Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

172. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, February 18, 1976.

[Omitted here is the title page.]

Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy

Summary

Saudi foreign policy under King Khalid continues to be marked by caution, with compromise at home and conciliation abroad. The Saudis are not given to bold diplomatic initiatives. They rarely act in haste—a notable exception being their proclamation of an embargo on oil sales to the US during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, an act that heralded their emergence as a major economic power.

Saudi Arabia is a small country in terms of population, and its military capability is not impressive. Hence, it prefers to solve its problems by spending money rather than uttering threats; money is its single most effective diplomatic tool and has been handed out for various reasons to its neighbors, North and South Yemen and Iraq; to the front line Arab states facing Israel; to selected third world countries and, in the form of loans, to Western Europe.

After the 1973 war, the Saudis threw their weight and economic leverage behind US efforts to arrange a negotiated Arab-Israeli settlement. They have become disillusioned about the likelihood of success, but probably have been unable to come up with an alternative plan of action. They are therefore content to let Egypt take the lead in setting pan-Arab strategy. Egypt’s currently isolated diplomatic position threatens this option, and the Saudis are doing what they can to smooth over inter-Arab differences and restore Egypt’s position.

They also worry about their relations with Washington. The Saudis prefer to do business with US companies to obtain goods and services for their ambitious development plans. They are having second thoughts about this preference in view of the legal actions in the US against firms complying with the Arab boycott against Israel. They are also taking a look at their dependence on the US as a source of arms.

The 10 months since Faysal’s death have been marked by the emergence of the personal style in foreign policy of Crown Prince Fahd, the new top man in Riyadh. He is far less rigid than was Faysal and more willing to take a fresh look at old ties. He is reluctant, however, to move very far ahead of others in the ruling circle, and some initiatives—such as the effort to arrange a reconciliation with Aden—have been hampered by the necessity for a family consensus. In his efforts to steer policy decisions as near to his own views as possible, Fahd seems to have found a useful ally in Faysal’s son Saud, who was appointed foreign minister last fall.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

1. Summary: The CIA assessed Saudi foreign policy after the death of King Faisal.

   Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DI/OCI Files, Job 79T00866A, Box 25, Folder 15. Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified]. The memorandum was prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated within the Central Intelligence Agency. [text not declassified]