229. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Ellsworth) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Sisco)1
(S) The British have agreed to postpone notifying the Sultan of Oman of their intention to withdraw from the RAF facility on Masirah Island until after the NATO Foreign Ministers Conference in Oslo. In preparation for the discussions in Oslo, I would like to reiterate the interest of the Department of Defense in retaining access to the facilities on Masirah Island [less than 1 line not declassified].
(S) The DOD interest is to assure access to air facilities for maritime surveillance aircraft operating in the northwest Indian Ocean. This is a primary area of Soviet naval activity, and it is too far from Diego Garcia to permit effective search operations to be conducted from there. Our use of alternative facilities, e.g., Bandar Abbas or Karachi, is restricted due to political constraints, and the potential availability of an airfield on Masirah would considerably enhance the flexibility of air operations in this important region.
(S) [1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]
(S) The most desirable solution from the viewpoint of the Department of Defense would be for the British to continue to operate the RAF facility on the island, even if only on a “bare bones” basis. We would be prepared to discuss with the British financial or other arrangements which might assist them in maintaining their presence at reduced levels of expenditure. However, talks with British representatives below the Cabinet level have revealed little interest in a cost-sharing formula, since the decision to withdraw is based primarily on a political desire to terminate their defense commitments East of Suez.
(S) The USSR is in the process of completing the naval and air support facilities at Berbera. The availability of the airfield there in particular may lead to a change in the nature and overall capabilities of Soviet military operations in the northwest Indian Ocean. We believe [Page 717] this would be the wrong time for the British to relinquish the air [less than 1 line not declassified] facilities on Masirah, and I recommend that they be urged to postpone their withdrawal for at least two years.
(S) If the British cannot be persuaded to reverse their decision, we would require at a minimum that an operational facility of some form continue to be available on Masirah. It is our understanding that the Sultan has indicated his interest in establishing a flying school at the airfield—probably with British contract assistance—[2 lines not declassified]. Although operation of the airfield under Omani auspices would be much less satisfactory than a continued RAF presence, it is in our interests to insure that any British negotiations with the Sultan be conducted with at least the minimum objective of preserving the operational capability of the airfield, with the understanding that we would wish to undertake direct discussions with the Sultan of Oman concerning future U.S. access rights.
Sincerely,
Summary: Ellsworth informed Sisco of the Department of Defense’s view that Masirah Island was valuable to the United States as a counterweight to the new Soviet facility at Berbera, Somalia, and as an adjunct to the joint U.S.–U.K. base at Diego Garcia.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 32, Trucial States (3). Secret. Published from a copy that indicates Ellsworth signed the original. On May 7, British Foreign Secretary Crosland sent a letter to Kissinger informing him of his government’s decision to postpone notifying Sultan Qaboos until after the 1976 Oslo NATO meeting. The letter was transmitted in telegram 122786 to London, May 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760193–0612)
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