175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia1
74947. For Ambassador Porter from the Secretary. Subject: Air Defense System for Jordan. Ref: Jidda 2101, Jidda 2165.
1. We long resisted repeated Jordanian requests that we involve ourselves with the Saudis in negotiating the financing of the air defense package for Jordan. After the Saudi dols 300 million decision, we reconsidered the state of play and decided that it was necessary to try to persuade the Saudis to make some additional funds available. In the light of our experience with Hussein last summer, we are sure he would reject out of hand the truncated air defense package we could put together for dols 300 million. Lacking the air defense he is determined to get, we think the chances are at least 50–50 that he would eventually seek help from the Soviets, with all that this would entail to our position in the Middle East. We think we now have to try for some additional funding from the Saudis because the stakes are so high.
2. You of course have to bell the Saudi cat, and we in turn want to go along as far as we can with what you believe are the tactics most promising of success. Quite frankly, however, your recommended course of action (reftels) has two major disadvantages which have to be weighed against the factors you have presented. First, we want to be in a position to present a joint US-Saudi proposal to Jordan, which we intend not to back away from. It would place maximum pressure on Hussein to accept, since to reject it would mean rejecting the most carefully considered advice—and the generosity—of his two closest and most reliable supporters. If we are not careful, under your recommended course of action the Saudis will regard our approach to them as a joint US-Jordanian position.
3. Second, there is the time problem. The Saudis are notoriously slow in making decisions. There will be a budgetary paroxysm here [Page 585] at the end of April if a Jordanian-Saudi arrangement is not fully settled by then, and we will be back to square one, in the mid-1975 stage. Someone will have to pay off termination and other contractual costs we have already incurred. If any new deal could be resuscitated later, it would cost more than the package we negotiated in the summer and fall of 1975 and began to contract for last December. We have to move now.
4. While it is probably too late for you to secure any Saudi reactions in time for Hussein’s talks here on March 30–31, it is imperative that you begin the dialogue with the Saudis as soon as possible, certainly before the King’s arrival here, so that the Saudis will not consider our approach to have been cooked up in talks here with Hussein.
5. You can adjust your instructions (State 65708) to take account of the fact that we will press Hussein in Washington for acceptance of the two-stage concept, and in the process we will attempt to determine the smallest option he could consider. Whatever that option might be will not necessarily be the final answer for us. Our position will depend on the degree of Saudi financial flexibility, and we hope you will do your best to move them into the $500-million range.
6. A few final points:
(A) We agree with you that, if Hussein turns down an agreed US-Saudi compromise position, we may be in an embarrassing position with the Saudis. We are counting on you to present the case in such a way as to ensure that the Saudis would not later be able to claim that we misled them. We intend to provide full and square explanations—through you—to any and all Saudi questions and suspicions, fully recognizing—as you have pointed out—that there have been a great many misunderstanding already.
(B) In your approach, it is important that you not convey impression we are seeking a Saudi financial commitment for the second stage as well as the first, although we of course hope that they will be helpful. Our thinking has been that Hussein should try for help on the second stage from some of the Gulf countries before going to the Saudis once again. FYI: It may be that the second stage will have to remain a year or more distant. End FYI.
(C) You are also correct in assuming that the total price of the first stage and a deferred second stage will run a great deal more than dols 713 million. How high costs actually would rise is hard to estimate, although fifteen percent per year is a ball-park estimate.
Summary: Kissinger instructed Porter to discuss with the Saudis a more generous contribution to a compromise two-stage air defense project for Jordan, while the Department negotiated with King Hussein during his visit to Washington March 30–31.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Jidda Embassy Files: Lot 79F80, DEF 12–5 Jordan January–April. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Amman. Reference telegram A was not found. Telegram 2165 from Jidda, March 24, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760111–0176. A two-stage plan for the system was first suggested as an option in telegram 1449 to Amman, March 18. (Ibid., D760102–0551) Kissinger and Hussein did not discuss the matter during the King’s visit to the United States, but Kissinger provided the King an update by letter, transmitted in telegram 94162 to Amman, April 17. (Ibid., D760147–0241)
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