingly overlapping context. The Soviets tend to
see the Region through two focuses:
—As part of the Asian rimland stretching from Turkey to Korea that is
of vital concern to them both because parts of it lie along Soviet
borders, and other parts of it encircle China. Moscow has
increasingly focused on this concept of Asia in recent
years—Brezhnev’s advocacy of an Asian security system is the best
known expression of this concern.
[Page 56]
—As a series of individual countries or conflict situations toward
which the USSR must develop policy
approaches. This traditional approach remains the mainstay of Soviet
policy and provides the framework within which we and they have, so
far at least, interacted.
Thus there is probably no precise, overall Soviet “grand design”
peculiarly tailored to the Region under discussion. As elsewhere,
Soviet policy is largely opportunistic, exploiting what
opportunities it perceives filtered through its special amalgam of
national interests and Communist dogma. The probable absence of a
precise, overall “grand design,” however, may make little
difference. Diverse considerations of both a global and a regional
nature in fact impinge on large parts of the Region. Regional states
are themselves forming ties across the various segments of the
Region. Consequently, we need to take account of the various factors
that bear upon Soviet activities in the Region with varying degrees
of intensity.
—The USSR is fully determined to
play to the hilt its new role as one of the world’s two super and
global powers. As Gromyko has put it, the Soviets contemplate a
world where no important decisions can be taken without the
interests of the Soviet Union being taken into account. But the
Soviets have definite priorities:
—Paramount is USSR national
security. This is a dominating motivation in Soviet policy toward
the countries on the USSR’s
southern border, and an important consideration in Moscow’s Middle
East policy generally.
—A second overriding objective, and the major mutual interest the
Soviets share with the U.S., is to
avoid any serious risk of nuclear conflict.
—Still another Soviet consideration is Moscow’s current pursuit of
détente with the West. Brezhnev has described it as basic strategy,
not tactics, and for a variety of reasons this seems to be true. It
is added reason for Soviet restraint on such critical issues as the
Arab-Israeli conflict, and also on other issues in the area which
are of vital concern to the West. For example, the Soviets are
unlikely to disrupt Middle East oil supply to the West, even if they
could, and the more so since they are currently in no position to
replace the West either as consumer or broker. They would certainly
like to have a major voice eventually in the disposition of the
area’s energy supplies, which in the long run they may need
themselves. They certainly entertain this fond expectation, but as a
distant goal and not feasible within the next ten years at
least.
The China factor looms large in Soviet foreign policy formulation,
but its importance also varies according to area and country. China
is not of major significance for Moscow in the Arab-Israeli conflict
or other important Middle East issues simply because the Chinese do
not
[Page 57]
have the capability to
exert major influence in these areas. However, Moscow’s concern
about China is of paramount importance in Soviet policy formulation
on the subcontinent, and probably also in Moscow’s desire to extend
its influence into the Indian Ocean.
The China impact on Soviet policy is not, on balance, a pernicious
one from the point of view of U.S.
interests. To the contrary, it reinforces the current Soviet
leaders’ predilection to be a status quo
power, to discourage regional conflicts or even domestic turbulence
in individual countries which might provide Peking with
opportunities for anti-Soviet exploitation. Probably above all,
Moscow is concerned about the prospect of Sino-U.S. collusion in regional conflicts in
the area such as it professed to see in the Indo-Pakistan War of
1971.
The interrelated concerns of security and détente have had some
impact on Soviet actions in the area, but this impact has been
differentiated by area and activity. In the Middle East, the Soviets
are much more acutely aware of the security problem and the danger
of confrontation with the U.S. Their
posture there emphasizes military aspects and is more cautious. In
South Asia, their approach is more political and under fewer
restraints since they see less risk of a collision with the U.S. Nowhere, however, has the Soviet
pursuit of détente thus far played a major constraining role on
efforts to increase Soviet influence through such time-honored
techniques as military and economic assistance. And nowhere in the
area does the USSR grant the
U.S. pride of place. In the
Middle East, they lay claim to at least equal influence, and in
South Asia probably feel that they are entitled to preeminence. In
the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, they are seeking to consolidate
their positions in Iraq and, by their support of Aden and military
assistance programs to Somalia, attest to the strategic importance
they attach to the tip of the Arabian Peninsula and entrance to the
Red Sea, Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula.
