216. Memorandum From Robert B.
Oakley and Clinton E. Granger of the National Security
Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger1
Washington, January 29, 1975.
SUBJECT
- Evolution of our Policy toward Oman
The visit of Sultan Qaboos has
left behind some important questions about our future security policy
toward Oman and the Gulf. A memorandum examining aspects of our Omani
relationship is at Tab B. Briefly, these questions include:
—The purposes for which US military ships and aircraft need to use
facilities in Oman, and the existence or absence of alternative
facilities. (The Sultan in principle has agreed to a limited US use
of the airfield on Masira Island. The British have asked us what use
we might [Page 687] make of the
island, noting the minimal facilities there and the need to supply
even water by ship).
—Our interest in directly equipping, training or advising the
Sultan’s forces. (During the visit of the Sultan we agreed to a
study team for his forces which are, at present, almost entirely
non-Omani in nationality. They are equipped, trained and advised by
those states directly engaged in helping the Sultan defeat the
rebellion.)
—The role of other states in Omani security and their attitudes
toward more direct US involvement. (The Iranians, the British, the
Jordanians and the Saudis are now deeply involved in supporting
Oman, assuming the primary military role with our approval and
encouragement in the context of our policy of maximum regional
self-reliance. The USSR, with the
help of Iraq and South Yemen, is supporting the Omani
opposition.)
—The strategic and political importance of Oman for the Gulf and
South Arabia. (The Sultan, who is reasonably well in control after
two years of power when oil prices were rising, blocks certain
radical and Soviet interests. Oman is, however, more of a dependent
state than one which exercises influence of its own in the region.
Oman also produces a small amount of oil for export.)
—The negative aspects of a deepened US commitment to Oman and the
implications of a growing US military presence in South Arabia and
the Indian Ocean.
The bases for US security policy and force deployment in the Gulf and
Oman are NSDM 92 of July 30, 1970 and
NSDM 186 of April 24, 1972
(Government Arms Sales to Oman), which directs that the primary
responsibility for the security of the region should fall upon the
states of the region, and that a continuing British role should be
encouraged. An up-date is needed.
We believe that before we send the DOD
study team for a survey of either the Masira facilities or the Sultan’s
forces there should be a careful review of our present policy. To date,
this has been remarkably successful in drawing others into cooperative
security efforts in the Gulf as well as Dhofar. There are, however,
signs of strain.
We may decide that we will want to proceed no further
in deepening our presence in Oman—or, alternately, that we have
fewer qualms now about replacing the British there. We may even want
to seek a major role ourself in preserving Gulf security and
positioning ourselves for other contingencies. However, we do not
now want to move in either direction without considering how small
steps relate to our overall strategic interests, without a review of
other options for protecting these interests, and without
considering what action we can take to minimize any unfavorable
repercussions of a change in our present policy. The study is needed
in the first instance to define the terms of reference of the DOD teams which go to Oman.
We should ask the USC
to carefully review existing studies and the subsequent NSDMs,
as they apply to Oman, taking into account the questions raised above.
Because of widening publicity—both here and [Page 688] in the Arab world—about a military role for the US
in the Gulf area, this study should be conducted on a very close hold
basis.
At Tab A is a memorandum to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries
Committee requesting that the study mentioned above be submitted for the
review of the President in no more than three weeks. The memo directs
that in the Department of Defense arrange the despatch of its teams to
Oman so that they will follow the completion of the study.
RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the memo at Tab
A.
Approve __________
Disapprove __________
Other (I want the study done, but the DOD teams can proceed to Oman without waiting for the
conclusion of the study.) __________
Tab B
Paper Prepared in the Department of State
US/OMANI RELATIONS: RESULTS OF THE QABOOS
VISIT
It appears that as a result of the visit of Sultan Qaboos to Washington, and of the US
Navy’s interest in obtaining aircraft support facilities on Masira
Island, the strategic positions of both the US and the UK in Oman are being altered, and the
US may be undertaking—at least implicitly—a more direct military
commitment in South Arabia in general.
What Qaboos Got
During his visit last week, Sultan Qaboos received US commitments for an immediate
delivery of TOW anti-tank missiles
(which he originally requested in July of last year), infrared
night-vision equipment (which had been agreed to prior to his
arrival), Claymore mines, and the possibility of pilot training in
both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. The latter question was
discussed between Qaboos and Secretary Schlesinger, but was not pinned down in detail. In
addition, DOD agreed to send a team
of three officers to Oman to study the improvement of the Omani
Navy, and possibly of Omani ground forces as well.
What Qaboos Thinks He Gave
In return, Qaboos consented to the use of Masira Island’s landing
facilities (presently run by the RAF) by US reconnaissance aircraft in [Page 689] need of refueling or emergency
assistance. As far as can be determined Qaboos did not ask, and was
not informed during any of his meetings in Washington, about the
types of US military aircraft which might avail themselves of Masira
or the purpose and frequency of use, although the impression was
given that this would be only occasional. He only asked that the
USG make the necessary
arrangements with the RAF.
