Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

183. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 8, 1976, 12:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

• US-Saudi Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• SAUDI ARABIA

  • HRH Prince Abdallah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, Second Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard
  • H.E. Shaikh Abd al-Aziz Tuwayjiri, Deputy Commander, National Guard
  • Ambassador Ali Abdallah Alireza

• US

  • The Secretary
  • Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements
  • Assistant Secretary of State (NEA) Alfred L. Atherton, Jr
  • Francois M. Dickman, Director, NEA/ARP (Notetaker)
  • Najib Najjar, Interpreter

Abdallah: It is very nice to be here. How old is this building?

The Secretary: I think it is about 15 years old. I believe it was intended to be a hospital originally. When I walk down the halls, I expect a door will be open and there will be an operating table ready. I do not know who the architect was, perhaps there was no architect. You know Your Royal Highness, one of the reasons I travel so much is because I hate low ceilings (laughter).

Abdallah: It is well known, of course, that you have beaten all track records.

The Secretary: Well, I have not had a chance to be in the Kingdom for nearly one year.

(Deputy Secretary Clements enters.)

The Secretary: (pointing to Clements) You realize Your Highness that you have two Ambassadors here—your own and Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements. They in Defense don’t let me sit in their meetings (laughter). I am very pleased that you have been able to visit us. How is the visit going so far?

Abdallah: Very well. I am very happy with the visit and the friendly atmosphere.

The Secretary: You are among friends. I want to tell you that I have a feeling of great affection for the Kingdom and for the late King Faisal. I admired him very much. I do not know King Khalid as well but I have great respect for him as well as for Crown Prince Fahd.

Abdallah: The late King Faisal as well as King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd have the greatest respect for Your Excellency.

The Secretary: I appreciate that. I remember well that in my negotiations in the Middle East, the influence of King Faisal and Prince Fahd was extremely important and very constructive.

Abdallah: For all the steps taken by Your Excellency, they wished you success in your endeavors and they are looking forward to further efforts.

The Secretary: I expect that negotiations in the Middle East will resume after the elections and that we can advance on the progress that has been made.

Abdallah: We wish that the negotiations in the Middle East had never stopped but had continued.

The Secretary: We all have to face certain concrete circumstances. Some have occurred on our side but some have occurred on the Arab side. Without a united Arab front, it is very difficult to conduct effective negotiations. Therefore, we have welcomed the efforts of Saudi Arabia to bring Syria and Egypt together. We think that Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, together with Jordan, have the elements needed to achieve a peace in the Middle East.

Abdallah: I hope so, God willing. As Your Excellency is aware, we are exerting our greatest efforts to bring these countries together.

The Secretary: Yes, we appreciate everything you have done. Do you think there is anything that the US could do?

Abdallah: I have many suggestions.

The Secretary: I would be very grateful for any thoughts you have.

Abdallah: (pausing) Do you smoke? (pulls out cigarette)

The Secretary: No thank you. I never learned how to inhale.

Clements: But he exhales very well. (laughter)

The Secretary: (to Clements) I understand you are going to be in charge of the Republican campaign.

Clements: No, I don’t think so.

The Secretary: Secretary Clements is a good friend of Saudi Arabia. If I could make him feel the same way about the State Department, Defense and State would work beautifully. (laughter)

Clements: Dr. Kissinger and I have no disagreement about US Middle East policy and especially about our policy toward Saudi Arabia.

The Secretary: The only disagreement we have is that he would like to conduct foreign policy from the Pentagon. (laughter) Your Royal Highness, you mentioned you had some ideas on what the US could do.

Abdallah: What I want to say is that the US has a great responsibility for achieving a settlement in the Middle East. Because the interests of the US and Saudi Arabia are the same, we must be concerned that the Russians not penetrate into the Middle East. We know that the US does not condone Russian penetration . . .

The Secretary: (interrupting) We oppose it.

Abdallah: . . . but we find ourselves between two groups: one which says that we follow the US in whatever it says and does, another which says that we are in agreement with the US over what is going on in Lebanon. As you know, we are exerting every effort to bring the parties in Lebanon together as well as to bring the Syrians and Egyptians together.

The Secretary: We are proud when Saudi Arabia says that it agrees with us but we do not believe that Saudi Arabia follows us. You know of the efforts to bring the parties together. We believe the Lebanese civil war must be brought to an end because otherwise there can’t be peace in the Middle East.

Abdallah: What I have referred to is not spread by us but by the Soviets.

The Secretary: I know, but what concretely does Your Royal Highness think the US can do?

Abdallah: Well, as far as we are concerned, we are pressing in every way we can the Syrians, Palestinians, Moslems and Christians in Lebanon.

The Secretary: Earlier in the Lebanese civil war, the US was accused of colluding with the Egyptians; now we are accused of colluding with the Syrians. This is not true. We will do whatever we can toward a solution. We want all the Arabs to come together, we think that would be the best solution from our point of view, especially for those Arabs who want to keep the communists out of the Middle East. Excuse me, just a minute, I want to introduce my son David.

(David Kissinger enters briefly)

The Secretary: (introducing David to Prince Abdallah and other participants): He is leaving for two weeks to go to Boston.

Abdallah: Like father like son, there is a strong resemblance between the two of you. (David exits)

The Secretary: He is at an age when young people rebel against their parents. I have told him I have no guilt feelings and that I am not a loser, so there has not been a rebellion. (laughter)

To come back to our conversation on Lebanon, our difficulty is that we don’t know what the US can do constructively, to be very frank with you. We support your efforts.

Abdallah: What we really want from you is to stop Soviet encroachements.

The Secretary: That we will do our best to accomplish.

Abdallah: The thing is to stop Russians from flourishing through situations of poverty, destruction, and violence that exist.