The Soviets will seek to pursue their traditional tactic of
exploiting regional disputes to further their own influence,
endeavoring simultaneously to work both sides of the fence. They
will take advantage of the special opportunity that Iraq offers them
to advance their interests in the Middle East and Persian Gulf area,
while at the same time striving to maintain good relations with
Iraq’s major rival, Iran, and getting the Shah accustomed to live
with the situation. Moscow appears to want to show some greater
even-handedness toward India and Pakistan, even though it is obvious
that in a crunch India will be favored. The Soviets also endeavor to
take advantage of Somalia’s concerns and ambitions vis-à-vis its
neighbors to obtain facilities that will enhance Soviet strategic
capabilities in the Indian Ocean, yet they carefully cultivate
Somalia’s neighbors. And Soviet exploitation of the conflict between
the two Yemens, and between South Yemen and
[Page 58]
Oman, has the same objectives and is
characterized by the same attempt to maintain a balance on both
sides. The tactic to date has been highly successful in expanding
Soviet influence into the area, reinforcing its geopolitical
advantages and in giving the USSR
a voice as major arbiter in its affairs.
Soviet standing in the final analysis will, however, depend on how
successful Moscow is in satisfying the aspirations of the individual
countries there. Here the prospects do not look too bright, at least
without cooperation rather than competitive rivalry with the West,
and the U.S. in particular. Moscow’s
impotence in achieving progress toward a settlement of the
Arab-Israeli conflict has been demonstrated in Soviet unwillingness
to run risks of major confrontation and their inability to influence
the major country in the equation—Israel. Their presence in the
volatile Arab countries of the Middle East is tenuous, as the
example of Egypt has shown, and involves a heavy political/economic
commitment. And Moscow’s hope to be the major arbiter of affairs on
the subcontinent could raise the prospect of heavy economic
commitments to India which could impose a serious burden on Soviet
resources. In sum, the Soviets are on the make, but are paying a
price, and the price is constantly going up.
II. How the U.S. Views the Region
Historically, we have formulated our policies in this Region on the
basis of two perceptions, often held simultaneously, never fully
reconciled and sometimes in direct conflict.
One perception has been that the Soviet threat is the overriding
reality with which we must deal. In this view, conflicts, rivalries
and alignments within the Region are secondary considerations, not
to be ignored but subordinate to the Soviet factor when it comes to
assigning priorities and making policy choices. It is largely this
perception that has led us to sponsor and support regional defense
groupings (the abortive Middle East Defense Organization, the
Baghdad Pact and CENTO) and to
concentrate on strengthening militarily key states in the Region
opposed to the Soviets or to Soviet-supported neighbors (Ethiopia,
Israel, Turkey, Iran and—until 1965—Pakistan).
The second perception has been that the separate sets of local
conflicts and problems within the Region, arising largely from
indigenous factors, constitute the overriding realities with which
we must deal. In this view the Soviet factor—while not to be
ignored—is often a kind of secondary infection rather than a primary
cause, so that measures to cope with it directly must be subordinate
to policies aimed at dealing with local situations within the
Region. Policies based on this perception have emphasized
strengthening our bilateral relationships across-the-board while
seeking to defuse or resolve local conflicts and to keep a foot in
both camps in local conflict situations.
[Page 59]
When these two perceptions (and the policies flowing from them) have
come into conflict in deciding how we should act or respond in
specific situations, the former has historically tended to prevail.
The result has often been that our perceived need to demonstrate
strength directly and/or through our friends vis-à-vis the Soviets
has exacerbated certain of our bilateral relationships in the Region
and limited our ability to influence the resolution of local
conflicts.
