166. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State1
8367. For the Secretary from Atherton. Subject: Assistant Secretary Atherton’s Meetings With King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd December 20. Ref: Jidda 7997.
1. Summary: During a routine half-hour audience with King Khalid on December 20, and a three-and-one-half hour meeting with Crown Prince Fahd (during which he unburdened himself of a range of concerns in hour-long monologue at beginning of meeting), I conveyed to them best wishes of President Ford and yourself. I said you had asked me to travel to the Middle East to explain current U.S. thinking re Middle East peacemaking process but that because of the importance of our bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia, my stop in Jidda was the most important of all. With Prince Fahd, I reviewed in considerable detail how we see future Mideast peace moves, January Security Council meeting, Palestinian question and need of U.S. and SAG to handle current problems (visas, boycott, etc.) with moderation and reflection. Fahd spoke of SAG’s exceptional record of standing by its friendship with United States. He urged we remain alert to the dangers that any Communist-dominated regime in Arab world would pose. Israel, like Soviets, he noted did not wish U.S.-Arab relations to improve. (King Khalid, Prince Fahd and Prince Sultan all concerned over Defense Minister Peres’ reported remark GOI might come to regard Saudi Arabia as confrontation state.) Fahd urged U.S. to include PLO in any future Middle East peace efforts. Noting King Khalid would visit Syria and Jordan this week, Fahd said Saudi Arabia was working to heal Egyptian-Syrian split, would counsel Syrian restraint in January Security Council meeting, and in Jordan would warn against becoming too linked to Syria at risk to Jordan’s traditional position. Saudis will also let Jordan know of Saudi unhappiness over recent GOJ criticism of Sinai II.
2. Fahd also spoke at length about bilateral problems arising from anti-boycott, and anti-discrimination measures in U.S. Public manner of their announcement made it difficult for Saudi Arabia to moderate [Page 558] its policies. But Fahd said he is aware the executive branch is in a weakened position to cope with anti-Arab elements in the Congress and elsewhere. He pleaded that the U.S. refrain from taking further actions that would publicly embarrass Saudi Arabia, saying he is prepared work with SAG and other Arab governments to modify boycott and visa practices but can only do this if there is period of calm out of the public glare. He agreed that if SAG were to react intemperately to recent moves in U.S., it would [garble] be helpful anti-Arab elements to achieve their goal. The tone of Fahd’s discussion was more one of appeal than recrimination. Had the news from Washington been less uniformly bad (other than our decisions on military supply, which were helpful), he might have come on stronger. But as it was he may have felt there was little point in shouting into the wind. U.S. anti-discrimination measures may embarrass Fahd’s political position. Fahd said SAG would welcome Ambassador Porter as friend. End summary.
3. Meeting with King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd: Saturday afternoon, December 20, I met with King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd. I conveyed to each of them the personal best wishes of President Ford and yourself. I told them that after your Paris talks you asked that I proceed to Saudi Arabia to review with Saudi leaders latest U.S. thinking re Middle East and to reassure them about position on various matters of greater bilateral concern. I noted that I was visiting other countries in the area as well, but that you regarded my visit to Saudi Arabia as the most important. I stressed to both of them that we were determined to continue to work for progress toward a Middle East peace settlement. King Khalid seemed to agree with all I said. I told him I appreciated his receiving me, and would pass on to you and to President Ford whatever advice I should receive from his Ministers. On the basis of talking points you approved, I reviewed with Prince Fahd in considerable detail our views toward the Palestinian question and the January meeting of the Security Council, and the paramount need for the United States and its Arab friends to work together in a spirit of mutual understanding—notwithstanding the strains and pressures under which U.S. relations with the Arab world and Saudi Arabia from time to time were subjected. Fahd himself spoke copiously on these topics in the course of a 3½ hour meeting. Summary of what he said follows.
4. SAG’s traditional friendly ties with USG: Fahd asked me to first convey his gratitude to you for sending me to Saudi Arabia. This was a propitious time for a high-level, face-to-face review of U.S.-Saudi relations. Fahd wanted me to know also he would be talking to me not as a U.S. Government official, but as a friend without affectation or exaggeration. Fahd said U.S.-Saudi friendship was of long standing, and he wanted it to remain firm and unshakeable. The U.S. knew over [Page 559] the years how much Saudi Arabia had suffered for the sake of this friendship, especially in the days of the SAG’s intense and at times violent confrontation with Gamal Abdul Nasser between the years 1957–1967. In those days in all the Arab world only Saudi Arabia was willing to stand firmly and publicly by its ties of friendship to the United States. Fahd contrasted this behaviour with that of other states who secretly protested they were our friends, but whose public record did not bear them out. He reminded me that Saudi Arabia did not recognize any Communist state, and that he did not see any change in this policy as likely. The USG knew, moreover, we could always count on Saudi help in efforts to bring about a situation in the Middle East that would give the Communists and the radicals less purchase.
5. Zionist and Communist hostility to U.S.-Arab friendship: Fahd believed that Zionists and Communists saw U.S.-Saudi friendship as dangerous to their aims, and—acting independently and for different reasons—were doing their best to weaken it. For obvious reasons, Russia was eager to return to Egypt and other Middle East countries via subversion, provision of military assistance programs or any other way. At all costs, Fahd said, we must try to prevent the reappearance of Communist-led or dominated regimes in the Arab world. For the radicals to make a comeback would be a tragedy for the moderates in the area, for the USG, and—regardless of what Israeli officials might think—a tragedy for Israel, too. Israel was opposed to better U.S.-Arab relations because it knew this could bring closer the day when it would have to relinquish the occupied territories and seek some political ways of resolving its problems with the confrontation states—none of which, Fahd stressed, any longer questioned reality of Israel’s existence.
