82. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Departments of State and Defense1
1126. SecDef for ISA. Army for CDSLOG and DCSOPS. Subject: Saudi Arabian National Guard Project. Ref: Jidda 09.
1. Ambassador and DATT met with Guard Commander Prince Abdullah at his request March 19. Abdullah informed us of “good news”: he had succeeded in convincing King Faisal to approve signature of memorandum of understanding. King had expressed some reservations at lack of fully detailed U.S. plan but Abdullah had told him MOU was as “key in auto engine” which once turned would permit program to move ahead. King had given Abdullah in writing formal authorization to sign MOU on behalf of SAG. Accordingly Prince stated he ready sign MOU at once in precisely same form as [Page 307] agreed upon at last meeting with Washington negotiating team on March 1 (reftel).
2. Foreign Ministry’s Legal Counselor Abdul Rahman Mansuri accompanied by SANG’s own lawyer then joined meeting presenting originals of MOU in English and Arabic which were duly signed by Prince Abdullah and Ambassador under March 19 date, with warm mutual congratulations and expressions determination both sides assure program’s success.
3. Abdullah asked for information on probable next step. Ambassador said that while he lacked specific instructions he was hopeful he might soon be authorized present HRH with military sales case providing funds for establishment of project office within US Dept. of Defense. Project office would be charged with planning and implementation of SANG modernization. Project office would include officers qualified carry out procedures in Washington and also to work out in Saudi Arabia with SANG representatives’ specifications for modernization plan. Abdullah concurred in desirability this step. Urged USG move with all possible speed. Abdullah did not bring up, nor did we think it appropriate at this time to discuss other letters of offer. (Our latest information is that SANG giving serious consideration to acquiring NATO rifle. SANG not desirous immediate assistance of Corps of Engineers, though may want it at later stage. We will make reserved inquiries re commo equipment stressing desirability of uniformity.)
4. Comment: Refreshing promptness with which Abdullah has moved seems favorable omen reflecting Abdullah’s ability take issues directly to King for immediate decisions, bypassing many of usual bureaucratic obstacles inherent in Council of Ministers’ consideration etc. Hope USG can reciprocate with comparable promptness in authorizing US to present project team letter of offer.
In preparing letter suggest it be drawn to cover expenses for perhaps two to two and a half year period and that we be given if possible description in outline of team’s purpose, how it will operate, etc., to present to Abdullah with letter of offer. As in case of USN team designated for Saudi Navy project, there might be advantage in drawing up SANG project group so that it could undertake many functions such as contracting, recruitment, preparation of specifications etc., which might otherwise have to be undertaken by DOD or US Army offices dealing with these matters. Prince Abdullah will, we believe, be eagerly awaiting arrival of first US “advisors” in Saudi Arabia. In interest of continuity and effectiveness we would suggest careful consideration be given to possibility assigning personnel for accompanied tours of two years or more. DOD might wish think also about possibility including eventually among those assigned to Saudi Arabia two or three young Arabists, military or civilian, to act as interpreters, expediters, government relations men. Project and individuals assigned would both benefit.
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Summary: Thacher and Prince Abdullah discussed Saudi approval of a program to expand its National Guard.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to CS Army, USCINCEUR, DAEN, DIVENGR MED, and CHUSMTM. Telegram 9 from Jidda was not found. Previous delays alluded to in this telegram reference King Faisal’s reluctance to contract the SANG modernization program to Raytheon, as reported in telegram 467 from Jidda, February 5. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–82–0274, NEG Saudi Arabia National Guard Modernization)
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