A further characteristic of the U.S.
view of this Region has been a tendency to compartmentalize our
approach into sets of largely (though not exclusively) separate
sub-regional policies. This approach has changed in the last
eighteen months in the aftermath of the British exodus from the
Gulf, the upsetting of the balance in South Asia, and the increasing
awareness of our energy resource needs from the Gulf and Arabian
Peninsula. Thus a brief description of our policies in the Region
would look something like this:
A. South Asia—disengage from an active U.S. role, let the Simla process work,
and adopt a low-key posture in our bilateral relations.
B. Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf—play a
supportive role in fostering a regional security consciousness and
cooperative measures among the states of this sub-region; strengthen
key states militarily—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait—against the threats
they perceive to themselves and their neighbors from
Soviet-supported states in the area; seek to deepen our relations
with the key oil producers to safeguard our energy supplies, and to
insulate this sub-region from the spillover effects of the
Arab-Israel problem.
C. Arab-Israel—encourage a negotiating process
among the parties leading to a political settlement or, failing
that, to agreement on interim steps that will defuse the situation;
meanwhile safeguard the ceasefire by maintaining the military
balance through military supplies to Israel, and strengthen the Arab
moderates (Jordan and Lebanon) to withstand radical pressures.
D. Horn of Africa—continue to give priority to
close relations with Ethiopia and Kenya while seeking to broaden our
dialogue with Somalia and encouraging resolution of Somali-Ethiopian
problems within an African context.
The leaders and the governments in the area see matters primarily in
overall regional strategic terms, and there is a deep suspicion of
Soviet-sponsored subversion, a lingering fear that détente will blur
America’s perception, awareness and responsiveness to continued
Soviet probes of soft spots and creeping expansionism. The Shah is
concerned not only about the Gulf but also about Pakistan and the
threat he sees from Soviet-Indian ties. India is seeking to
strengthen ties with Iraq. Pakistan has tightened its links with
Iran and has military assistance relationships with Jordan and Arab
Gulf states. Saudi Arabia
[Page 60]
and Egypt have increasingly close ties, and Sadat is seeking to enlist
Faisal’s political as
well as financial and rhetorical support in the Arab-Israel context.
Hussein is looking
increasingly eastward to his role in the Lower Gulf, Oman and Yemen,
and has special ties with the Shah. Israel maintains a close
relationship with Iran and Ethiopia and also has ties with Turkey—a
quadrumvirate which in Israeli strategic thinking should, with
U.S. backing, constitute the
basic structure for countering Soviet inroads into the Region. In
Ethiopia, the Emperor sees his country not just as an African
country with African interests but as a bastion in the path of
Soviet ambitions in the Near East.
The foregoing observations suggest that we need to heighten even more
our perceptions of the overall strategic elements of the Region in
recognition of the fact that a compartmentalized view does not
accord with the perceptions of many of those in the area, which need
to be taken into account in our approach to the Region and to our
relations with them. This broadened perception makes sense
independent of any Soviet role or overall Soviet perception,
although it could be most useful in dealing with Soviet
trans-regional activities. At the same time we should recognize the
basic instability of most of the states of the region and that their
perceptions, consequently, are liable to sudden change—e.g.,
following the division of Pakistan or the overthrow of the Mosadeq
regime in Iran.
Finally, our thinking and approach must also take into account the
new emphasis in the equation of U.S.-Soviet relations in this Region which has not been
historically present. This is the presumed Soviet desire to avoid
situations that will seriously jeopardize U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations and détente in Europe
and could foster the coalescence of a U.S.-Chinese community of interests in the Region. The
priority the Soviets attach to these new considerations and the
price they are prepared to pay for them, in terms of modifying their
traditional policies in the Region, remain to be seen but should be
tested. Certainly the Soviets will not easily abandon those
policies, if at all—the exploitation of local tensions; the
provision of arms, economic aid and political support to tie
countries of the Region to them; the probing for weak spots to
undermine the U.S. position and
extend their own. Today the Soviets are pursuing a policy of seeking
to disarm the West and Europe while trying to maintain, develop and
enhance their position in the Middle East, South Asia, the Persian
Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. They can do this today with less
risk of confrontation with the U.S.
than in times past.
