Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

170. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council¹

Washington, undated.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS—SAUDI ARABIA

Background

We have a long-standing security assistance relationship with Saudi Arabia, dating back to the signing in 1951 of a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement which linked the continued leasing of Dhahran Air Base to the provision of American military training and equipment, including a US Military Training Mission (USMTM). In earlier years when the Kingdom’s revenues were inadequate to meet its budget needs, much of our aid was MAP grant aid. In recent years, we have shifted entirely from grant aid to FMS sales as the basis for our relationship.

The early years of our security assistance relationship were characterized by relatively small shipments of unsophisticated equipment and limited training for Saudi military personnel both in the Kingdom and in US service schools. The first modernization program began in 1965 as a joint US–UK effort. Reacting to the Egyptian threat that spilled over from the civil war in North Yemen, (where Nasser was supporting one side with Egyptian troops and aircraft) the Saudis sought to acquire a modern air defense system. The British contracted to provide much of the equipment and training, including sophisticated Lightning interceptors and advanced radar and communications systems. The United States participation was limited to sale of training on Hawk missile batteries through a commercial contract with Raytheon Corporation.

Organization and Management

The security assistance program in Saudi Arabia is presently managed by four separate DoD organizations: the USMTM, the Corps of Engineers (COE), the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) Project Manager’s Office, and the USAF Detachment 22. Six other DoD activities provide support to these organizations. The existence of four separate organizations, rather than a single activity, is the result of responses to individual Saudi requests for specialized assistance over a 25-year period. Although complex and even redundant from a managerial point of view, the division of labor represented by these various entities reflects to a considerable extent the political balance in the Kingdom [the Army and the National Guard are intentionally maintained as autonomous and counterbalancing military forces]. The Saudis have rejected our suggestions that these various functions be unified, reinforcing the parochial bureaucratic interests and prerogatives acquired over time by organizations such as the COE which prefers to run their own show. The four security assistance activities are staffed with more than 500 military and civilian personnel, a strength projected to more than double by September 1977. The DoD personnel strengths will continue growing until the peak is reached about FY 1980. The present population of 1,100 DoD contractor employees devoted to the principal FMS programs will nearly double by the end of CY 1978.

—US Military Training Mission. The USMTM was established in 1951 to train the Saudi Air Force and administer the military assistance program to Saudi Arabia. As the senior DoD representative, the Chief, USMTM functions under the general supervision of the Ambassador, reports through the CINCEUR to the DoD, and has coordinating authority over all DoD personnel in-country. His mission is to supervise US security assistance required to build Saudi military competence and further US security policies and interests. The present USMTM organization is comprised of 148 military and 12 civilian personnel. These 160 personnel are assigned to six locations in Saudi Arabia. Of the 160 there are 77 personnel with assigned duty as advisors.

—US Army Corps of Engineers. The COE has provided design and construction management services in Saudi Arabia since 1951. Since 1965, the COE has provided technical assistance to Saudi Arabia and has supervised Saudi-funded construction projects. Over 90 percent of the COE projects are military related. The few remaining projects are for the SAG Ministeries of Agriculture and Water and Information. By current forecasts, the COE program is destined to become the single largest US security assistance effort. The COE has forecast that its civilian personnel requirements, exclusive of support personnel, will be: FY 1978: 832; FY 1979: 901; FY 1980: 967; FY 1981: 967; and FY 1982: 967. In September 1966 it was agreed that the COE would assist the Saudi army in establishing and operating an integrated logistic system—the Saudi Arabian Mobility Program (SAMP). The program was subsequently expanded to include support of conventional armaments and the services of 750 contractor personnel, who perform maintenance and supply operations and train Saudi army personnel. In November 1972 the Saudi Ordnance Corps Program (SOCP) was established as successor to the SAMP, to modernize the Saudi army vehicle fleet, to provide limited weapons maintenance and to establish a modern logistics system for the support of about 9,300 tactical and general purpose vehicles.

The Saudi army modernization program is being managed by both the USMTM and the COE in its SOCP arrangements. Currently the SOCP has the responsibility for activating and training the direct support maintenance units above battalion level, while the USMTM advises the headquarters logistics personnel and the area commanders and implements the battalion level maintenance system. As a result, different echelons of the Saudi army occasionally receive conflicting advice and guidance.