6. In this regard, Fahd was concerned at GOI statements that Israel could not be indifferent to the massive presence in Saudi Arabia of U.S. military matériel, and that as a result Saudi Arabia may have acquired the characteristics of a confrontation state. From time to time, moreover, the SAG has informed the USG by the Embassy in Jidda of Israeli violation of Saudi airspace near the Strait of Tiran, (King Khalid and Prince Sultan also expressed concern to me about increased Israeli militancy towards Saudi Arabia. I urged all of them not to attach too official a character to statements made by individual Israeli politicians.)
7. A role for PLO in peace talks: Fahd thought it was high time for Israel as well as the United States to tackle problems of peacemaking and especially of the Palestinians in a creative way. In particular, Fahd thought the USG ought to give some encouragement to the moderate wing of the PLO which he thought would quickly respond to any American overtures. If we were to do so, the stock of the PLO’s pro-Communist elements would collapse. Fahd urged we find some way of overlooking those aspects of the Palestinian position that seem unrec [Page 560] oncilable with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. If we could do so, he thought we would see in retrospect how our initiative had paid off. I stressed need for move by PLO toward position on Israel adopted by confrontation states.
8. Current strains on U.S.-Saudi friendship: Returning to U.S.-Saudi relations, Fahd said he knew they were being subjected to hostile pressure and wondered what could the USG do? He knew the U.S. Government and especially the executive branch was in a weakened position to cope with anti-Arab elements in the Congress and elsewhere. There were even, he noted, some anti-Arab elements among USG officials. He said, however, the campaigns in the U.S. against Saudi Arabia were a great embarrassment to Saudi Arabia: after each public affront by the USG, pro-Soviet Arabs would come to the SAG as if pleased, and ask how much more humiliation the Saudis were prepared to endure from their American friends. Fahd affirmed he had opposed such radicals all his life, and as a Saudi official would do his best to continue to stand with U.S. But how long could he continue unflinchingly to do so?
9. Fahd noted that as a result of his agreement with you of June 1974, U.S. economic relations with Saudi Arabia are flourishing, but if U.S. banks and private corporations are to put obstacles in the face of this agreement, and if Congress is to attack U.S.-Saudi cooperation, what is the SAG to do? The FRB’s injunction to member banks, he considered ill-judged, harmful above all to the American economy, and an invitation to our European competitors to displace us in Saudi Arabia’s rich commercial and capital market. Fahd cited the Arab boycott as another area where public outcry in the United States was making it hard for the SAG to modify its position—even though he personally believes the boycott is ineffective and deprives the SAG of services of many firms which could be useful to Saudi Arabia’s development.
10. On the SAG’s visa policy, Fahd said if this matter had been raised in a private setting a natural solution in the course of things could have been found. But instead the issue had been raised publicly and the radicals are now standing by to attack Saudi Arabia if it shows any signs of backing down. Fahd asked why Saudi Arabia could not inquire about the personal status of visa applicants. Can any state accept such a limitation on its sovereign concern for its security? The United States would not indiscriminately allow Communists or Palestinians to pass its frontiers, and for the same security reasons Saudi Arabia was presently denying entrance to many thousands of Arab Moslems. If the SAG is prepared to distinguish among fellow Arabs, “it has the right to do so against anyone else, I guess.” Fahd pleaded that the United States refrain from taking deliberate actions that would [Page 561] embarrass Saudi Arabia. He asked that I convey to you and to President Ford the SAG’s earnest desire that any points at issue between the USG and Saudi Arabia be handled quietly and privately. Fahd hoped that reason would prevail and the USG would not subject Saudi Arabia to any more embarrassment before other Arabs and its own people. He agreed, however, with the point that I had made that if the SAG were to react in an intemperate way to U.S. measures on visas and boycotts, it would play into the hands of elements opposed to good U.S.-Saudi relationships. It would only be helping SAG’s critics achieve their goal. He seemed disposed to consider ways in which Saudi visa practices could be modified if public pressures on SAG abated.
11. Comment: Fahd may be worried about the vehemence and momentum of anti-discriminatory and anti-boycott moves that are being made in the U.S. and which are regarded here as being aimed at Saudi Arabia. Just as such measures can embarrass Saudi Arabia before its radical critics, so can they embarrass Prince Fahd before any of his critics in the Council of Ministers. The tone of Fahd’s discussion was more one of appeal than of recrimination. It certainly was more moderate than that which was reported in Jidda reftel. Had the news from Washington been less disturbing to Fahd, he might have come on stronger. But, as it was, he may have felt there was little point in shouting into the wind. In terms of U.S.-Saudi relations, the Embassy thinks the timing of my visit—as it so happened—was opportune as I was able on the spot to provide the Saudis with reassuring attention at a time when they must have needed it.
12. Ambassador Porter: At conclusion of my discussion, Prince Fahd thanked me for the news I had brought him of Ambassador Porter’s arrival in January. He was pleased by my assurances that the great importance the United States attached to its relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would in no way be diminished. In fact the U.S.-Saudi bond could only increase in importance with the assignment to Jidda of our most senior serving Ambassador. Prince Fahd said he was looking forward to meeting Ambassador Porter and would receive him in the same frank, friendly and open manner that he did other U.S. officials and Ambassadors.
13. Other subjects covered in Fahd meeting being reported septels.
Summary: Atherton reported on his conversations with Prince Fahd and King Khalid regarding the present state of U.S.-Saudi relations.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 30, Saudi Arabia—State Department Telegrams, To SecState-Nodis (9), 9/75–11/75. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Telegram 7997 from Jidda, December 2, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750419–0145. Atherton’s report of his conversation with Prince Sultan is Document 167.
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