32. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State1
978. Beirut pass Baghdad. Subject: Iraqi Attack on Kuwait; Its Implications for Kuwait and Gulf.
Summary: FonMin told Ambassador March 26 that Iraqis had offered come Kuwait to discuss border situation about April 8 but GOK seeking earlier arrival. Sabah believed Soviets involved in Iraqi moves. Kuwaitis pleased at support of small Gulf States, but irritated with Saudis who only expressed regret. Ambassador urged that Kuwait and lower Gulf states join together to protect themselves from obvious growing dangers from north and south. Sabah agreed that more joint cooperation among small Gulf states essential. Ambassador also urged Kuwaiti assistance to Oman and suggested that threat to Oman should also be seen by Kuwait as a danger to itself and stability of area, similar to threat from Iraq. Sabah asked that USG expedite sending military items requested by GOK. End summary.
1. FonMin Sabah received me at my request March 26. In answer my questions, he gave details on present border situation with Iraq along lines we have reported in other tels. He said Iraqis had offered come to Kuwait to discuss border about April 8 but GOK had replied requesting earlier meeting and demanding know why delay. Sabah said GOK’s demand talks be conducted on basis 1963 agreement had not been answered by GOI, but Kuwaitis confident of general Arab support as injured party if GOK forced take problem further, including to Arab League.
[Page 176]2. FonMin said GOK persuaded Soviets had hand in Iraqi move. He had just seen Soviet Ambassador (who was departing Ministry as I entered) and asked him report GOK’s request that USSR restrain its protegé.
3. I told Sabah USG had thought it best not issue public statement on Kuwaiti-Iraqi’s border problem. He replied he agreed silence best but USG could help by expediting military items requested. I told him military requirements sent me by MinDef [garble—were?] already en route Washington (septels).
4. Referring to several recent commentaries in local press, I asked Sabah whether as result Iraqi attack GOK might not be feeling bit lonely. Did he think traditional policy of being friends of all and yet having no friends in time of need would now come under review? Sabah was not willing acknowledge failure of “neutralist” Kuwaiti policies, but he was clearly receptive to discussing subject. He was especially irritated with Saudis whose only reaction to date had been message sent through Saudi Amb here expressing regret for incident “which is contrary to Arabism and Islam.” Other small Gulf states however had been prompt in offering full cooperation including use of their airfields and other facilities. GOK said been very pleased and gratified by this response.
5. I commented it my personal view lesson to be learned was that Kuwait and lower Gulf states could go on acting alone, as though all world owed them their existence, and in end be swallowed up one by one; or could join together to protect themselves. If they chose latter course, they could be respected power in their own right.
Kuwait, I said, would have great deal to offer such a grouping, and I was sure there were rulers, especially Khalifa of Qatar and Isa of Bahrain, who would be receptive to idea. No outsiders likely to be respectful or helpful if Gulf states unable show they could put own house in order. Right now they were tasty and tempting morsels to bigger fish, like Kuwait to Iraq.
6. Sabah did not take issue. In fact, he said, Kuwait had initiated new contacts with lower Gulf and Oman and these would be expanded. Much more, he conceded, needed to be done. He was especially worried, he said, about Oman where inexperienced Sultan not in touch with his people, surrounded by British expatriates, and wasting his money on fighting handful of people in Dhofar instead of developing his country. Was it good thing that Iranians and Saudis had entered scene and were stirring it up?
7. I told Sabah he had it wrong. Qaboos was indeed inexperienced but he trying hard, with long legacy of utter neglect of country under his father. Qaboos had two problems: costly defense of country which after all under attack by neighboring communist regime of PDRY and [Page 177] at same time trying to engender some economic and social progress in far-flung and backward country. He badly needed help. If Kuwait did not like Iran-Saudi role, what was Kuwait doing to make it unnecessary? If Kuwait could take full honest look at area, it might discover danger to itself from south (Aden) as well as north. It might realize that Oman’s struggle was Kuwait’s problem too, only a few miles removed. Kuwait should understand predicament Qaboos was in. For all its enlightened policies toward other countries, Kuwait had now discovered that some people do not play game according to rules. Now ever Kuwait finds it must defend itself. If all Gulf states came to conclusion that Kuwait’s problem with present Iraqi regime and Oman’s problem with PDRY regime were fundamentally one and same, their chances of survival would be measurably improved. I added US had very important selfish interest in welfare of Gulf states as well. We get our oil from this region.
8. Sabah said he would welcome further discussions of this sort. In meantime GOK urgently requesting US help with weapons Kuwait now needs to strengthen its armed forces.
Summary: Ambassador Stoltzfus reported on his meeting with Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, at which Stoltzfus explained the U.S. reaction to the Iraqi incursion and urged al-Sabah to consider joining with other Gulf states for mutual protection.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret. Repeated to Abu Dhabi, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, London, Manama, Muscat, Moscow, and Sana’a. The archived record of the telegram is misdated March 13.
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