Office of the Historian

139. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State1

Jidda, May 22, 1975, 0858Z.

3634. Pass: To Secretary from Robinson. Subj: King Khalid’s and Prince Fahd’s Reactions to SecDef Schlesinger’s Statements on Use of Force in Event of Oil Embargo. Ref: A. Jidda 3633; B. Jidda 3632.

1. Immediately preceding telegrams give factual account of my lengthy sessions (2½ hours total) with King Khalid and Prince Fahd May 21 concerning Secy. Schlesinger’s remarks on use of military force in event of oil embargo. I conclude that the resultant situation is a cause for serious concern and that we should consider alternatives for remedial action as urged by Prince Fahd. Our choices seem to be as follows:

A. Ignore the Saudi démarches and do nothing. I think the Saudis are genuinely concerned over both the import of the statements and their effect on our position in the Middle East. To do nothing would heighten their suspicions and permit erosion of our influence with the moderate Arabs.

B. Formally disavow Schlesinger’s remarks. I can imagine the ramifications of doing this, though it appears that SecDef went well beyond your own Business Week and subsequent remarks concerning an oil embargo that would “strangulate” Western economies. An embargo similar to the ‘73 one would not constitute “strangulation.”

C. Issue a positive statement concerning US policy toward the Arabs and particularly Saudi Arabia. Such a statement could reaffirm our commitment to strengthen bilateral relations with the Arabs, our support of territorial integrity in the Middle East, and our dedication to a peaceful solution of the Middle East conflict which would eliminate any consideration of military action. A carefully drawn statement along these lines would probably meet Fahd’s request.

D. To meet Fahd’s concern over Israeli aggression against northern Saudi Arabia in event of another war, give assurances supporting Saudi Arabian territorial integrity. This could be done separately and [Page 475] privately, possibly in conjunction with the public statement under alternative (C).

2. On basis of my knowledge from here I would recommend course (C), with possible combination with (D). I would be glad to discuss this further with you on my return to Washington May 23.

Akins

  1. Summary: Robinson reported that he and Akins met with King Khalid and Prince Fahd regarding Schlesinger’s comments on the possible use of military force in the event of another oil embargo and provided options for responding to Saudi concerns.

    Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and Africa, Box 29, Saudi Arabia—State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis (6). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Khalid and Fahd remonstrated to Akins and Robinson during May 21 meetings. (Telegram 3632 from Jidda, May 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750179–0947) Telegram 3633 from Jidda, May 22, is ibid., D750179–0887. For Schlesinger’s remarks, see Document 136.

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