What DOD
thinks Qaboos Gave
Certainly, the US Navy is interested in Masira as a convenient
emergency stop and a sometime refueling facility for aircraft in
transit to other Indian Ocean facilities. It is also apparently
interested in Masira as a possible regular-use airport for Lockeed
P–3 Orion reconnaissance aircraft now stationed at Bandar Abbas,
some 450 miles further north, and as a transit/refueling stop for CV
support aircraft, such as the Grumman C–1, operating in the area.
This question has taken on greater currency with the arrival of the
Enterprise in the Indian Ocean, but the Navy’s interest is
undoubtedly of longer duration than the Enterprise’s cruise.
A related factor is the interest of the US Air Force in using Masira
as a landing point for F–111’s. In 1971 or early 1972, shortly after
Qaboos took power, the British were sounded out about the
possibility of a small group of F–111’s flying from Europe to Masira
to demonstrate the US Air force’s ability to deploy into the Indian
Ocean if necessary. The British deferred to Qaboos, who declined
permission but did not shut the door completely. It is likely that
this request will now be renewed by the USAF.
The Implications for the UK
Heretofore, our interests in Oman have been well served by our
strategy of backing the continued military presence of the UK and encouraging Iran and Saudi
Arabia (and to a degree Jordan and Egypt) to combat radical elements
in the Gulf and support Oman’s military in its struggle with the
South Yemen-backed rebellion.
The British have assumed the primary responsibility of advising
Qaboos on both foreign policy and military affairs and have exerted
strong influence over the direction of the Dhofar war. Although they
have had a payback in prestige and money from military sales to
Oman, late last year it took our strong urging to convince them not
to abandon Masira as a British base.
The weakened position of the UK at
home and abroad is undoubtedly not lost on Qaboos, who must
certainly realize that before too long the British could well
withdraw permanently their military presence from South Arabia.
Reservations in his own mind about the desirability of maintaining
the intimacy of his relationship with the British [Page 690] may already exist; there have
certainly been costly errors of judgment committed by his military
advisor, Major General Creasey, in the conduct of Qaboos’s forces
against the Dhofari rebels; and Yahya Omar, the Libyan loyalist
advisor to Qaboos, who accompanied the Sultan to Washington and is
involved in all military matters, makes no secret of his intense
personal dislike of the British.
If the Sultan is considering the possibility of eventually replacing
the UK, his visit to Washington came
at an opportune time. His perception of the willingness of the US to
work with Oman must certainly have been reinforced by his
conversations here, by the eagerness of DOD for access to Masira, by our immediate supply of
hitherto unavailable TOWs and by our decision to send a military
evaluation team to Oman in the next few weeks.
The British may also see the US as a possible replacement in Oman,
given Labor policy of progressively phasing out military presence
East of Suez. Turning the base and the burden for helping Oman
control its rebellion over to the US could have a certain
attraction, although there are also elements of jealousy and
national pride which push the UK to
stay. In regard to our use of the Masira airfield the British have
asked several specific questions about the extent to which it will
be used, as well as about our military supply relationship. They
state that they are unable to logistically support more than
occassional aircraft. They imply that anything greater would require
US assistance and, very possibly, personnel.
Policy Implications for the US
The reasons behind keen DOD interest
in access to military facilities on Masira are understandable, given
our strategic interest in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East.
Masira has an excellent location for surveillance and possible
interdiction of hostile shipping, not only in the Indian Ocean but
also the Persian Gulf and Straits of Hormuz (critical for oil
shipments) and the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb (of importance
vis-à-vis Israel and of even greater importance, particularly
vis-à-vis the USSR, should the
Suez Canal reopen). It provides an excellent link between Diego
Garcia and facilities available to the US in Iran, Turkey and
Greece. It is in a good position to support US Navy operations in
the Gulf, Red Sea or South Arabia. It provides a good site for area
familiarization and training and it would be a valuable staging area
in event of a conflict involving US forces.
On the other side of the coin, however, US interest in Masira will in
all probability generate pressures for an even closer US-Omani
relationship, and requests from the Omanis for US assistance in
weaponry and military advice which may require positive responses if
the use of Masira, once gained, is not to be lost. In sum, the
Island could [Page 691] become a
static Omani quid for escalating US quos. More important, any reduction of
British presence in Oman will place greater onus on the US to be the
Sultan’s strategic ally.
At the moment, US involvement is still slight. The TOWs require only
two US trainers on a non-government basis, and the occasional use of Masira by aircraft may not require US
support personnel. Greater involvement, particularly that which may
follow the visit of a DOD team,
could well result in a semi-permanent US military presence in
Oman.
The primary question that needs to be answered is whether the
military reasons moving the US toward a deeper relationship with
Oman are counterbalanced by an interest in staying out. Unless
clearer guidelines are developed on the basis of such a policy
examination, we risk slipping gradually and naturally into a
relationship which will be seen by Oman, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq
South Yemen, the USSR, the UK and others as being deeper than now
foreseen.
