130. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State1
1469. NEA for Atherton from Ambassador. Subject: Reactions to Current Anti-Saudi Campaign. Ref State 45186. From Saunders.
1. We are beginning to get reactions to the current anti-Saudi campaign in the States. There has been, as yet, no official statement, and there may not be but the press is beginning to take up the cry.
[Page 460]2. The Arab boycott of Israel: The Governor of the Central Bank (SAMA) told me we should understand Saudi Arabia would invest where it wanted and through whatever banks it wished. It would not deal with banks on the Israeli boycott list. If we don’t like this, he said, then they will go elsewhere. He asked how the Israeli boycott differed from our boycott of firms or of ships dealing with Cuba or of the boycott of certain transactions with Communist countries—even by European affiliates of American firms.
3. He said the Arabs had considered a significant relaxing of the boycott rules [1 line not declassified], but in view of the current campaign in the United States this would now be very difficult.
4. It should be noted that Saudi Arabia in the last year has invested almost $1 billion in FNMA debentures and has bought or committed itself to over $4 billion in Treasury notes.
5. Visa for Jews: Congressman Waxman, who was not a member of the House Foreign Armed Forces Committee, got onto the Committee’s tour of the Middle East apparently solely to raise the question of visas for Jews. He asked King Faisal why Jews were not permitted freely into the Kingdom and the King asked why they would want to come. Most Jews, said the King, support Israel.
6. We have made extraordinary progress through quiet diplomats in getting visas for Jews since I have been here—as you know and as Hal Saunders testified before Senator Church. It has not been particularly easy but every Jewish applicant has come in with the sole exception of Joe Kraft—and I finally got that arranged.
7. Now as a direct result of the publicity, the reaction has set in. A Colonel David Berg (or Burg) has apparently recently applied for a visa in Washington in connection with some Air Force survey (we have no details from the Saudis; and our military mission knows nothing about him). The Acting Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Muhammad Mas’ud, asked me last week if I thought they should allow him in. I said of course; to refuse him a visa now would cause tremendous problems. He referred the matter to Prince Sultan, Minister of Defense, who has just replied through the Foreign Ministry that we could, in effect, take Colonel Berg and shove him. Visa matters are the perogative of every sovereign state, the Foreign Minister quoted him as saying, and he added that the United States is extraordinarily careful about letting anyone into the country who might harm it. The Arabs must assume that Colonel Berg could report everything he learned in Saudi Arabia to the Israeli Embassy in Washington. If we insist, too bad; but Colonel Berg will not rpt not come into Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are prepared for whatever consequences this might bring. I doubt, incidentally, that I will now be able to get Joseph Kraft in. And visas for all Jews will be harder to get.
[Page 461]8. The Embassy leases: We have long-term leases on two large pieces of property in Jidda and Dhahran. The Dhahran lease expires the end of next year and the Jidda lease 8 months later. I’ve been trying to get both extended on the same terms, i.e. no rent. The Jidda property—42 acres—is now worth over $60 million. The Dhahran property—65 acres—is worth over $40 million. The head of the political section of the Foreign Ministry, who is handling the lease renewals, has just told me they will not rpt not renew the leases in view of the extraordinary campaign conducted against Saudi Arabia in the United States. He asked how he could justify this “gift” to us today. He suggested we buy the land; “you’re a rich country.”
9. Saudi Arabia in OPEC: Our wireless bulletin tells us this morning about the extraordinary role Saudi Arabia is playing in OPEC to keep oil prices down in spite of the opposition of every other country in OPEC; Saudis find themselves under attack from other quarters (especially the U.S. Congress) and hear nothing positive about their actions in Vienna. I believe Saudi Arabia in anger may weaken under pressure from fellow OPEC members unless it feels it receives more support and understanding from the U.S.
10. The invasion threats: Omar Shams, Saudi Director of Intelligence, told an EmbOff recently that the Saudi Government is convinced that the various invasion articles, culminating in the March Harper’s article by “Ignotus,” is part of a USG plan to soften up the American people for attempted occupation of the Arabian Peninsula. The Kennedy proposal to stop arms deliveries to the Persian Gulf is considered part of this strategy. In an extraordinarily bitter outburst, Shams said that from now on the Arabs must consider the United States as “an extension of Israel”; as “Israel’s tool in the Middle East.”
[1½ lines not declassified]
11. Comment: Neither our allies who see themselves in the position of picking up the pieces of the military/commercial empire we have carefully constructed here since the October War, nor our enemies who see us voluntarily giving up our influence in the Arabian Peninsula, will be particularly unhappy with these developments. There is not too much we can do here to counter the inflammatory stories out of Washington. You will have to handle them. We will, of course, do what we can to keep the Saudis calm.
12. Information requested:
A) Who is Colonel David Berg? Why does he need a visa for Saudi Arabia?
B) We have heard nothing about the reaction of the Saudi team in Washington to all this. How did they take the cancellation of the Simon/Aba al-Khail press conference? The formal announcements which we [Page 462] have received in our news bulletins are fine; but there must have been some private reaction. If not, I suspect the Saudis are holding it in and I’ll get an ear-full when they come back.
13. Action I will take here:
A) I will see Prince Sultan, Prince Fahd and Omar Shams soon; ask them to remain calm; tell them they must not allow themselves the gratification of an open or hostile reaction to the threats and statements from individuals in the United States. This could only make matters worse and would play into the hands of those who want to disrupt our relations. The administration attaches great importance to good relations with Saudi Arabia; many Members of Congress share this opinion, as does the overwhelming mass of American businessmen.
B) I will ask Sultan to give a visa to Colonel Berg, provided he is a bona fide U.S. officer on official business.
C) I will ask all of them to continue to support actions to relax the Israeli boycott. Anything they do will not necessarily be interpreted as yielding to U.S. pressure in this field; they had, after all, considered relaxation long before the latest attacks on them.
D) I will continue to work on the Embassy and ConGen compound problem. But I do not think there will be much chance of success soon. (I can imagine the reaction in NEA/EX if faced with a $100 million bill for facilities in Saudi Arabia.) I had earlier suggested that the Saudis give us free-hold to the land, and I thought this idea was catching on until the recent stories from Washington.
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Summary: Akins reported on the Saudi reaction to a perceived “anti-Saudi” campaign in the U.S. press.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750073–0428. Secret; Stadis. The reference telegram was not found. The Department responded that it gave Akin’s comments “serious consideration” in telegram 48750 to Jidda, March 5. (Ibid., D750076–0380) In its March 1975, issue, Harper’s ran an anonymous article entitled “Seizing Arab Oil.” The article formed the subject of telegram 1887 from Jidda, March 17, in which Akins described Saudi concern—as expressed to IBRD President Robert McNamara—that no U.S. official had condemned the article. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and Africa, Box 29, Saudi Arabia—State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis (6)) Akins repeated the substance of Saudi concerns in telegram 2407 from Jidda, April 3. (Ibid.) On April 13, he sent a paper, entitled “War for Oil: Armageddon as Fun City” to posts worldwide, expanding on these points. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, footnote 3, Document 52.
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