—Saudi Arabian National Guard Program Office. The SANG program started in 1973 under a country-to-country agreement to modernize the Guard in the areas of organization, training, equipment, maintenance, supply communications and facilities, under the supervision of a US Army Project Manager. The SANG is unique because the Guard is under the direct command of the third ranking member of the Royal Family who, as such, outranks the Minister of Defense and Aviation. The Guard, completely separate from the MODA armed forces, proudly maintains this independence. Seldom is there any interaction between the MODA and the SANG.

—US Air Force Detachment 22. The Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) was designated by the Chief of Staff of the USAF as the single manager of the F–5 aircraft program with responsibility for implementation, control and administration. Detachment 22 was established by the AFLC to provide in-country contract administration and program management services. The fact that the detachment does not come under the command of the Chief, USMTM has resulted in overlapping and duplication of advisory functions in the areas of munitions training, maintenance and supply.

—DoD Support Activities. Six elements of parent military commands based outside Saudi Arabia provide support services to DoD activities in-country. Since July 1975, the Chief, USMTM has been assigned operational control of in-country support and responsibility for all administrative and logistic support for security assistance teams assigned to the USMTM, as well as specified logistic support (e.g. commissary, exchange, housing, schools, and postal, medical and recreational facilities) to other DoD activities. Over the years, the COE has established several specific SAG-funded support services for COE personnel. Divergent command channels and authority have tended to encourage duplicative support services.

Current US Security Assistance Programs Under FMS

The United States Army Corps of Engineers provides engineering and management services for the construction of a wide range of facilities such as military cantonments, schools, hospitals, dependent family housing, headquarters buildings, and ports. The COE participation in the Kingdom dates back to 1951 with the construction of the Dhahran military air field, and the completion in 1961 of the Dhahran Civil Air terminal. In 1965, an Engineer Assistance Agreement was signed between the USG and the SAG, detailing the terms under which construction assistance would be provided. The COE has completed construction of projects valued close to $400 million, has under construction today facilities valued approximately $1 billion, and has under design or in planning construction that could well push the total up to $20 billion. Actual construction is performed by civilian contractors under COE supervision. The SAG pays all costs of the COE services provided to the Kingdom.

In 1966, DoD undertook a major long-term program to improve maintenance of the Saudi army vehicle fleet, first called “SAMP” for “Saudi Arabian Mobility Program.” In this program, the COE supervised civilian contractors in maintenance, and in training of Saudis to take over the system. The Saudis are more involved in the management today, and the name has changed to “SOPC” for “Saudi Ordnance Corps Program,” but contractor assistance continued with no end in sight. Contractor services are provided by Bendix-Syanco, a US-Saudi joint venture. A major training program will begin in mid-1977 to train a total of 1000 Saudi personnel in vehicle maintenance at the rate of 200 per year.

In 1968, the Saudis asked the USG, the French, British, and the Pakistanis to survey their naval requirements. These surveys culminated in a SAG–USG agreement in 1972 under which the USG undertook a long-term (ten-year) Saudi Navy Expansion Program. This program, which includes building 25 ships, construction of bases, training, and maintenance, is managed by the US Navy. Ship construction is performed by US shipyards. Construction projects in Saudi Arabia are carried out by private contractors under supervision of the COE, with US Navy technical supervision and input. The program calls for training of 2000 Saudi naval personnel, and 900 of these have attended or are currently attending Navy schools in the US.

In 1971, after intense commercial competition, the SAG turned to the USG for procurement of F–5 aircraft through FMS. Under this program, the USG has provided 50 F–5s with maintenance and training. In January 1975, the SAG signed a Letter of Acceptance (LOA) to purchase an additional 60 F–5s, and on 4 March 1976, the SAG signed an LOA valued at $1,464 million for continued maintenance and training with associated construction. Northrop Corporation is the US contractor for this project, under supervision of the USAF Detachment 22. The projected training of 200 Saudi pilots and 1200 technicians called for in this program is well underway.

In 1973, we agreed to modernize units of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). The first of four infantry battalions to be modernized completed its training in October 1976. Principal US contractors for this program include Vinnell Corporation (training), General Electric (Vulcan air defense system), and Cadillac-Gage (armored cars), under the supervision of the SANG Program Office. The US Army is the Executive Agent for this project.

