163. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- President Ford
- Prince Saud ibn Faisal, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Amb. Ibrahim Al-Sowayel, Saudi Ambassador to the United States
- Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
[The press was admitted briefly for photos. There was small talk about Saud’s familiarity with the U.S., his English accent, the Secretary’s UN speech, etc. The press was then ushered out.]
The President: We worked very hard on the UN speech.
Saud: I think the reaction was every good. I hope it will be reflected in further meetings of developed and undeveloped nations.
The President: I am pleased to have the opportunity to meet you. I regret I never met His Majesty King Faisal and I look forward to meeting King Khalid. I think personal relations are extremely important.
Let me first clarify a couple of points which may be of concern.
Ambassador Porter is one of our very top diplomats. He is going there because we are upgrading our representation there with one of our very best people. It’s for no other reason. Replacing Akins with Porter has no other meaning. We think Porter will be able to upgrade our relations.
Saud: I convey the greetings of His Majesty King Khalid and I thank you for the opportunity to convey them. We agree on the closeness of our relations. The closeness of our relations is such that if there are any problems, we can discuss them frankly and openly. We hope the intensity of our relations will continue to grow.
The President: So do we. As you know, we tried very hard to keep the Middle East from stagnating. We think what we have achieved has been in the interest of world peace. I assure you that we will not stop here. This is just a building block towards peace. We will keep working for further steps. We will not back out, but we will be active toward our common goal.
Saud: We put tremendous weight on your efforts, Mr. President. There is anxiety in the Middle East as to where we go from here. Most would accept a step-by-step approach if only they knew where they were taking us. President Sadat has put his entire faith in you and has taken immense risks for peace—with the other Arabs and with his army. Where is the balance? We see reports from Israel that this is the last move, that the settlers on Golan won’t be moving, etcetera. That also causes concern.
The President: I developed a very fine relationship with President Sadat at Salzburg. I feel a personal commitment to him to see that this agreement is carried out. I look forward to meeting President Asad. I tried to meet him in August but it didn’t work out. Secretary Kissinger has spoken highly of him and I look forward to meeting him.
Kissinger: Do you know him?
Saud: Yes. I think he is realistic and truthful in his presentation. Syria has more territory under Israeli occupation since ‘73 than before.
[Page 549]Kissinger: They got it back in the disengagement, plus a sliver at Kuneitra. But I agree with His Highness that President Asad is a man of moderation.
Saud: Syria has accepted Resolution 242 as the basis of a settlement, but Israel has not. If peace is to be achieved, it can come only through the exercise of America’s persuasive powers on Israel.
The President: I can assure you we used them to the utmost. And we will continue to do so as we move down the road of peace.
I took some personal risk in agreeing to the request from Sadat and Rabin for American technicians. It helps me if we can have as much support as possible in the Arab world for the agreement. It helps us in continuing our pressure to keep things going. When the Arabs raise questions, it makes it harder for me.
Kissinger: It is the perception here that we brought pressure on Israel. If, having paid the price with the Jews here, we are attacked by the Arabs abroad, many Americans will think there is no point in engaging. This is the first time we have had movement in peacetime and it sets the path for further steps. I will talk further with you on this.
Saud: We don’t see why the people should attack it, because it is like the previous one.
Kissinger: It is more significant.
Saud: What worries us is the promise of new military equipment and unusual equipment—like the Pershing. When Secretary Kissinger was in Saudi Arabia, we considered the agreement a positive step. We continue to hold that view, but we need assurances that Israel looks at it that way. The demand by Israel for equipment indicates they are not seeking peace but more American aid.
The President: You should know that we qualified the words, and the commitments we made very carefully. I said we promised to study them.
Kissinger: The F–16 can’t be delivered before 1979. We will study the Pershing very carefully. These things we will hold as a condition for movement. If we have not made a dramatic movement toward peace by 1979, we will be in a very difficult situation. There is no commitment at all on the Pershing.
Saud: Is it true that there is no agreement until the Congress approves?
Kissinger: Only on the technicians, not the aid.
The President: Israel understands the military and economic assistance will come in the annual foreign aid legislation and probably won’t be considered for a month or two.
Kissinger: The drafting in Geneva is not finished yet. By the time it is, we hope to have the technicians approved.
[Page 550]Saud: There is one point that Prince Fahd wanted to be raised—the Palestinians. Recognition of their rights in peace is important. They have a destabilizing capability now. Secretary Kissinger mentioned the possibility of contacts with them.
Kissinger: It would have to be done carefully.
The President: It would have to be held very closely because it is a sensitive issue in the United States. We recognize the Palestinian interests but we must be careful. Private talks would be helpful—if it became public, it would make it difficult to make more movement.
Saud: Just one more point that His Majesty asked me to raise—the information on companies which is now coming out in this country. We would like to know what it is coming out. One is the legal aspects of bribery—which should be dealt with in the committees. The commissions that people used is added to the government-to-government price. Our government will take the position that it will not pay these charges.
If names get thrown around in these hearings, it would have a very bad influence.
The President: I deplore the publicity this is getting. We will do whatever possible to protect individuals. And we don’t condone any illegal acts any more than you.
We don’t control the press so I can’t guarantee what they will do.
Kissinger: We give no names, but we can’t control what the companies give to the committees.
Saud: If it was names with proof, but these are just wild allegations.
The President: As your Ambassador knows, we are going through a difficult period here, with the media interested in news more than in fact. We will do whatever we can, but we can’t guarantee it.
Saud: We appreciate that. If there is proof, His Majesty wants it, but not this kind of irresponsible allegation.
Kissinger: We have discouraged the turning over of names and I have told Senator Church that it is unfair to put out names.
Summary: Ford met with Prince Sa’ud to discuss the current state of Middle East negotiations, arms sales to Saudi Arabia, and the current session of the UN General Assembly.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 15, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office at the White House. Brackets are in the original. Kissinger sent Ford briefing papers for the meeting on September 18. (Ibid., Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 27, Saudi Arabia (6)).
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