Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

168. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 9, 1976, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• DepSecDef Meeting with United States Ambassador-designate to Saudi Arabia

State Participants

• Ambassador-designate to Saudi Arabia, William J. Porter
• Deputy Director, Office of Arabian Peninsular Affairs, Richard W. Aherne

DOD Participants

• Deputy Secretary of Defense, William P. Clements
• Military Assistant, RADM Kenneth Carr, USN
• Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Amos A. Jordan
• Director of Defense Security Assistance Agency, LTG Howard M. Fish, USAF
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (NEASA), James H. Noyes
• Region Director, NESA, MGen Clarke T. Baldwin, Jr., USA
• Country Director, Saudi Arabia, Colonel William Fifer, USA

(C) Mr. Clements opened the meeting with a general statement of his conviction that Saudi Arabia was of great importance to the United States. Our two nations share much in common; there is much that we need from Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia has been most helpful as a moderating force for stability. Saudi Arabia is the key to solving many of the horrendous problems of the Middle East, and it is important that our relations run as smoothly as possible. In this regard we are not managing this relationship as well as we could, either in-country or here in Washington. Even internally, within the elements of the US Government, our cooperation and efforts have not been as good as they should be. Ambassador Porter agreed and pointed out that with so many people involved this created problems, that clearly there needs to be one individual in charge. He assured Mr. Clements that there would be no lack of effort to bring all elements together; the issue is too important for petty rivalries. LTG Fish commented that within DOD we have not done all that can be done to pull things together. For example, in Saudi Arabia there are four or five separate organizations that should be placed under one head, except perhaps for the National Guard program. Ambassador Porter said he preferred dealing with one senior military commander and initially could see no reason why the National Guard project manager should be excluded. Mr. Clements agreed that there is a need to consolidate responsibility but suggested the Ambassador wait on the SANG issue until he has had six months to look the situation over, but assured him it was his decision and that DOD would support him. Ambassador Porter indicated his main concern would be that we do nothing within the US Government organizationally that would be divisive in our relations with the Saudis.

(C) The conversation then shifted to the importance of close personal relations and access to key Saudis. Mr. Clements felt we needed the ability to get to Prince Fahd more easily to have his candid views on important issues. Ambassador Porter pointed out that Arabs, by their nature, are reluctant to take positions—particularly on controversial matters—where they might have to reverse themselves later. However, he intended to have ready access to Fahd. Fahd is the key, but the problem is quite complex; we are dealing with a family corporation and we need to be able to tap in where and when needed.

(C) Ambassador Porter said he had assurances from Secretary Kissinger of any assistance required initially. He hoped that if he had to call on the Department of Defense he would receive the same support. Since initial impressions are vital, he had felt it important to arrive in a military aircraft and appreciated DOD’s assistance.

(C) Mr. Clements pointed out that the Saudis were concerned over price increases, delays in deliveries, and problems connected with agent fees, and that Ambassador Porter should expect to have these problems raised with him frequently. Mr. Clements also pointed out Saudi concern that the US Government had not provided a sense of direction when needed. For example, we had raised the problem of Soviet presence in Somalia; whereupon, the Saudis had asked what they could do, but we had never really followed up. Also, in the program of assistance for Yemen, we had not provided the impetus needed. Ambassador Porter said he felt that we should not take issue with the Saudis over minor points. For example, if they strongly desired equipment for Yemen to be delivered first to Saudi Arabia, we should agree. If we have transfer problems with Congress, it is our job to sort that out back here; his job is to build our relationship and to reinforce it.

(C) LTG Fish stressed the requirement to urge the Saudis to phase equipment deliveries to training necessary for proper operation and maintenance. Mr. Clements agreed but pointed out that, as Arabs, they will continue to seek early deliveries of hardware whether they can maintain it or not; that our only option is to keep providing maintenance support indefinitely.

(S) The subjects of Saudis training Egyptian pilots, and of US intelligence gathering, were discussed in general.

(S) Ambassador Porter raised the issue of Saudi visa discrimination. LTG Fish summarized the pressures from Congress and the expectation that there will be some form of legislation on this subject. Ambassador Porter was urged to try to smooth over this issue with the Saudis, since it seems inevitable that individuals of the Jewish faith will come up for assignment in Saudi Arabia.

(C) Mr. Clements asked Ambassador Porter to urge the Saudis to assist in providing the housing and other support required by our advisers, so that they could spend longer accompanied tours and be more effective in their assignments. He was asked to consider the establishment of a high school for American dependent children in-country.

(C) Mr. Clements concluded by mentioning the problem of price escalation in the Navy landing craft utility (LCU) construction. Prince Turki had agreed to have MODA absorb the cost, although the blame was entirely ours. Mr. Clements recommended that Ambassador Porter inform the Saudis of our appreciation for their action.

1. Summary: Ambassador-designate William Porter met with Clements and other Department of Defense officials to discuss programs involving the Department of Defense and Saudi Arabia.

   Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–79–0049, Saudi Arabia 000.1–399, 1976. Secret. Drafted by Fifer; approved by Noyes. The meeting took place in Clements’ office at the Pentagon.