In addition to the specific training programs mentioned above, Saudi military personnel also attend US Service schools and technical training courses as required. There are approximately 200 Saudi military trainees in the United States at any given time in addition to those in the various specific programs. There are currently a total of 1741 Saudi students in training in the US.

Military Survey and Future Prospects

At Saudi request in 1974, we conducted detailed surveys of their armed forces and security requirements. The results of these surveys were provided as recommendations for gradual modernization in the future, without significantly increasing the personnel strength of their armed forces. [Saudi Arabia has less than six million population, of which the majority is illiterate and untrained, and shortage of personnel is the limiting factor in implementing any Saudi programs, whether military or civilian.] As a result of the survey:

—In June 1975, the SAG asked for equipment to mechanize two of its four infantry brigades. The USG responded affirmatively in September 1975 and LOAs were provided in January 1976. A Congressional resolution to block sale of this equipment was defeated on March 3, 1976 and the SAG signed the LOAs in May. This program will take three to four years to implement and could be followed by a Saudi request to mechanize its other two infantry brigades.

—The Saudis have asked for price and availability data for approximately 80 helicopters, based on the survey recommendation that the SAG acquire an airmobile capability.

—The British Lightening interceptor is to be phased out around 1978–80 and the SAG is considering various options for replacements, including US fighters, French Mirages, and British Jaguars. The USG has provided briefings on the F–14, F–15, F–16, and F–18 fighters. A Saudi team visited the US in April 1976 to acquire additional data on these aircraft.

Civilian Contracts

In addition to the major FMS programs for which the USG and the Department of Defense have a direct responsibility, the Saudis have contracted directly with US civilian firms for significant security assistance:

—The Raytheon Basic Hawk contract was signed in 1965. Under a follow-on contract, Raytheon is upgrading the Basic Hawk to Improved Hawk, and has just signed a $1.14 billion contract to provide six batteries of “Triad” Improved Hawk.

—Lockheed began sales of C–130 aircraft in 1965 and has delivered 30 to date with eight more on order. Lockheed also has the contract to maintain and operate early warning radars and air defense communications.

—Whittaker Corporation provides operation and maintenance of three Saudi army hospitals.

—Litton is negotiating a contract valued near $1 billion to provide the AN/TSQ–73 “Missile Minder” air defense command and control system.

Third Country Assistance

Although the United States provides the majority of security assistance to Saudi Arabia, there has been and continues to be a Saudi policy to diversify its sources of assistance. In addition to British aircraft as mentioned above, the French in recent years have been the major source of armor for the Saudi army, including 400 armored cars, 160 AMX–30 main battle tanks, and recently, an $830 million contract for Crotale air defense missiles. The Italians (Agusta Bell) have been the major source of helicopters.

FMS Purchases to Date

Saudi FMS purchases to date are characterized by a high proportion of basic construction, repair, supply and other services of a non-lethal nature (85 percent of all purchases). Of the more than $12 billion of FMS orders to date, only 11 percent had actually been delivered as of mid-1976. The following chart shows the breakdown in dollar value:

	Cumulative Orders	Total Deliveries	Percent Delivered To Date
	(30 June 1976)	(30 June 1976)
	($ million)	($ million)
Total	12,170	1,396	11
Aircraft	716	178	29
Ships	456	4	1
Vehicles	21	142	25
Ammo	144	62	60
Missiles	74	3	4
Construction	7,598	498	7
Other*	2,760	511	19

*Communications equipment, repair, supply, training, and other services.

American Personnel in Saudi Arabia

We estimate that there are approximately 25,000 American citizens in Saudi Arabia at the present time. Approximately one-fifth of them are associated with defense-related projects, as follows:

US Employees
Military	281
Civilian	367
US Contractors
Raytheon	216
Boeing	1
Whittaker	218
Lockheed Intl	450
Lockheed	500
Bendix-Syanco	196
Hughes Aircraft	1
Northrop	1,019
Cadillac-Gage	34
General Electric	12
Vinnell	272
J. A. Jones (construction)	83
Total Employees	3,640
Total Dependents (est.)	1,456
Total	5,096