Modification of such Soviet policies would help the U.S. position in the Region, which is
certainly not a goal of Soviet strategy. The extent to which they
may nevertheless be prepared to move in this direction will depend
on their assessment of the relative costs and
[Page 61]
benefits of not doing so—an assessment which
will in turn depend on the extent to which we are prepared to take
risks to make those costs and benefits clear to them. Also, of
course, the Soviets will expect us to make reciprocal concessions.
The Soviets are acting now in the area on the assumption that there
is wide strategic latitude, and they have not been particularly
inhibited—short of confrontation—in seeking to exploit opportunities
in the area. For example, to compensate for the Egyptian loss there
has been a meaningful increase of Soviet supply of Syria and a
continuance of Soviet supply of Iraq and Aden. Even in
Afghanistan—while there is no evidence they had a direct hand in the
coup—no such coup could take place without at least the acquiescence
of the Soviets who have military advisors at every level of the
Afghan Army.
III. Toward a Regional
U.S. Strategy
From the foregoing, it seems possible to state certain assumptions on
which to base a regional strategy:
A. The Soviets seek predominant influence if not hegemony in this
area, although they may have no overall, well-coordinated “grand
design” there.
B. The region is so important to the U.S. that we will want to remain in a position to
influence developments there.
C. Thus both the U.S. and the Soviet
Union will be competing for influence vis-á-vis the other. One
important standard for measuring success will be the ability of each
side to help nations in the area to fulfill their aspirations, one
of which is preserving their own security and independence.
D. The issue for the U.S., therefore,
is what combination of U.S. actions
and what kind of relationships with and among the nations of the
region will enhance U.S. influence
there. Since this is a diverse area with many conflicts cutting
across it, the choice for the U.S.
is how to build the strongest possible position in the area
consistent with its many interests, one of which is maintaining or
enhancing its influence vis-á-vis the USSR.
Before attempting to define two possible strategies for discussion,
two other approaches need to be mentioned:
A. It is assumed that the U.S. will
continue to conduct active bilateral relations with most of the
nations in the area, taking into account the special problems of
each of the main sub-regions in the area. That has essentially been
the U.S. policy. All of those
relationships together could continue to comprise a U.S. approach to the area. This
approach is not dealt with in detail here because the purpose of
this paper is to examine whether a new dimension would be suggested
by looking even more broadly at the area as a whole.
[Page 62]
B. It is also assumed that in connection with any strategy mentioned
in this paper, we could probe to see where Soviet cooperation might
be enlisted in reducing local tensions.
Conceptually, we can adopt one of the two broad strategies outlined
below in our approach to this Region. In the real world, it is
difficult to envisage a situation where we would follow totally one
or the other. Any set of policies and actions is likely to involve
some mix of the two. However, if we define them in this way and opt
for one or the other as the basic framework for our approach to the
Region, this will provide a consistent guide as to where we place
our emphasis, how we determine priorities when there are choices to
be made, and how we assess the risks involved.
Strategy One
We can base our policies on the view that, to protect our interests
in the Region, we need to move more actively to counter the Soviets
where we believe those interests threatened or, alternatively, build
up proxies who can do the job. While continuing to seek improvements
in our bilateral relationships in the Region and the elimination of
sources of local tension, we would not let such considerations stand
in the way of actions we deemed necessary to carry out the main
thrust of this strategy.
In terms of specific regional situations, the policy implications
flowing from this strategy could include the following:
A. Build up according to their requests the military capabilities of
the major military powers in the region—Iran, Israel, Ethiopia, and
Turkey. We would go on providing arms to other countries in the
region but (1) would be guided by the major regional powers’ views
on any limits on type or quantities of equipment that should be
imposed and (2) would make no effort to limit their own equipment
regardless of the sensitivities of others in the area.
B. Rely heavily on the military action of those countries to confront
aggression in their areas (e.g., Iran to support Kuwait and Pakistan
against Iraq and India, Israel to support Lebanon and Jordan against
Syria and Iraq) or to restore stability (e.g., Iranian action in a
chaotic situation in a Gulf state, Israel in Jordan, Iran in
Pakistan).
