181. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State1
3482. Subject: Jordan Air Defense—Soviet Offer. Ref: Amman 3479, Amman 3475 (both Notal).
Summary: Ambassador met with Army Commander in Chief Bin Shaker morning July 1 to review details Soviet offer. Soviets agreed provide up to 28 batteries, 100 SA–7 (improved) and 60 Shilka ZSU 23–4 DUNS on APCS with delivery over 3 years beginning in 1977 for total of 372 million rubles (ie about $430M). King and Shaker have restructured Soviet request to 24 batteries of missiles and 72 Shilkas at $517M, with same delivery times. Shaker believes on basis of what Syrians have told him that this “military” price could be reduced 40–50 percent when “political” price finally negotiated. Shaker says King is agonized by his problem and both he and King badly want Western equipment, even though Soviet offer is better militarily because of its high mobility. End summary.
1. As arranged yesterday with King Hussein, I met morning July 1 with Army Chief Bin Shaker to discuss military details of Soviet officer given to Jordan. Bin Shaker, by way of background, told me that military sessions in Soviet Union were businesslike and very open. He contrasted them to numerous neuralgic sessions he has had with us in “Pentagon basement”. Contrast also was between purely military to military character of his talks and those in US which involved all sorts of unidentified civilians each on his own “crusade”. In first three hour meeting Jordanians presented their wish list (large). Shaker said they told Soviets of their justification for air defense, described their target systems and drew on information from Syrians to relate to it their proposed defense equipment from Soviets. Soviets asked pertinent and direct questions. They offered to discuss tanks, helicopters and aircraft which Shaker said he wanted to defer until air defense system worked out, as a means of holding them off. Shaker concluded that Soviets definitely were trying to “entice” Jordanians by putting best foot forward.
[Page 602]2. The following day, the Soviets provided their offer. They agreed to supply 28 air defense missile batteries to Jordan over 3 years beginning in 1977. They offered 9 batteries (Soviets called them battalions) of SAM 2, 9 of a new and improved version of SAM 3, and 10 batteries of SAM [garble—6?]. Shaker was not clear when I asked him how many launchers were included in each battery (battalion). He did say that total offer was well beyond the US 14 Hawk batteries in numbers and launchers. In addition the Soviets offered 60 ZSU 23–4 guns mounted on an APC with each system containing a type of radar fire control unit. The total offer included ammunition, training costs and a long line of spare parts. Soviets offered to train Jordanians in USSR and did not insist on sending advisors when Jordanians made clear that “Jordan did not operate that way”. Instruction in USSR for Jordanian trainers would be given in Arabic. I asked Shaker for the price tag since I had been given different information by King and Prime Minister Rifai. Shaker said that the Soviet system as offered would be priced at roubles 372 M, which he assumes is about $430–440M at current exchange rates.
3. Shaker went on to explain however that figure given to me yesterday by King Hussein of $517M covered a restructured package in which the Jordanians are interested. Shortly, Shaker said, he will tell the Soviet Ambassador that he is not interested in the SA–2 which is old and is heavy on manpower. Jordanians want to increase the number of SAM 3 and SAM 6 batteries and Shilkas to approximately 12 SAM 3 and 12 SAM 6 and 72 Shilkas. From the price lists which the Soviets have given Jordanians, Shaker estimates restructured package would cost them in terms of Soviet quoted prices about $517M. They want the new package all in three years as well. (Since Rifai told me that Soviet production schedules were main factor driving the original Soviet offer, the new package would presumably require some shifts in Soviet priorities).
4. Shaker did not give me exact delivery schedules but a note in Arabic in his files seemed to indicate that deliveries would be made in the terms of the original offer of 11 batteries in 1977, 11 in 1978 and 9 in 1979.
5. I asked Shaker where he thought Jordan would get the money for this deal. He said that point is primary preoccupation of the King, but that Syrians had said that Soviets would give a 40–50 percent “political” reduction over the military price. I said that still left a lot of money to be paid. Shaker said that maybe they could get a grace period or some kind of long term loan or help from other Arabs. I asked what Jordan would have to do to get the “political” price. Shaker said he did not know, but he was sure that King would not accept anything dangerous to himself or the regime. Shaker again reassured [Page 603] me that in spite of the military value of Soviet equipment, especially its mobility and low price per unit, he wanted, and he was sure King wanted, to buy Western equipment if any way could be worked out to do so.
6. Shaker said he was aware of the Shah’s indication to the King that Saudis had promised Iran they would fund $500M for a Western system. He said that somehow he and King did not trust this promise; the Saudis had said the same thing before. Shaker was fully aware of Saudi complaints to Rifai last month about Jordan’s dealings with Syria. (Iranian Ambassador has just called to tell me that Rifai will be going to Tehran to report to Shah as soon as he can set up an appointment).
7. Concerning the equipment itself, I asked Shaker for his evaluation. He noted that he had not seen it, but his experts had been shown it and there was included in the offer a new version of the SAM 3 which the Syrians did not have. He also added that the offer included 100 new SA–7’s. He said it was a new version which compared favorably to or was better than the Redeye (which Jordan now has). He also said that his people were shown a new aircraft which the Soviets called the Su–22 (Sukhoi 22). His people claimed it was very much like the F–16, built as an air-to-air fighter and ground attack plane with a great deal of sophisticated, computerized equipment. The plane was demonstrated by a Soviet Brigadier General who rolled the plane on take-off just a few feet over the runway.
8. Shaker said he met with Soviet Air Marshall Kutakhov, another Marshall (ground forces) who was his superior in the Defense Ministry and a Lieutenant General of Engineers. His talks on substance were held in a building called the Engineering Directorate which, he said, is where the Soviet Defense Ministry organizes its foreign sales program.
9. I asked Shaker if he felt that he could operate and maintain complex Soviet systems in short period implied by delivery times without any Soviets coming to Jordan. Shaker said he was convinced that Syrians could not do so—they still had many Soviets in their air defense forces—but he was sure Jordan could do it.
10. Dept please pass DOD.
Summary: The Embassy reported on Pickering’s meeting with Lt. Gen. Bin Shaker, at which the General relayed the Soviet offer for an air defense system for Jordan.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Jidda Embassy Files: Lot 79F80, DEF 12–5 Jordan. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Priority to Moscow, Jidda, and Tehran. Telegrams 3479 from Amman, July 1, and 3475 from Amman, June 30, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760254–1114 and P850107–2146, respectively.
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