Saudi Military Forces

Army

—The Saudi Arabian Army (SAA) is not capable of conducting successful combat operations against a modern military force. However, it is capable of conducting limited cross border operations against the states and principalities of the Arabian Peninsula and assisting the National Guard in controlling internal disorders and insurgencies. Army units were deployed to Syria but were not involved in major combat during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The two primary factors contributing to a poor combat capability are the dearth of trained/trainable manpower, and poor leadership. Other contributing factors are inefficient training system, poor discipline, a rudimentary understanding and practice of modern army logistics which renders the system incapable of sustained combat service support, a centralization of authority which stifles initiative at the unit level, and an over-reliance on foreign country contractual services for maintenance, training, and operational functions. Personnel strength totals 45,000 (3,150 officers, 11,250 NCO’s and 30,600 enlisted personnel). Ground combat strength is shown in the following chart:

4 Infantry Brigades	7,100	4,000	16,000
1 Armor Brigade	3,000	800	800
2 Tank Battalions	400	300	600
3 Artillery Battalions	600	450	1,350
2 Airborne Battalions	850	850	1,700
1 Royal Guard (Inf) Battalion	450	450	450
16 Air Defense Artillery Batteries	150	100	1,600
10 Hawk Missile Batteries	200	160	1,600
2 Light Armored Battalions	600	500	1,000

Navy

—At present, the Royal Saudi Naval Force (RSNF) is an insignificant force capable of providing only a token presence at sea which, even in combination with the sea-going assets of the Coast Guard and Frontier Force, provides Saudi Arabia with only a very limited coastal patrol and interdiction capability. The operational experience of the RSNF has been limited to coastal operations in waters near Ad Damman and, while capable of making limited contributions to patrol efforts in these Persian Gulf waters, possesses no real naval combat capability. Personnel total 1,500 (approximately 200 officers and 1,300 enlisted personnel, many of whom are in training in the US). Ship inventory is shown below:

PTF (fast patrol boat)	3
PB (patrol boat)	1
YFL (launch)	2
YTB (large harbor tug)	2

Air Force

—The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) is a marginally effective military force. Transport aircraft and fighter forces could operate independently of contractor support for no more than two weeks and could conduct only limited combat operations. Limitations include: lack of fully trained pilots, maintenance, and munitions personnel; minimal training in air-ground operations; and lack of experience in conducting joint operations. Fighter forces would probably perform credibly in small engagements with enemy fighter forces because training has centered heavily on air combat maneuvers and intercepts. Personnel strength totals 15,000 (flying—200 pilots (jet—90); nonflying—300 officers, 400 warrants, approximately 4,250 enlisted men, 850 civilians, and 9,000 Air Police). The order of battle and organization are shown below:

Combat Acft		Helicopters		Transports		Trainers/Utility
Lightning	31	Alouette III	1	C–130E	24	F–5B	19
F–5E	30	AB 204	1	KC–130H	4	Lightning	5
BAC–167	29	AB 205	10	C–140A	2	Cessna 172	8
	30	AB 206	19		30	U–3A	1
		AB 212	4				33
			35

Units	Aircraft	Principal Bases
2 All-Weather Fighter Sqdns	28	Dhahran, Khamis Mushayt
1 Fighter Training Sqdn	9	Dhahran
3 Pilot Training Sqdns	37	Riyadh
1 Transport Wing (2 Sqdns)	30	Jidda
2 Helicopter Sqdns	35	Taif
1 F–5 Operational Conversion Unit	25	Dhahran
1 F–5 Fighter Sqdn	24	Taif
1 Lightning Conversion Unit	8	Dhahran

National Guard

—This 100 percent mobile force is capable of suppressing civil disturbances in wide areas of the Kingdom. In periods of crisis, National Guard troops are deployed near cities and borders to provide defensive depth. Under a memorandum of understanding signed March 1973, the US Government is equipping and training four mechanized infantry battalions and an artillery battalion. Personnel total 35,000 (200 officers, 34,800 NCO’s and enlisted personnel).

1. Summary: The NSC Staff drafted a comprehensive assessment of arms sales and deliveries made, and projected, to Saudi Arabia.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Middle East and South Asian Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 22, Saudi Arabia-Military (2). Confidential. Brackets are in the original.