The Secretary: We agree and we are trying to contain the Russians wherever we can. I think it would be very helpful if we could work something out with Jordan on the Hawk missiles. It would be a tragedy if Soviet equipment were introduced into Jordan together with Soviet technicians.

Abdallah: King Hussein was in Riyadh a day or two ago to discuss this.

The Secretary: Our impression is that these were good talks. We have received a report from Amman. (Turning to Mr. Atherton) Have we heard from Jidda?

Atherton: No, but we have had a very detailed report from King Hussein.

Abdallah: The late King Faisal promised King Hussein that Saudi Arabia would finance the Hawks which were originally to have cost $300 million. King Faisal passed away. However, King Khalid took upon himself to fulfill any commitments that had been made by King Faisal. Meanwhile, the prices went up. The Jordanians came to see us. We reaffirmed our earlier promise but the Jordanians said that these funds were not enough and that they would try to secure missiles from the Soviet Union. We told the Jordanians they should not go to Moscow. We would finance missiles purchased either from the US or Western European countries. Subsequently we heard an Anglo-American project was being presented.

The Secretary: (interrupting) Yes, but King Hussein did not want it.

Abdallah: King Khalid lately agreed to raise the amount from $300 to $500 million to be paid over a period of ten years on the one condition that missiles be purchased from the US or other friendly nations. But King Hussein went to Russia without informing us. We advised him that he was playing in matters which really were not in his interest.

The Secretary: You are right. We think that with the $500 million from Saudi Arabia, we can come very close to meeting King Hussein’s requirements. There were a lot of people who were urging us to get in touch with Hussein before he went to Moscow. We did not do so. We did not want to be blackmailed by the Soviet Union. I had the impression that the Kingdom had come to the same conclusion. In any event, we think the decision of His Majesty King Khalid to increase the offer to $500 million will enable us to make a proposal which we think King Hussein will now be prepared to accept—(turning to Mr. Atherton) don’t you think so Roy?

Atherton: Yes, if Hussein reduces his requirements a little.

Clements: If Hussein agrees with our proposal, it will have the advantage that Jordan and Saudi Arabia will have the same standard system. Both systems will be completely interchangeable.

Abdallah: My personal feeling is that King Hussein is very dedicated but there are some people around him who influence him in ways that are against his interests. Why should Jordan threaten the US or Saudi Arabia with going to the Russians? After all, it is we who are helping the Jordanians.

The Secretary: I am glad that we did not send missions and that you did not send missions to Amman when we both heard that Hussein was going to the Soviet Union. I think that if Hussein should go ahead with the Soviet deal, it would lead to the destruction of the monarchy in Jordan.

Abdallah: I agree.

The Secretary: I think it is a wise decision for Hussein to resume talks with you on the Hawks. A little more move in both directions should permit some acceptable proposal to be worked out. Your Royal Highness, our guests are waiting upstairs and we can continue our talks a little longer after the lunch.

Abdallah: (rising) I want to make just one point very briefly. It is very important that the US continue its political and economic support of Egypt and also of the Sudan.

The Secretary: We are doing this. I do not know if you saw the message which President Ford sent to President Nimeiri congratulating him on his ability to overcome the coup.

(Meeting resumed in the Secretary’s office at 2:45 pm following the luncheon on the Eighth Floor.)

Abdallah: (after presenting a curved dagger attached to a plaque to the Secretary) I would also like to present you and some of your colleagues with a small token (a tie clasp). I know that US Government laws forbid you from accepting any gift of significant value. Actually this is a good idea. It is in our interest as well, since we can save something. (laughter) (Tie clasps presented to Mr. Atherton and Mr. Dickman.)

The Secretary: I simply wanted to sum up by saying that we attach great importance to the role the Kingdom has played.

Abdallah: I want to say that I like to be with a truthful friend. After the events in Pakistan, Vietnam, and Angola, people have started to point to us and say look—see what happens to America’s friends. The Americans have abandoned them. There are many who are doubtful that the Kingdom should be so closely identified with the US. We have to combat these rumors but we would like you to [do] something.

The Secretary: I understand these concerns. With regard to the events in Pakistan, this was largely the fault of Yahya Khan who behaved very foolishly. With regard to the other two events, you are quite right. We have had a very difficult time, it has been a very difficult period for the Executive because of Watergate and the intelligence investigation; but I think that after the elections our Executive authority will reassert itself and gain very much. I agree that we have to act decisively and I think our friends will not be disappointed.

Abdallah: This is what we hope and this is what we are trying to convince other people that the US has been and still is holding loyalty toward its friends. We see what is going on in Somalia. The Soviet Union has the guts to push itself there and gain a position of influence. At one time, the US had such prestige that such Soviet adventures would have been impossible. Look for example what happened in Cuba when Castro deployed the rockets. He removed the rockets two days after the US took decisive action. Yet we see Cubans in Angola.

The Secretary: As your Ambassador knows very well and can tell you what happened, because of opposition in Congress, we were unable to take the action that we wanted.

Abdallah: I know this, but this Congress, it is like a disease.

The Secretary: I think the situation will improve after the elections.

Abdallah: You see a state is like a person who has prestige, if he is strong and decisive. Once the prestige is lost, then the position of the state is lost.

The Secretary: I believe we will be seeing each other again tomorrow night, and I look forward to continuing our discussion on that occasion.

1. Summary: Kissinger and Clements met with Prince Abdallah to discuss arms sales and the status of the Jordanian air defense problem.

   Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 209, Geopolitical File, Saudi Arabia, May 11–August 4, 1976. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Dickman. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office at the Department of State. Pickering reported on Hussein’s July 4 visit to Riyadh in telegram 3552 from Amman, July 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760259–1029)