C. Concentrate special military and economic assistance on Pakistan
because of their importance to the stability of Iran. We would do
this accepting its negative effect on our relationships with India
(1) because of the greater importance of the Persian Gulf than of
South Asia and (2) because of the importance of demonstrating to
both the USSR and the PRC as well as to other nations in the
area that friends of the U.S. fare
better than friends of the USSR
(like India).
D. We would concentrate special military and economic assistance on
Jordan because of its importance to the security of Israel and to
the
[Page 63]
avoidance of
Arab-Israeli hostilities which could draw the USSR into the conflict.
E. In the settlement of sub-regional disputes, an effort would be
made to assure that our friends negotiated from a position of
strength.
F. Step up our naval presence in the Indian Ocean—Arabian Sea—Persian
Gulf—Red Sea area and seek opportunities for demonstrations of our
military air capabilities in the Region.
G. Promote more active, broadly based and institutionalized regional
security measures among friendly states in the area (e.g., Israel,
Iran, Ethiopia, Turkey) to the extent local antagonisms—as between
Israel and moderate, pro-Western Arabs—make this feasible.
H. Undertake a more direct U.S.G. role to supplement
Saudi/Iranian/Jordanian/UAE
efforts to strengthen Oman and Yemen militarily, reallocating
resources as needed from other areas.
I. Explore possibilities for covert actions against Soviet-supported
regimes in Iraq [less than 1 line not
declassified], in PDRY
and in Syria.
This strategy vigorously pursued would demonstrate to the Soviets
that we were not being lulled by détente in Europe and progress in
our bilateral relations into acquiescing in the consolidation and
extension of their position, whether directly or by proxy, in the
Region. It would be a strategy welcomed by a number of our friends
in the area, though certain aspects of it [less
than 1 line not declassified] would cause concern to other
of our friends [less than 1 line not
declassified]. At the same time it would tend to polarize
local conflict situations and reduce our ability to defuse threats
to our interests arising out of such situations—[6
lines not declassified].
Strategy Two
We can base our policies on the view that our interests will best be
served and Soviet influence checked and reduced by relying heavily
on the nationalism of the regional states and concentrating on the
resolution of local conflicts and the improvement of our bilateral
relationships where they are unsatisfactory in the Region. This
strategy would be based essentially on the premise that (1) local
conflicts, in which the Soviets align themselves with one side, have
been a principal vehicle for the expansion of Soviet influence, and
(2) the forces of nationalism and fear of Soviet domination will
operate to limit Soviet inroads, especially once the pressures of
local conflicts are relieved.
In terms of specific regional situations, the policies flowing from
such a strategy could include the following:
A. Seek to enlist Soviet cooperation in defusing local conflicts and
limiting our respective military inputs into the Region, through a
systematic dialogue with them about each of our policies toward and
[Page 64]
interests in the Region
as a whole. This could begin by exploring whether our positions are
compatible to some degree and whether we can achieve mutual
acknowledgment of the importance of the Region to both of us. The
1969 Brezhnev Asian security proposal could provide a possible
framework for such explorations.
B. Be less forthcoming with respect to rates and magnitude of
delivery and levels of sophistication, in responding to arms
requests from our friends, [less than 1 line not
declassified].
C. Engage the Soviets, if possible, in agreements for selective
mutual reductions in military supply to our respective clients.
D. Maintain but do not increase our present military profile in the
Region. Explore with the Soviets the possibility of at least tacit
mutual restraint in our military postures, notably in our naval
presences in the Indian Ocean (cf. NSSM–110).
E. Seek to persuade friendly states in the area to channel more of
their efforts at regional cooperation into economic development
rather than military and security-oriented programs. As one example,
encourage Pakistan, Iran, the Peninsula/Gulf states and Jordan to
develop areas of cooperation that utilize the particular human,
financial and technical resources each has to offer. Reallocate from
other regions available USG
economic and technical assistance resources to help support such
efforts in a coordinating and pump-priming role.
