227. Memorandum From Robert B. Oakley of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1
SUBJECT
- Masirah Island
Since no decision was taken on NSSM 217 concerning Oman, we explicitly folded the Masirah question into NSSM 238 on Persian Gulf security issues. It is moving along but too slowly to meet the UK intent to notify the Omanis by mid-April of their intention to withdraw from Masirah (Tab A). Therefore, I chaired a meeting with DOD (JCS and ISA), State and CIA representatives on April 6. The results are summarized in the message at Tab B to our Embassy in London, with the key facilities of interest to the USG being the airbase [less than 1 line not declassified] at Masirah. We asked the UK here and in London to hold off with the notification until we could complete our study. They told us that the decision had been taken at the Ministerial level but agreed to wait until after our annual talks with the UK on the Gulf (April 22 and 23), although holding out little hope of a change of mind or a long delay (Tab C) and suggesting that we negotiate directly with Oman on any future USG use, as was the pattern with Bahrain after the UK withdrew there.
At the meeting I chaired on April 6 there was full agreement that the USG should find a means of preserving its option of using Masirah occasionally, particularly for P–3 flights. This can be done in one of several ways, ranging from the UK continuing to operate the base as in the past (virtually precluded), through our aiding the UK financially (doubtful the UK would agree to stay, even on this basis) to other arrangements which need to be clarified (e.g. having the airfield remain open under Omani Government control, presumably with some sort of contract service; Iranian and/or Jordanian or Saudi participation along with Oman in running the airfield; USG participation in running the airfield; using Salalah airfield in Oman—still run by the RAF—as an alternative to Masirah). State and DOD will explore all possible [Page 713] alternatives with the UK team tomorrow and Friday. The British have come fully prepared on this subject so we should have a reasonably clear idea of what is possible by the end of the talks.
Finally, State has before the Secretary a memo—which I cleared for NSC—explaining the problem of the UK notification of Oman and recommending that he either send a message to Prime Minister Callaghan or take up with Foreign Minister Crossland a request that the UK wait another few weeks until the USG has developed a definitive position on Masirah. This would strengthen our position for the talks with the UK tomorrow and Friday.
No matter which alternative we may reach—assuming we do wish to have the option of using occasionally an airfield on Oman—we are going to be faced with the need to negotiate an agreement with Oman and will probably have to consult Congress on what we are doing. Neither of these is an insurmountable problem, but both will make our life more difficult in reaching the desired outcome. [3 lines not declassified] Vis-à-vis Congress, we shall get the usual hue and cry about expansionism and Indian Ocean arms race, etc., although the mood seems to have improved considerably in recent weeks.
Summary: Given the U.K. abandonment of its Masirah Island facility, Oakley provided Scowcroft with a summary of U.S. options, pointing out the island’s importance for [text not declassified] flights.
Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 41, NSSM 238. Secret. Sent for information. Scowcroft wrote “Thanks” at the top of the memorandum. Tabs A and C were not found. Tab B is published as Document 225. NSSMs 217 and 238 are Documents 217 and 25, respectively.
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