84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia1
70182. Subject: Saudi Arabian-Iranian Coordination in Security Matters. Ref: Jidda 1450; Tehran 2372. SecDef for ISA.
1. We are concerned at indications provided reftels that Saudis are seemingly reluctant to enter into frank dialogue with Iranians on peninsular security matters. Granted that King Faisal, for political as well as personal reasons, may not wish to take any initiatives to arrange for transfer of Iranian-owned F–5 munitions to Saudi Arabia. Still, this would appear be shift in Saudi policy position in as much as precedent for such transfer was established by loan to Saudi Arabian Army of Iranian 106 mm recoilless rifles and anti-aircraft guns several years ago. Failure of Saudis to discuss peninsular security questions with Iranians moreover strikes us as step backward from basis for frank dialogue seemingly laid at time of Saqqaf visit to Tehran last December.
2. Recurring hints from various sources that Saudis are disturbed in some way by presence of Iranian special forces and helicopters in Oman, as well as Iran’s hesitation [mentioned by Khalatbary] to provide military support for Yemen lest it upset the Arabs point to need for early and frank discussions between Riyadh and Tehran about their respective roles and activities in supporting peninsula states threatened by PDRY aggression/subversion. Such consultation need not be in context of drawing up “security treaty” or other formal alliance but should instead focus on assuring that each side is aware of what other is intending to do to help in order that competition or overlapping can be avoided. If Saudis are in fact uneasy about Iranian military assistance initiatives in Oman or Yemen, then they would be well advised to let Iranians know what they themselves are planning to do and suggest ways in which Iranians can be helpful in supporting Saudi effort. If [Page 314] Saudis choose to leave Iranians in dark about their aid programs and intentions in YAR and Oman, result could be that Iranians will act without consulting Saudis. Not only does this risk wasteful duplication of effort but it could serve further to increase any suspicions Saudis may have that Iran intends play lone hand in peninsula and Gulf.
3. Our policy is to continue encourage both Saudis and Iranians to assume primary responsibility for regional security. Accordingly, we do not believe that USG should substitute itself in role of middleman between Tehran and Riyadh, whether purpose is to arrange transfer of military material or to supply information on each other’s military assistance programs to third countries. To do so merely invites continuing recourse to this tactic by either side and vitiates our policy of stimulating greater regional cooperation and self-reliance. Instead, we consider USG efforts should most usefully be employed in pressing both sides, and especially Saudis, in getting on with developing kind of dialogue with each other that would genuinely facilitate meaningful coordinated planning of assistance to other peninsular states.
4. For Jidda. We look forward to receiving your thoughts on how direct Iranian-Saudi dialogue could be encouraged. At your discretion, you may also wish to discuss points raised Tehran reftel and para 1–3 above with Saqqaf prior to your departure for COM conference. Since Saqqaf [next perhaps to Kamal Adham] has been senior Saudi official most closely involved in Saudi coordination with Iran on security matters, it would be useful to have his views on how Saudis see question of coordination and cooperation with Iran developing.
5. For Tehran. Suggest you inform Khalatbary that we ourselves do not possess full information on Saudi assistance to Oman and Yemen. You could add that we too believe more consultation between Saudi Arabia and Iran is required and that we have requested Ambassador Thacher to give some consideration prior his visiting Tehran to how Saudis might be encouraged to be more forthcoming with Iranians on military assistance issues.
Summary: The Department instructed the Embassies in Jidda and Tehran to encourage closer cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran regarding regional security.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, 1970–73, POL Iran-Saudi Arabia. Secret. Drafted by Brooks Wrampelmeier (NEA/ARP); cleared in NEA/IRN, NEA/ARP, and NEA; approved by Atherton. Repeated to Tehran, Kuwait City, London, and Sana’a. Brackets are in the original. Telegrams 1450 from Jidda, April 9, and 2372 from Tehran, April 12, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. The difficulties of Iranian-Saudi cooperation were discussed in INR study RNAS–6, April 12, “Iran and Saudi Arabia—The Odd Couple.” (Ibid.) Both Ambassadors attempted to facilitate discussions during the spring of 1973 while emphasizing the difficulty of encouraging trust between King Faisal and the Shah, reported in telegram 2450 from Tehran, April 16, and telegram 1618 from Jidda, April 20. (Ibid., [no film number] and D760430–0677)
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