F. Promote a closer relationship between Ethiopia and the moderate
Arabs and Iran while encouraging Israel to lower the visibility of
its program without reducing it. Particularly encourage the
cultivation of mutual interests among Ethiopia, North Yemen and
Saudi Arabia.
G. With respect to the Soviet-supported regime in PDRY, encourage anti-PDRY area states to concentrate on
strengthening the economic, social and political fabric of North
Yemen and Oman, [1 line not declassified]
H. With respect to Iraq, foster the present trend toward conciliation
with Iran and the Kurds and more pragmatic relations with western
nations.
I. In the subcontinent, continue to encourage resolution of
Pakistani-Indian-Bangladesh issues on the basis of the Simla
agreement, avoiding advocacy of any party’s position. Continue
efforts to normalize U.S.-Indian
relations on a basis of reciprocity.
J. Temper somewhat our relationship with Pakistan and Israel so as to
preserve the possibility of some relationship with India and Egypt.
Actively encourage an even closer relationship between Saudi Arabia
and Egypt. At some point, this might require less than full support
for the diplomatic positions of Pakistan and Israel, although this
would not necessarily be the case.
[Page 65]
K. Engage ourselves more directly in diplomatic efforts to move the
Arab-Israeli issue off dead center, even though this would
inevitably involve some strains in U.S.-Israeli relations.
L. Encourage India and Iran to talk out their differences and
cooperate in ensuring the security of the Western Indian Ocean
region.
In pursuing this strategy, we would start with certain advantages.
Taking the Region as a whole, we have a number of strong assets. For
the most part we, not the Soviets, have the militarily strong and
economically viable friends in the area. The Soviets, being both
powerful and geographically contiguous, are seen as a greater
longer-range threat by nationalistic local governments—even by those
presently allied with them. We only seek to prevent Soviet
domination of the Region, whereas the Soviets seek dominant
influence if not hegemony.
Against these advantages, the strategy outlined above has two
principal risks for us:
(1) It could be interpreted as weakness on our part by the Soviets
and extremist elements in the area, encouraging them to press for
additional advantages if we pursued to the fullest the course of
attempted accommodation this strategy suggests.
(2) It would have a seriously unsettling effect on our friends in the
Region, leading to shifts in their policies that could make even
more intractable the local conflicts we seek to resolve.
IV. Conclusions
These two options are not mutually exclusive and in fact we have been
successfully pursuing the elements of both with the results that we
are limiting Soviet gains and in some instances even reversing the
trend. On balance, our basic interests of preventing Soviet
domination and maintaining access for ourselves, including to the
Region’s petroleum resources, have been preserved despite the
undeniable fact that the Soviets, while they have experienced some
setbacks, have improved their overall position in the Region as a
whole on the last decade. But, given the unnaturally low base from
which the Soviets started in the 1950’s, this is hardly surprising.
As we weigh our future strategy, the critical questions are
these:
(1) Can we assume that a continuation of policies based more on a
Strategy One than a Strategy Two approach will continue to protect
our vital interests in the Region? This question is especially
applicable to the Arab-Israel area, where a continuation of the
present impasse, in circumstances where we are seen as fully
identified with Israeli policies, casts a growing shadow over much
of the Region and in particular the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf
area, playing into the hands of the Soviets and extremist elements
and creating crosscurrents that could increasingly affect our
ability to meet our growing energy
[Page 66]
demands. In South Asia, where we would be
backing the weaker horse in Pakistan, this policy could also prove
costly.
(2) Are we prepared as an ultimate sanction to make clear to the
Soviets that our relations in this Region are an integral part of
our total relationship, and that this relationship with all its
evolving and complex advantages to both of us will be at stake?
(3) To support such a position, are we prepared to invoke the
prospect of U.S.-Chinese
collaboration in this Region?
(4) Are the Soviets prepared to accept the check on their historical
thrust into this Region which an approach along the lines of (2) and
(3) above would seek to achieve?
